Executive Summary:
- Two important conferences on overseas Chinese affairs work in July signaled that the Party’s united front work is set to ramp up in the coming years, as Beijing aims to deepen political control over the 60 million citizens who live outside the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
- On July 13, politburo standing committee member Wang Huning told the 400 assembled delegates from 140 countries and regions at 11th World Conference of Overseas Chinese Associations that they must promote national unification. Many of the delegates interviewed affirmed their plans to work to support this key Party priority upon returning to their respective countries of residence.
- At the National Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs Work—the first since 2017—United Front Work Department head Li Ganjie delivered Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s instructions on this “long-term and strategic task of the Party and the State.” These focused in particular on leveraging the talents and the commercial networks of overseas Chinese to support the domestic economic progress.
July 2026 was an important month for the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) overseas united front work. On July 13, the 11th World Conference of Overseas Chinese Associations (第十一届世界华侨华人社团联谊大会) began in Beijing, with over 400 invitees—all leaders of overseas Chinese associations—streaming in from 140 countries and regions. The conferences were attended by both Wang Huning (王沪宁), who heads the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and sits on the politburo standing committee, and Li Ganjie (李干杰), a member of the politburo who runs the Party’s United Front Work Department (Xinhua, July 13). Two weeks later, on July 27–8, Beijing hosted another event, the National Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs Work (全国侨务工作会议). Wang and Li were both in attendance again, and both delivered remarks (Xinhua, July 28).
The confluence of these two events was “no coincidence” (并非偶然), as commentators in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) observed, yet neither has received much coverage in non-Chinese media (Shaanxi Institute of Socialism, July 30). The latter event was particularly notable. It was the first such conference held since 2017, and so the first since the 2018 organizational reforms under which the Party’s united front work departments at all levels subsumed their corresponding overseas Chinese affairs offices (China Brief, April 28, 2018, October 7, 2024; People’s Daily, February 18, 2017, July 27). As such, it provided a rare platform for the Party to shape overseas united front work for the years ahead, incorporating feedback canvassed from the visiting overseas Chinese leaders earlier in the month.
At these conferences, the Party leadership delivered Xi’s “important instructions” (重要指示) on “what overseas Chinese affairs work should do and how it should be done in the new era” (新时代侨务工作做什么、怎么做), according to Yan Miao (晏淼), Director of the United Front Work Department’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau (People’s Daily Overseas Edition, July 29). In practice, these instructions will lead to an expansion of united front work—including political work—beyond the PRC’s borders, further efforts to standardize and deepen coordination between overseas organizations, and more work to make it easier for overseas Chinese to increase their commercial engagement with the PRC.
Political Work for Political Goals
The principal concern for foreign governments when it comes to overseas Chinese affairs work is that it is inherently political. While it is undoubtedly the case that a great deal of the activities of overseas Chinese organizations is legitimate and has real and positive effects in terms of providing community, resources, and services to PRC nationals living overseas, this is not the principal reason for this work.
The clearest clue to the political purpose of overseas Chinese affairs work is the involvement of the highest levels of the Party in managing it. As state media points out, Xi Jinping views overseas Chinese affairs as a “matter of great national importance” (国之大者) (Xinhua, July 28). And as almost every article covering the two conferences makes sure to note, overseas Chinese affairs work is a “long-term and strategic task of the Party and the State” (党和国家一项长期性、战略性工作) (People’s Daily, July 27). The “Regulations on the United Front Work of the CCP” (中国共产党统一战线工作条例) also make this clear, stipulating that the main task of overseas united front work is to “strengthen ideological and political guidance” (加强思想政治引领) (Xinhua, January 5, 2021).
Some Chinese scholars are even more explicit about the political nature of this work, and about its increasing importance today. In an article for China Youth Daily, which is published by the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China, Wu Xingchen (吴星辰), a professor at Tianjin Academy of Socialism, writes that overseas Chinese affairs work is “first and foremost political work; its political nature is its primary attribute” (首先是政治工作，政治性是其第一属). Wu goes on to argue that this work is even more necessary in the new era, where it “must more consciously serve the central tasks of the Party and the country” (必须更加自觉服务党和国家中心大局). In his view, this is now starting to happen. He says that this work has “already transcended the traditional meaning of managing overseas Chinese affairs, becoming an important strategic fulcrum for the united front to unite people’s hearts and gather strength in the new era” (已经超越传统意义上的侨务事务管理，成为新时代统一战线凝聚人心、汇聚力量的重要战略支点) (China Youth Daily, August 3).
The political benefits for the Party that could come from exerting more influence on overseas Chinese are substantial. By its own count, there are more than 60 million overseas Chinese across nearly 200 countries and regions, as well as more than 40 million “returned overseas Chinese and relatives of overseas Chinese” (归侨侨眷) in the PRC. For the Party, these 100 million people constitute assets to be deployed in service of national goals: they are a “valuable resource” (宝贵资源), according to Xi, who speaks approvingly of their value for increasing the country’s wealth and power, often praising the “abundant economic power, rich intellectual resources, and extensive business networks” (雄厚的经济实力、丰富的智力资源、广泛的商业人脉) of the “vast number of overseas Chinese” (广大海外侨胞) (People’s Daily, July 27).
In the Party’s eyes, overseas Chinese affairs work is channeled toward achieving its principal goal: realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which Xi Jinping has long evinced is “the common dream of all Chinese people at home and abroad” (海内外中华儿女共同的梦), and from which overseas Chinese “cannot and will not be absent” (海外侨胞不能也不会缺席). To this end, overseas Chinese affairs has been tied explicitly to a number of the Party’s seven national development strategies, which are enshrined in the Party Charter (Party Members Net, October 22, 2022; China Brief, September 26, 2025). The People’s Daily notes that local governments and relevant departments have closely integrated the promotion of overseas Chinese affairs with the Rejuvenation through Science and Education Development Strategy (科教兴国战略), the Talent Strong Country Development Strategy (人才强国战略), and the Innovation-Driven Development Strategy (创新驱动发展战略) (People’s Daily, July 27, [1], [2]).
One of the most concerning aspects of national rejuvenation as a policy goal is that it includes what the Party calls “China’s unification” (中国统一), or the “unification of the ancestral homeland” (祖国统一) as a necessary condition for its achievement (People’s Daily Overseas Edition, July 29). In practice, this means the annexation of Taiwan. The Party sees Taiwan—which the PRC has never controlled—as the “core of its core interests” (核心利益中的核心), and unification features prominently not just in its messaging to overseas Chinese groups, but also in the messaging of those groups themselves (Xinhua, May 7). For instance, a senior official in the China Zhigong Party (致公党) recently noted that Xi had emphasized the need to “actively serve the great cause of national unification” (积极服务祖国统一大业), and that his party would “fully leverage its extensive overseas connections, unite overseas Chinese, returned overseas Chinese, their families, and students studying abroad” (充分发挥同海外联系广泛的优势，团结海外侨胞、归侨侨眷和留学人员) in its pursuit (People’s Daily Overseas Edition, July 29). Similarly, Zhang Changbao (张常豹), president of the French Association for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification of China (法国中国和平统一促进会会长), who attended the conference in July, said that the it had “strengthened his determination and confidence in promoting China’s unification” (坚定了促进中国统一的决心和信心) (China News Network, July 17).
Building a Stronger United Front
Much of the discourse surrounding the two conferences in July focused on practical ways in which overseas Chinese affairs work could be improved. An article in Quishi lays out some current weaknesses. Noting that the grassroots workforce is relatively insufficient, it calls for strengthening coordination, innovating new working methods, and building more diverse platforms and approaches for providing services to overseas Chinese. (Qiushi, July 29). Some suggestions from the first conference focused on improving the institutions and organizations that are part of the wider united front system. For instance, Zheng Jinbiao (郑金标), an overseas Chinese leader based in France, said that he planned to promote the “standardized development” (规范发展) of overseas Chinese associations (Europe Times, July 15). Others focused instead on attracting more talent and youth. One article says that this is a “key focus” (关注重点)for major overseas Chinese organizations (WeChat/Fujian Overseas Chinese Daily, July 16).
Many of the policy directives that have come out of the conferences seek to encourage overseas Chinese to do more business with the PRC. This would lead to direct economic benefits for the PRC, but it would also help to “better unite the hearts and efforts of overseas Chinese” (更好凝聚侨心侨力). In other words, it would create additional points of leverage for the Party (People’s Daily, July 27). To this end, a lot of coverage focuses on the Foreign Investment Law and related regulations, improving support for overseas Chinese-funded enterprises, developing the Shantou Overseas Chinese Economic and Cultural Cooperation Pilot Zone in Guangdong, building industrial clusters and innovation bases catering to the overseas Chinese business community, encouraging overseas Chinese to participate in the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, and other similar proposals.
Beijing hopes that by extending these preferential policies, it can then “leverage geographical and kinship advantages” (发挥地缘、亲缘优势) to pursue its strategic goals domestically, and externally that it can “guide” (引导) overseas Chinese to “convey China’s voice well” (传递好中国声音) by toeing the Party’s propaganda line (CPPCC, November 10, 2025; People’s Daily, July 27).
Conclusion
The 11th World Conference of Overseas Chinese Associations and the National Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs were landmark events in the development of the Party’s overseas united front work. All indicators from these events of the last few weeks point toward an aggressive expansion of this work in the months and years ahead. The readouts of the conferences and related commentaries are unambiguous in portraying overseas Chinese affairs work as political work on behalf of the Party and in support of its broader strategic ambitions.
That neither of these events have received attention outside of the PRC suggests that much of the Party’s overseas influence work continues to operate without an appropriate level of scrutiny. The Party believes that all overseas Chinese are unofficial ambassadors for the PRC, are “committed to high-level scientific and technological self-reliance and innovation” (锚定高水平科技自立自强，矢志创新攻关), and must present a “trustworthy, lovable, and respectable image of China” (可信、可爱、可敬的中国形象). The Party does not speak for all of those individuals, and Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” is not shared as widely as he might wish. For now, however, he appears to feel as though the Party’s efforts are paying off.
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