Executive Summary:
- Moscow’s war against Ukraine is driving Russian economic decline and decreased support for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Disagreements about post-war economic and political structures structure of Russia portend increased elite infighting and instability.
- Russia’s increased restrictions on the internet and messaging apps are leading to criticism even from groups within the elite, staunch supporters of the war, and pro-government media outlets.
- Putin’s United Russia party is losing support amid economic strain from the war and divisions within the elite, leading to increased chances of protests and instability and continued authoritarian rule following the end of the war.
Mounting evidence suggests that Moscow’s war against Ukraine is turning to Russia’s detriment. This is manifested not only in the theater of war, but also in the state of the Russian economy (see EDM, March 2, April 13). An increasing number of independent sociologists note that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rating is falling amid internal problems and foreign policy failures (see EDM, April 7, 13, 14, 21, 23 [1], [2]). The Kremlin’s policies of blocking messaging apps and imposing internet shutdowns are adding to this decline (see EDM, April 7, 23). Russians are especially alarmed by Putin’s unwillingness to alter course and the Kremlin’s reliance on repression of any manifestation of dissent (see EDM, April 7). This has drawn criticism even from serious groups within the elite, including staunch supporters of the war.
Russian internet portal “Military Review”—which is close to the Russian Ministry of Defense—published an article on April 14 titled “Sovereign AI on imported chips” about the impossibility of creating a “sovereign internet.” The article has since been taken down from the portal. (See Russkiy Dnepropetrovsk, April 14, for a reposted version of the article. See Topwar.ru, April 14, for the original link that has since been removed.) The article argues that it is impossible to create a “sovereign internet” in a country where the entire cycle of computer manufacturing and artificial intelligence (AI) development is completely dependent on foreign producers. This includes the design and production of microchips, neural network architecture, training datasets, and infrastructure. The article highlights,
All Russian supercomputers featured in the TOP500 list are built on NVIDIA and AMD platforms … Taiwan’s TSMC manufactured the ‘Elbrus’ and ‘Baikal’ processors. After 2022, TSMC simply shut its doors. Production ground to a halt. We lack the lithography capabilities to produce even 28-nanometer chips—let alone the 7- or 5-nanometer nodes upon which modern AI relies.
Creating one’s own AI without drawing on global scientific advancements is impossible. Russia is itself, however, cutting off its access to such advancements by designating leading Western universities as “undesirable organizations” (RBC, April 10).
Ultra-conservative Russian television channel “Tsargrad” also unexpectedly came out in favor of Internet freedom. It noted, “The accelerated construction of digital sovereignty, under the leadership of the Ministry of Digital Development, has already led to alarming consequences—ranging from technological dependence on Chinese components to panic within the banking sector” (Тsargrad, April 12). The Russian government appears not to be paying attention to these signals as it continues its assault on the Internet. At the beginning of April, the Russian Ministry of Digital Development began to develop proposals to restrict Internet provider licenses, which will lead to the exit from the market of the few telecom operators at the municipal and regional levels (Izvestiya, April 2). The Association of Regional Small Telecom Operators has already protested these initiatives, sending a formal appeal to Putin, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, and Russian Prosecutor General Aleksandr Gutsan (Istories.media, April 14).
Independent media reports that sources within the Presidential Administration, speaking anonymously, admit that the security services’ actions to block the Internet are highly unpopular (Verstka.media, March 27). This pertains not only to practical inconveniences, but also to the outlook for upcoming elections (see EDM, April 14, 21). The limitations are leading to a decline in the popularity of Putin’s United Russia party, even though the responsibility for election results lies with Kremlin political strategists. Some of these strategists do not support the blockages and continue to operate on Telegram. Neither deputies nor the government officials, however, will openly oppose Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). The emerging situation clearly sharpens the conflict between the security services and the Russian Presidential Administration (Verstka.media, March 27).
Telegram channels linked to the latter openly note that economic repression and labor market contraction strengthen protest sentiment among a population normally loyal to the government (Telegram/@russiaRU, April 14). Independent journalists also note this tendency. An article from the independent Verskta portal says that anxiety and frustration are growing among the “core electorate” of United Russia—namely, older people, women over 55, low-income citizens, and the residents of small towns. Political strategists acknowledge these difficulties, although for the time being do not consider them critical (Verstka.media, April 3).
Increased internet restrictions at a time when support for the Kremlin is declining could lead to more outward protests for ending Moscow’s prolonged war against Ukraine and instability across Russia (see EDM, April 7, 13, 23). Mikhail Troitskiy, a professor at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, suggests in an article for Re-Russia four possible scenarios for the development of post-war Russia (Re-Russia.net, March 16). Maintaining internal stability and the possibility of achieving the war’s stated objectives—the occupation of regions of Ukraine and the limitation of its sovereignty—are the primary factors determining which scenario will happen. Analyzing various combinations of these factors, Troitskiy concludes that a serious transformation of the Kremlin regime is likely in just one of four scenarios, in which it fails to achieve its military objectives, leading to internal instability. Otherwise, the Russian regime will remain a repressive dictatorship. Should the military objectives not be achieved or should serious rifts emerge within the elites, however, Troitskiy opines that the Kremlin will be forced, at the very least, to seek to normalize its relations with Western countries (Re-Russia.net, March 16).
Russian society’s and the elite’s attitudes depend on the government’s success in “selling” the cessation of hostilities against Ukraine as a “victory.” It is, however, quite difficult to predict how this would be accomplished. Internal stability and an intensification of elite infighting following the end of the war appear to be the most likely scenario (Re-Russia.net, March 16). Contradictions within Russia among the FSB, the military, radical patriots, big business, and the Kremlin’s “technocrats” are growing, creating the very “internal instability” which could destabilize the regime once the war ends.
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