Executive Summary:
- In October, Georgia hosted the fifth edition of the Silk Road Forum, bringing together officials, organizations, and business leaders under the slogan “Invest in Connectivity– Grow in Stability.”
- Attendees largely avoided discussion about geopolitical shifts, Georgia’s democratic backsliding, and political crises, instead focusing on technical infrastructure issues. By stripping politics out of conversations on energy and connectivity, the forum overlooked the forces shaping the region’s future.
- Georgia risks drifting to the margins unless Tbilisi restores strategic alignment with its Western partners and acknowledges the political foundations of connectivity.
The opening session of the 2025 Silk Road Forum in Tbilisi featured the Prime Ministers of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, reflecting the momentum of regional cooperation (Balcani Caucaso, November 3, 2023; Tbilisi Silk Road Forum, October 22). This marked the fifth Silk Road Forum since it began in 2015 and was only the second time that prime ministers from all three states appeared in the same session. Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s remarks, in which he named Georgia’s free trade agreement with the European Union as the key advantage of the country’s investment profile, attracted significant attention in contrast to the ruling Georgian Dream party’s largely anti-EU sentiments from the past few years. Kobakhidze claimed that Georgia’s strategic location, peace, and stability make the country a reliable economic partner (Business Media, October 22). The operationalization of Georgia’s infrastructure projects, including the Middle Corridor, Anaklia Port, and Black Sea Cable, will depend on credible partnerships with the West.
Georgia is currently only nominally a candidate for EU accession due to its autocratization and increased alignment with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Civil.ge, June 11; see Strategic Snapshot, October 9). Georgia has more political prisoners per capita than Russia and is far from both stability and EU accession (1TV, October 20). Since 2024, Georgian Dream has held elections marred by voter pressure and Russian manipulation, violently suppressed pro-democracy protests, enacted illiberal laws, and suspended EU accession talks. During the Silk Road Forum, amid Western sanctions on Georgia and the threat of losing a visa-free regime with the European Union, Kobakhidze expressed high hopes for future joint projects with Brussels, such as the Black Sea Undersea Electric Cable initiative (Civil Georgia, July 10; Business Media, October 22).
Following Kobakhidze’s remarks, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan noted how the histories of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan have long been intertwined, especially in the context of losing and regaining independence from the Soviet Union. Pashinyan’s speech came across as a warning about the risks of involvement with Russia (Prime Minister of Armenia, October 22). Pashinyan additionally asserted that Georgia’s European trajectory is essential to Armenia’s European aspirations (NEWS HUB, October 30).
Pashinyan was the only leader to publicly emphasize the U.S. role in shaping the present-day South Caucasus through diplomatic and economic cooperation. For many years, however, Georgia was the primary recipient of U.S. financial support in the Caucasus through funding for Middle Corridor projects. The United States awarded nearly $25 million to promote a transportation and logistics program in Georgia and supported the development of the corridor (Business Media, May 16, 2024, July 2). Unlike the 2023 Silk Road Forum, the U.S. ambassador to Georgia did not attend, echoing the deterioration in relations between Washington and Tbilisi (U.S. Helsinki Commission, September 10).
For the first time in the Silk Road Forum’s history, the Azerbaijani and Armenian prime ministers publicly thanked each other for advancing regional stability and infrastructural development through the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), something unimaginable a year ago (see EDM, October 15). The U.S.-brokered TRIPP plans to connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave through Armenia’s Syunik province. Both parties rejected the idea that the TRIPP weakens Georgia’s transit role, arguing that new regional projects complement it. While Pashinyan cited the Persian Gulf–Black Sea railway as boosting transit for both Armenia and Georgia, Azerbaijani speakers stressed that Georgia’s Poti and Khulevi ports cannot be replaced, given Baku’s exports to ten European countries through them (see EDM, November 3).
Armenia’s limited transport capacity, coupled with rivalry from Iran and Russia, slows the TRIPP’s operationalization, even with U.S. backing (Interpressnews, June 11). In the long term, there is a risk that Georgia will fail to maintain its speed, reliability, and strategic partnerships, which are necessary for participation in international commerce and connectivity. Without maintenance, Tbilisi could lose the opportunity to evolve steadily as the main transit hub for the Middle Corridor, especially in light of the new economic cooperation agreement between Washington and five Central Asian countries (Interpressnews, October 26; Eurasianet, November 7).
The forum highlighted the Middle Corridor’s challenges, including a lack of infrastructure, bottlenecks, inefficient border controls, and limited digitalization. For Georgia, a small country dependent on external support for its national security, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and development, going against Western priorities is risky.
Georgian officials named the Anaklia Deep Sea Port as a symbol of Georgia’s development, linking the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Central Asia, and Europe with the shortest route in the Middle Corridor. Tbilisi rejected the claim that the port created a fissure between Georgia and its Western partners by excluding the United States from its development, instead prioritizing the PRC (see EDM, June 6; Ministry of Economy of Georgia, October 22). The European Union was also skipped over, even though Brussels was ready to provide 333 million euros ($384 million) for Anaklia (Forbes Georgia, January 17, 2019; FactCheck, October 6, 2021). The implementation of the Anaklia project has been delayed for years and now risks losing the economic foundation it was designed to rely on (Radio Tavisupleba, April 1). Without operating as a major transit hub for cargo from Central Asia to European and U.S. markets, it might lose its value.
The Black Sea Submarine Cable Project (BSSC), which aims to link Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hungary, featured prominently at the Silk Road Forum. The high-voltage transmission link would strengthen Georgia’s role as a transit state while supporting EU efforts to diversify away from Russian energy and advance its 2050 carbon-neutrality goals. The European Union is expected to mobilize up to 2.3 billion euros ($2.65 billion), alongside the World Bank’s support for preparatory work, but final commitments are still pending (Civil Georgia, December 12, 2022; World Bank, May 21, 2024). Georgians have highlighted that the project is included in the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity’s (ENTSO-E’s) 2024–2034 development plan, but ENTSO-E does not provide finances. Its role is limited to coordinating system planning, market integration, and regulatory harmonization (GSE, February 2, 2024).
Recent tensions between Romania and Georgia, amid Bucharest’s support for EU sanctions and a review of bilateral cooperation, risk slowing momentum (1TV, October 20). The project also faces operational and security risks. Its route runs near Russian-occupied Crimea, and ultra-deepwater installation at depths exceeding 2,000 meters (6,561 feet) increases technical complexity, costs, and delays.
Whether the European Commission decides to grant the BSSC Project of Common Interest status, expected by late 2025, will determine whether it can access regulatory benefits and co-financing through the Connecting Europe Facility (Finport, October 29). Until then, the initiative remains important but exposed to political and technical uncertainties (Rondeli Foundation, October 3, 2024)
The Tbilisi Silk Road Forum revealed a widening gap between Georgia’s economic aspirations and its geopolitical trajectory. By stripping politics out of conversations on energy and connectivity, the forum overlooked the forces shaping the region’s future. Infrastructure projects from Anaklia Port to the Black Sea Cable cannot advance in a vacuum; they depend on trust, stability, and credible partnerships with the West. As Armenia and Azerbaijan move forward under more cooperative realities and Central Asia deepens cooperation with the United States, Georgia risks drifting to the margins. Unless Tbilisi restores strategic alignment with its partners and acknowledges the political foundations of connectivity, it may forfeit the leading role it hopes to have in the Middle Corridor.
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