Executive Summary:
- The Kremlin’s December 2025 placement of the Oreshnik missile battalion on combat duty in Belarus is the highest readiness level for potential strikes against Ukraine and Europe. The deployment of up to ten launchers is temporary, while permanent infrastructure remains in Russia.
- Russia’s use of mobile launchers has not been confirmed—Moscow’s January strike on Ukraine’s Lviv Oblast used a stationary launcher in Kapustin Yar, Russia, indicating that the Oreshnik has not been successfully integrated with the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant (MZKT, Минский Завод Колёсных Тягачей, Minskii Zavod Kolësnykh Tiagashei) mobile chassis.
- The missile battalion in Belarus is fully subordinate to Russian Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN, Ракетные Войска Стратегического Назначения, Raketniye Voiska Strategisheskovo Naznacheniia) Main Command, leaving Minsk without real influence over launch orders or target selection but with political and military culpability for potential strikes against Ukraine and Europe.
During his address to the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka confirmed that the Russian Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) system entered combat duty in Belarus on December 17, 2025 (President of Belarus, December 18, 2025). The day before, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that the Oreshnik would enter combat duty by the end of the year, and Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, confirmed the formation of an Oreshnik-equipped missile brigade in Belarus (President of Russia, December 17, 2025; Telegram/@mod_russia, December 18, 2025). These synchronized announcements point to coordinated political and military signaling that the system is transitioning from testing to deployment, projecting new missile and nuclear threats to Ukraine and Europe.
In December 2025, Lukashenka explicitly denied reports of Oreshnik deployment near Slutsk, Belarus (see EDM, December 2, 2025; Interfax, December 19, 2025). The site near Pavlovka in the Slutsk District is purportedly a military-industrial production facility, not a missile site. In 2026, the facility is expected to produce 120,000–180,000 122-millimeter Grad Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and 180,000–270,000 152-millimeter artillery shells, supporting Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and preparations for a potential large-scale conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Belpol, December 21, 2025).
The most recent assessments identify the former Soviet airfield, Krichev-6 in Mogilev oblast, as the likely Oreshnik deployment site inside Belarus, approximately five kilometers (3.1 miles) from Russia’s Smolensk oblast. Satellite imagery shows intensive construction from August 2025, including new buildings and reconstruction of rail lines and stations, aligning with earlier assessments identifying the Chausy–Krichev–Cherikov and Krichev–Bykhov–Kirovsky triangles as potential deployment sites (Reformation, December 27, 2025). Krichev-6 conforms to Russian tactics for mobile missile systems—dense forest cover, low population density, pre-existing Soviet-era military infrastructure, robust road and rail connectivity, layered Russian and Belarusian air defenses, and the absence of water barriers hindering maneuvering (see EDM, March 13, 2025). The Krichev-6 site would allow Oreshnik units to withdraw rapidly into Russian territory following missile launches, placing them under Russia’s nuclear escalation umbrella and complicating the feasibility of limited retaliatory action against them (see EDM, October 2, November 26, 2024, June 26, 2025).
Video footage released by the Belarusian and Russian Defense Ministries on December 30, 2025, documenting the Oreshnik system’s entry into combat duty, provides important insight into the command-and-control structure of the deployment. The ceremony was overseen by Russian Lieutenant Colonel Roman Ostroushko, former commander of a battalion of the 54th Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN, Ракетные Войска Стратегического Назначения, Raketniye Voiska Strategisheskovo Naznacheniia) in Teykovo, which is equipped with Yars Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) (Radio Svaboda, December 31, 2025). Ostroushko confirmed completion of personnel training, operational readiness of combat crews, organization of combat duty according to RVSN manuals and regulations, patrol zone definition, and ongoing reconnaissance.
The ceremony highlighted Russian primacy over Belarus, featuring one Belarusian state flag and three Russian flags—the Russian state flag, the Russian Ministry of Defense flag, and the Russian Strategic Missile Forces flag. Personnel uniforms were mixed, with Russian All-season Field Uniform Set (VKPO, Всесезонный Комплект Полевого Обмундирования, Vsesezonniy Komplekt Polevogo Obmundirovaniia) combat uniforms alongside Belarusian field attire. This visual and organizational composition suggests an integrated formation in which Belarusian forces perform secondary logistical, security, and support functions, while operational control remains firmly in Russian hands (Telegram/@modmilby; Telegram/@mod_russia, December 30, 2025).
The Krichev-6 facility appears subordinated to the RVSN Main Command and to the authority of Putin. This arrangement preserves Moscow’s exclusive prerogative to authorize missile launches against pre-designated and pre-reconnoitered targets. In a crisis scenario, Moscow could formally transfer the unit under the operational control of the Joint Command of Russian and Belarusian Regional Troops Grouping to share political responsibility with Minsk for strikes. The Kremlin has additional flexibility to conduct strikes with reduced transparency, without notifying Washington through the Russian National Center for Nuclear Risk Reduction, because Belarus is not a party to the New START Treaty and the Memorandum of Understanding on Notifications of Missile Launches (see EDM, December 18, 2025). The Russian state news agency, TASS, indirectly confirmed this command structure by withdrawing an “erroneous” statement by Belarusian Defense Minister Viktar Khrenin, who claimed that Belarus would be able to independently designate targets for Oreshnik strikes (TASS, December 23, 2025).
Video from Krichev-6 does not show missile launchers, suggesting deliberate concealment or incomplete integration of Russian missiles with Belarusian Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant chassis. Pavel Podvig, Senior Researcher at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, noted the lack of mobile launchers with missiles and permanent storage and maintenance infrastructure. U.S. analysts, including the Center for Naval Analyses’ Decker Eveleth, assess Krichev-6 as a battalion-level technical base, not a permanent deployment site for Oreshnik (Radiyo Svaboda, December 31, 2025). This interpretation aligns with earlier assessments suggesting that Belarus’ Mogilev oblast hosts temporary positions and combat duty patrol routes rather than permanent basing points likely located in Russia (see EDM, March 13, 2025).
Observed equipment during the Oreshnik combat duty ceremony included a 15V180 command vehicle, 15V240M support vehicles, 15M69M engineering/camouflage vehicle, and Typhoon-K armored escort vehicles (K-63968 or variants). By analogy with Yars and Topol-M missile units, a deployed Oreshnik battalion also likely comprises three autonomous launchers on MZKT-79291 chassis, a 15V190 communications vehicle, a UTM-80M thermal support vehicle, and additional engineering, training, and escort platforms (Military Russia, January 1).
Deputy Head of the General Staff Faculty at the Belarusian Military Academy, Colonel Andrei Bagadzel, confirmed that the first Oreshnik battalion with three launchers has entered combat duty in Belarus. There are plans to expand to a regiment of up to ten launchers, potentially evolving into a division under the Union State framework as a response to Germany’s deployment of U.S. Typhon IRBMs (RIA Novosti, December 23, 2025). Alternative assessments argue that Belarus is more likely to host a highly autonomous missile brigade with 9–12 launchers, which—unlike standard Russian Mobile Ground-based Missile Systems (PGRK, Подвижный Грунтовый Ракетный Комплекс, Podvizhnyi Gruntovyi Raketnyi Kompleks), regiments reliant on divisional engineering and logistical support—would provide greater mobility, self-sufficiency, and operational autonomy (Telegram/@milioptimist, December 22, 2025).
Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces, Paval Muraveika, confirmed that Belarus has designated combat patrol areas for Oreshnik. Belarus and Russia have linked crews and geodetic coordinates to ensure rapid and accurate deployment and minimize missile launch preparation time, marking the system’s highest state of readiness (RIA Novosti, December 26, 2025). Muraveika previously described Belarus’s security environment as “even more complex than in June 1941,” on the eve of World War II, framing preparations—including Russian tactical nuclear weapons and Oreshnik deployment—as deterrence against potential Western aggression (BelTA, December 9, 2025). Khrenin reinforced this stance, stating that Oreshnik, capable of nuclear and conventional strikes up to 5,000 kilometers (3,107 miles), is a defensive response to NATO’s preparations against Belarus and Russia. Khrenin framed Oreshnik’s positioning in Belarus as a reaction to Western “aggression” against Belarus with no intent for an attack from Minsk (BelTA, December 26, 2025).
RVSN Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Igor Fazletdinov, and retired colonels Sergey Tarazevich and Alexander Reznik from the Russian Ministry of Defense’s fourth Central Research Institute, explained the role of non-nuclear weapons such as Avangard and Oreshnik in Russia’s defense in the December 2025 issue of the Russian Ministry of Defense-affiliated journal, Military Thought (Военная Мысль, Voennaia Mysl’). According to Fazletdinov, Tarazevich, and Reznik, non-nuclear high-precision systems are not intended to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary. Their ability to engage critical targets on enemy territory provides a deterrent against “aggression” toward Russia. These authors believe that early use of these systems in a conflict could effectively counter aggression and compel an adversary to cease hostilities under conditions favorable to Russia. Non-nuclear strategic systems, unlike nuclear weapons, do not carry an immediate risk of triggering global nuclear war, making them a more acceptable instrument for achieving the Kremlin’s military objectives. The authors assert, however, that strategic nuclear forces remain the primary means of deterring aggression against Russia, with no viable alternative available. High-precision conventional systems within the RVSN can strike critical enemy infrastructure, causing significant damage to military and energy assets, thereby deterring aggression and facilitating Russia’s version of “de-escalation” (RG.RU; RIA Novosti, December 26, 2025; Voennaya Mysl’, December 2025, 85–91).
The second confirmed combat use of Oreshnik on January 8 served as an operational validation of this concept. Russia launched the missile from Kapustin Yar against targets in Ukraine’s Lviv oblast—including the Lviv State Aircraft Repair Plant. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev linked the strike to discussions between Ukraine, Europe, and the United States on security guarantees, asserting Russia would not tolerate foreign troops in Ukraine (X/@MedvedevRussiaE, January 10). The use of a stationary launcher for the recent strike further supports assessments that full integration of Belarusian chassis and Russian missiles remains incomplete.
The Oreshnik deployment in Belarus fits an offensive pattern despite Minsk’s claim that it is purely defensive (see EDM, December 2, 2025). Ukrainian analysts and officials note that Oreshnik’s primary targets are likely Europe, not Ukraine, as much of Ukraine, including Kyiv, lies outside Oreshnik’s minimum engagement range of approximately 700 kilometers (435 miles). From this perspective, Kyiv is roughly 660 kilometers (410 miles) from Belarus’ farthest point and 380 kilometers (236 miles) from Krichev-6, complicating the targeting trajectory (Defence Express, December 19, 2025). Head of Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service Oleh Ivashchenko stated that the deployment aims to pressure Europe and NATO while shielding the system from Ukrainian counterstrikes. Stationing in Belarus also shifts escalation burdens onto Minsk and reduces missile flight times to European targets (Ukrinform, December 13, 2025).
Alternative assessments suggest a shorter minimum range of 500 kilometers (310 miles) combined with northern or northwestern maneuvering actions and/or an increase in the apogee of the missile’s trajectory, which could theoretically bring Kyiv within Oreshnik’s reach from Belarus (Telegram/@infantmilitario, November 21, 2024). Lukashenka claimed Moscow considered striking decision-making centers in Kyiv with Oreshnik, but Putin allegedly rejected the plan, a narrative repeated after a Kremlin-fabricated drone attack on Putin’s Novgorod residence (BelTA, August 22, 2025; BelTA, December 31, 2025; see EDM, January 12).
On the eve of the Lviv strike, Kremlin-aligned experts reinforced escalatory signaling. Igor Korotchenko, editor-in-chief of the Russian National Defense magazine, reacted to the U.S. detention of the Russian-flagged Mariner tanker by calling for an Oreshnik strike against a NATO naval base in the Baltic or North Sea, framing the action as a precursor to nuclear escalation should Western pressure persist (Telegram/@igor_korotchenko, January 7). Retired lieutenant general and State Duma deputy, Andrey Gurulev, advocated for preemptive Oreshnik strikes on European defense-industrial facilities, including Rheinmetall (Telegram/@readovkanews, January 7). Colonel Oleg Ivannikov, an advisor to the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Sciences, included major Ukrainian defense-industrial enterprises and port infrastructure in Odesa oblast used for Western arms deliveries in Oreshnik’s target list (Argumenty i Facty, January 9).
Oreshnik launches from Belarus against Ukrainian or European targets may be preferable for Moscow. Any first retaliatory strikes would primarily affect Belarusian territory and its senior military-political leadership, who continue to publicly claim, contrary to reality, that they select the targets rather than Moscow. Lukashenka continues to deny that the deployment of Oreshnik transforms Belarus into a primary target for an attacking or retaliating adversary, placing the country under constant threat (see EDM, December 2, 2025). He also fails to explain the strategic rationale for deploying such systems in Belarus when, by his own admission, Russia already guarantees the country’s strategic defense (BelTA, December 18, 2025). This contradiction suggests either that the Belarusian leadership lacks genuine insight into Russian operational and strategic intentions or that it is deliberately performing a disinformation function in support of Moscow’s broader objectives.
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