Executive Summary:
- On June 12, RBC-Ukraine, citing a source in the Ukrainian government, reported that the United States had provided Kyiv with information indicating that Russia was preparing a potential Oreshnik strike in the coming days.
- This warning, which has so far not come to fruition, comes amid a string of Russian setbacks, including a scaled-back May 9 Victory Day parade, Ukrainian drone attacks amid the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, failed influence efforts in Armenia’s elections, and the Oreshnik’s poor performance in previous launches.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to dismiss evidence of military and economic difficulties, including battlefield communication shortcomings, budget strains, and falling external investment into Russia, reinforcing concerns that Kremlin decision-making is becoming detached from Russia’s worsening realities.
On June 12, RBC-Ukraine, citing a source in the Ukrainian government, reported that the United States had provided Kyiv with information indicating that Russia was preparing a potential Oreshnik strike (RBC-Ukraine, June 12). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy focused on this threat in his address to Ukrainians that day, but only a few Russian media sources covered the topic (Vzglyad, June 12). Two days before the previous Oreshnik strike on May 24, the Russian Foreign Ministry advised Western diplomats to evacuate from Kyiv, which they firmly refused to do (Nastoyashee Vremya, May 26). That strike was so imprecise that Russian President Vladimir Putin described it as a test, even though he bragged about his new “wonder-weapon” in October 2025 and in January of this year. During the May attack, warheads landed near Bila Tserkva, some 80 kilometers (49.7 miles) south of Kyiv, and others ended up near Avdiivka in the Russian-occupied Donetsk oblast (Meduza, November 22, 2024; see EDM, January 13).
This latest Oreshnik warning is particularly alarming because of the recent sequence of setbacks in Russian domestic and foreign policy. The first was Russia’s curtailed May 9 World War II Victory Day parade, which, even in its truncated form, was made possible only by the U.S.-led ceasefire (Radio Svoboda, May 11). Then, the June 3–6 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) was shaken by Ukrainian drone attacks on the opening and closing days (Forbes.ru, June 10; The Moscow Times, June 13). The Kremlin then canceled its annual June 12 concert on the Red Square for Russia’s national day (MSK1.ru, June 12). In May, Putin’s official visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) did not yield the long-planned agreement to construct the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline and left the impression of asymmetry turning into Russian dependency on the PRC. Putin sought to disprove this perception at the SPIEF, but many of his claims about the Russian economy, including saying that Russia is increasing its high-tech exports, are false (The Insider, June 12).
Moscow sought to demonstrate its capacity to influence political developments in the South Caucasus in the parliamentary elections in Armenia. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, however, succeeded in withstanding this pressure (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 7; Novaya Gazeta Europe, June 8). Putin did not congratulate Pashinyan, though other regional leaders did so, including Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Mainstream Russian media emphasized alleged irregularities in the Armenian elections, and only a few Russian expert comments acknowledged the results as a setback for Moscow (Kommersant, June 9). The Kremlin’s inability to prevent Pashinyan’s victory underscores the deep erosion of Russia’s position in the post-Soviet region (see EDM, June 5; Carnegie Politika, June 10).
The course of Russia’s war against Ukraine is the main driver of Russia’s declining influence. The tide of Russia’s war has turned heavily to Moscow’s disadvantage since the start of the year, particularly in the fast-evolving drone warfare (Re: Russia, June 9). Against mounting evidence, Putin continues to insist that Russia holds the strategic initiative and keeps advancing every day in all directions (Izvestiya, June 13). This departure from reality has become so stark that even Russian jingoist pundits are warning about the risks of misinformation from their commander-in-chief (TopWar.ru, June 11). The problem is not in fake reports from the General Staff, but in Putin’s resolute rejection of data that does not fit his perspective on Russia’s steady march to victory. In a recent meeting with veterans, he dismissed their persistent requests to improve battlefield communication systems and asserted that the new grouping of Russian satellites worked better than Starlink (Kommersant, June 13). In April, Russia made three successful space launches and deployed about a dozen military satellites in low orbit, though one has already expired. The scale of this program, however, is far below the demand for real-time combat intelligence, and its continuation is hampered by explosions at Roscosmos plants (The Moscow Times, June 8; Fontanka.ru, June 9).
Putin also refuses to heed his ministers’ warnings about the depth of Russia’s budget crisis, which has not been assuaged by higher oil prices since the start of the Iran conflict (Meduza, June 9). The final version of the budget approved late last year kept the deficit manageable by reducing war-related expenditures. In reality, however, these have expanded to 65 percent of Russia’s expenditures (The Moscow Times, June 13). Official data shows an unprecedented 15 percent decline in investment activity in the first quarter of this year, but Putin insists that this is incidental, and not indicative of a larger trend (Re: Russia, June 12). Elvira Nabiullina, chief of Russia’s Central Bank, is one of the few officials daring to deliver bad news to Putin, and her disappearance from public functions in recent weeks may signal a shift toward a more rigidly militarized economic policy (Riddle, June 13).
Russia’s progressing economic and strategic stagnation is quite apparent to the Europeans, who are developing a joint position with the Ukrainians on bringing the war to an end (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 9). The European–Ukrainian conditions, starting from the immediate ceasefire, are much tougher than the “understandings” that Putin presumes were reached at the Alaska summit in August 2025 (Carnegie Politika, June 8). Putin’s attempts to invoke the “spirit of Anchorage” upset even war-mongering bloggers and indicate a failure to grasp the best opportunity to end combat operations on satisfactory terms (TopCor.ru, June 6; The Moscow Times, June 13).
On the morning of June 15, a massive Russian missile strike hit Kyiv. No use of the Oreshnik has been reported, however. Technical problems could have delayed the launch, but Putin is also likely considering the possible reactions of the Group of Seven (G7) summit in France. The summit will likely focus on the agreement to end the Iran conflict and to open the Strait of Hormuz, though that remains uncertain. Putin’s refusal to reckon with strategic and economic realities is increasingly at odds with the preferences of Russian elites, but he is trapped by his denials and braggadocio. This senseless course is certain to produce more problems for Russia, and one of them may become the last straw that breaks the enfeebled back of his regime.
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