Does Just War teaching, which calls for a probability of success, require Ukraine to submit to terms favorable to Russia?
This Providence article and this First Things article say yes.
But Just War teaching does not ask for an outnumbered nation under attack automatically to surrender or agree to highly unfavorable terms.
There are other considerations besides the size of contending forces. Larger nations do not automatically prevail against smaller nations. The latter are often better organized, better equipped, better led, more motivated, more unified, are wealthier per capita, have geographic advantages or better allies.
The other considerations include whether conditions under submission or unfavorable terms would be worse than under war, whether the “peace” would only be prelude to further war, and whether there is a duty to allies or wider humanity to continue to resist. A nation facing extreme oppression, slavery or extermination will prefer to fight against great odds. And a nation, even realizing likely defeat, may see the moral imperative of resisting the aggressor so that future likely victim nations have more time to prepare.
Belgium in 1914 knew it could not successfully resist the impending German invasion when Germany requested peaceful passage for its troops attacking France. But it dutifully resisted both for honor and to assist France. Belgium’s heroic resistance, at great cost, called “the rape of Belgium,” also motivated Britain’s entrance into the war.
Britain in 1940, after France’s fall, stood alone against a Nazi occupied Europe. It barely had an army after Dunkirk. Surrendering French collaborator Marshal Petain predicted Britain’s neck would be wrung like a chicken within a week. As Churchill later told Canada’s parliament: “Some chicken! Some neck! Britain fought on because Nazi victory was too monstrous to abide. And Churchill explained that surrendering nations rarely recover, but fighting nations, even if defeated, can later resurrect.
Earlier, in 1939, Poland resisted German invasion even though outmanned and outgunned. Poland knew Germany wanted to eradicate their nation. Quick surrender was unacceptable. While Germany, joined by the Soviets, occupied Poland, and Polish armies surrendered, the Polish government escaped to London where resistance could continue. Several years ago I met an elderly Polish WWII veteran who said he never doubted, even amid imprisonment and horrors, that the Allies would win. “We listened to the BBC,” he explained.
Other victims of Hitler made similar choices. Norway, tiny in population compared to Germany, fought Germany’s invasion longer than any other eventually fully occupied nation. Racially acceptable to the Nazis, the Norwegians did not, like the Poles, face physical extermination. But honor, anger, and abhorrence of Nazi outrages forbade surrender or coming to terms requiring collaboration. Norway’s king and parliament escaped north literally under fire, ultimately relocating to London, from which the Norwegian underground was directed.
France in 1940 officially capitulated. But French Deputy War Minister Charles de Gaulle escaped to London to organize a Free French force that became France’s legitimate government. Through bluster and defiance, French honor was preserved for post-war France.
Israel, of course, was heavily outnumbered in 1947, 1967 and 1973 by multiple Arab armies and yet never considered submission or crippling peace terms. With its national existence at stake, Israel fought with little alternative. Prime Minister Golda Meir said she would die in Tel Aviv before leaving. General Ben Gurion suffered a panic attack during Syrian advances in the Golan. Israel had America as an ally in 1973 but not earlier. Even alone, Israel was more motivated, better led, and typically better armed.
None of these defiant, outnumbered nations violated Just War teaching by not seeking peace terms with the aggressors. Even when defeated in the battlefield, their continued defiance ensured their longterm national futures and/or assisted stronger allies who could prevail.
As to whether Ukraine should surrender or submit to Russia under negative terms, its situation is superior to the above described nations during their duress. It is geographically larger than all of them with more room for losses and maneuver. Its population remains motivated. It has against great odds resisted a much larger power for three years. Russia has suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties, relies on conscripts, prison inmates and mercenaries, and shows little ability to break the gridlock, despite its terror attacks on civilians by missiles and drones. Ukraine, even if losing America, under its current president, as an ally, still has far more allies than Russia. Domestic support in Russia for Putin’s war is impossible to measure accurately since all dissent is criminalized. But Russians on the attack are almost certainly less motivated than Ukrainians under attack.
Ukrainians know Putin wants to eradicate their nationhood and subsume their democracy under his dictatorship. Who can blame them for defiance? They may also feel some duty to resist on behalf of other potential Putin victims, like the Baltics.
The two articles supporting USA presidential pressure on Ukraine do not acknowledge any of these factors. They assume Ukraine will lose so prolonging the agony causes needless suffering, which Just War teaching argues against. But their counsel actually makes a plausible peace less likely. Russia will not agree to peace under reasonable terms if all USA pressure is on Ukraine. And a Ukraine relying mostly on Europe, without America, can likely sustain war but with any successful conclusion less likely.
USA presidential pressure on Ukraine has so far only encouraged Russia while terrifying Europe, some of whose leaders now speak of nuclear weapons for themselves, knowing America, under the current president, will not back their security. A plausible peace requires incentivizing Russia to accept terms, which is now less likely.
Prudence and Just War teaching counsel seeking reasonable and sustainable peace terms when possible. They do not require Ukraine to surrender or accept terms that cripple its nationhood or only postpone further Russian aggression. The best case scenario might be a truce that freezes current forces in place, without legally recognizing Russia’s occupied territory, while allowing Ukraine time to recover and further solidify its national strength. But that scenario is only possible if Russia knows it cannot gain more.
Tragically, current U.S. policy of pressure only on Ukraine makes such a peace unlikely.