Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February of 2022, significant existing fractures, especially on the right, have been exposed in American foreign policy. Democrats have largely aligned behind the policy of the Biden Administration, which has been one of strong rhetorical support though with often-lackluster material aid and an inordinate fear of “escalation.” That term has been the bugbear of the political right when it comes to this conflict, dividing traditionally hawkish Republicans from populist isolationists, who seek a much more limited American role abroad. Both groups criticize Biden’s Ukraine policy but for vastly divergent rationales: one because it is too weak and the other because it is too strong.
While the hawks complain that the White House has failed to deliver military aid in a timely and efficient manner, other Republicans are concerned that supporting Ukraine, in addition to dragging the U.S. into an unnecessary conflict, could potentially spark WWIII. This line of rhetoric, particularly with an impending second Trump Administration, may come to increasingly shape foreign policy.
Escalation is not a one-way street, yet these critics ignore the bigger half of the issue – constant Russian aggression – to focus narrowly and unfairly on Ukraine. This approach is detached from the reality of warfare in general, ignores the specific path of this conflict, lends undue credence to nuclear saber-rattling, and blames America for the belligerence of our enemies.
First, this inordinate fear of World War III and nuclear exchange is disconnected from how escalation dynamics actually work in modern conflict. For a conflict to de-escalate to a point where it is stable enough to reach a sustainable endgame, both sides must be deterred from further escalation. If one side sees it as in their interest to continue fighting, peace will not be reached. Counterintuitively, this often requires greater escalation (escalation dominance) to create a deterrent effect; each belligerent must understand that unacceptable costs will be imposed by continuing. But that escalation – or threat thereof – must be credible to the opposing faction to be successful. Warfare, particularly the existential kind in which Ukraine is currently embroiled, is not something that can be carefully micromanaged. Restrictions on warfighting are counterproductive, only serving to disadvantage the restricted side by reducing the credibility of its threats of escalation. And that prolongs wars and increases their potential to broaden, not the reverse.
Second, the Russo-Ukrainian War in particular has not been the story of Ukrainian escalation against Russia, but Russian aggression towards Ukraine. The current stage of the war began when Russia launched an unprovoked full-scale invasion in February 2022, intended to topple the government in Kyiv and turn the country into a pliant satrapy. Russia has attacked civilian targets, razed Ukrainian cities, massacred innocents, taken children captive, and interdicted food shipments. It has used ballistic missiles, naval bombardment, carpet bombing, and even North Korean auxiliary fighters. Ukraine, supplied by the West and at a major disadvantage in terms of total soldiers and firepower, has been restrained in response. It has barely attacked Russian positions in Russia, largely due to arbitrary constraints imposed by its sponsors, especially the United States. The reason Kyiv has been able to remain in this war is in spite of these restrictions: it has innovated tactically and technologically, as well as taking big chances on impressive attacks in the Black Sea, the Kursk salient, and against Russian military infrastructure. Some analysts claim this opportunistic and gutsy Ukrainian response to overwhelming Russian aggression is a “maximalist” strategy bringing doom to the world; the reality is precisely opposed, as a maximalist strategy of deterrent-creating escalation would have Ukraine in a far better position than it is today.
Third, the World War III predictors constantly buy into every rhetorical threat of nuclear escalation on the part of Vladimir Putin, allowing Russia to deter Ukraine and the West via belligerent speech. Moscow has set red line after red line, from the provision of main battle tanks, long-range fires, and fighter jets to Ukrainian incursions into pre-war Russian territory and the sinking of Russian naval vessels. They backed each of those hardline stances with ever-increasing nuclear saber-rattling. Yet none of those eventual actions, even if deterred for months, were responded to with any sort of serious force on the part of Moscow. These were empty threats from the beginning, but they worked, hence why they have continued apace.
The same pundits also accuse America, via NATO expansion, of having caused the war in the first place. They argue that the growth of a purely voluntary defensive alliance in the former Warsaw Pact violated a nonexistent ‘commitment’ made to Russia after the Cold War and created an untenable security threat on Moscow’s border. In reality, the voluntary accession to NATO by nations formerly under the boot of Soviet oppression is a logical response to the long-term historical danger of Russian expansionism – one that has repeatedly proven destructive over the past few centuries. Ukraine is the one being threatened by Russia, not vice versa. It is Russia that has subjugated, starved, and invaded Ukraine in recurring attempts to destroy it, not the reverse. It is an aggressive Moscow that poses a security risk to its peaceful European neighbors, not a defensive-minded NATO acting against Russia.
Not only are these doomsayers harming Ukrainian defense and self-deterring American action, but they are also endangering our national security across a wide variety of theaters. Showing our adversaries that we will cower in response to any nuclear threat is an incentive for more nuclear threats and greater proliferation. Russia, China, and North Korea all have nuclear weapons and a good reason to threaten us to achieve their geopolitical aims. Other enemy and rogue regimes, including Iran and its terrorist proxies, would only be incentivized to pursue weapons of mass destruction.
The Soviet Union similarly engaged in nuclear brinksmanship, constantly provoking American reaction and testing our red lines. This included the Cuban Missile Crisis, testing weapons of mass destruction regularly, and supplying and reinforcing our enemies. Nikita Khrushchev’s infamous 1956 “we will bury you” speech is probably the most well-known example of this phenomenon.
America cannot be made to back down every time Putin intimates he will use nuclear weapons; if that became our policy, it would be completely impossible to deter Russia from anything. We are the primary world power and should not forget our own large nuclear arsenal. This is not to encourage belligerence generally, but that we should respond in kind to our foes so as to preclude further aggression on their part: escalating to de-escalate. But this strategy, one that worked to win us the Cold War, is incomprehensible to those who would cry ‘World War III’ at the earliest opportunity.