Executive Summary:
- The ruling Georgian Dream government issued a controversial statement on March 2 about events in Iran, expressing condolences for Iranian losses and solidarity with Persian Gulf Arab states while avoiding explicit support for the United States or Israel, reflecting a policy shift away from traditional Western partners.
- Diplomatic tensions intensified after an unidentified Georgian official visited the Iranian embassy to offer condolences, prompting criticism from Israel and raising concerns about Tbilisi’s ties with Tehran amid growing Iranian influence and controversial diplomatic gestures.
- Georgia’s increasing engagement with Iran—through diplomatic visits, alleged sanctions circumvention, and the expansion of Iranian religious and educational networks—complicates its geopolitical balancing act.
On March 2, the ruling Georgian Dream party’s government responded to the U.S.–Israeli war with Iran after several days of silence through an official statement. It expressed condolences for the deaths of civilians both in Iran and in Israel. At the same time, solidarity was expressed only with the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. The statement said:
We express our condolences to the Iranian people and the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the current military actions have claimed the largest number of lives, including the Supreme Leader, other political figures, many innocent people, and dozens of children (Facebook/GeorgianGovernment, March 2).
In response to a question from local media about whether it is a matter of condolence when the U.S. executes a murderer, Georgian Parliament Deputy Nino Tsilosani, known for her anti-Western statements, replied, “In the legislation of all countries, the killing of a murderer is not welcomed” (Facebook/tvpirveli.ge, March 2). The wording of the statement reflects the Georgian Dream government’s recent foreign policy. In its relations with longstanding friends and historical partners, the government shows coldness, while toward Iran—with which Georgia has never had close ties—it displays loyalty.
On March 6, Iranian Ambassador to Georgia Ali Moujani posted a thank-you letter on X, stating, “A friend is known in hardship,” thanking an “honorable representative of the government and people of Georgia,” for visiting the embassy and leaving a note in the book of condolences (X/@AliMoujani, March 6). The embassy did not reveal the identity of this high-ranking Georgian official, despite the condolence text fully mirroring the Georgian government’s March 2 statement. The attempt to conceal the identity of the high-ranking official, in itself, suggests that Georgia may have something to hide in its relations with Iran.
On March 7, Israeli Ambassador to Georgia Walid Abu Haya responded to the Georgian official’s visit to the Iranian embassy. He stated:
True friendship between nations is measured by their ability to distinguish who chooses the path of life, stability, and cooperation, and who chooses the path of terror, extremism, and violence. While we do not choose our neighbors, we do choose our friends. The 2,600-year-old friendship between the Georgian and Jewish peoples, based on mutual respect and shared values, must continue to be demonstrated today, especially in difficult times (Facebook/publika.ge, March 7).
Considering the tone and wording the Israeli ambassador used, Israel, with the intelligence capacity to track the whereabouts of Iran’s leadership, could already know which Georgian official attended the Iranian embassy in Tbilisi.
Despite the Georgian government categorically denying the growing influence of Iran in Georgia, on March 7, local media reported that citizens of Georgia of Azerbaijani ethnicity came to the Iranian embassy with photographs of the murdered Ali Khamenei and expressed their condolences. Those gathered were allegedly chanting, “Azerbaijan is great, Khamenei—we are at your service” (Facebook/Mtavarinow, March 7).
In January, Iran appointed Seyed Ali Mojani as its new ambassador to Georgia. This coincided with the mass anti-regime protests in Iran, where thousands were killed. Georgia did not officially respond to these events. Upon his appointment on January 12, the new ambassador stated that Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian had instructed him to ensure a balanced approach among all parties and to promote Iran’s constructive, forward-looking engagement in strengthening stability in the Caucasus (Facebook/iraningeorgia, January 12). Before this appointment, Mojani served as the special representative of the president of Iran for Afghanistan. In 2024, while holding that position, the Taliban expelled him and declared him persona non grata (Ekho Kavkaza, January 13). His tenure in Afghanistan concluded with controversy, and his diplomatic career in Georgia has likewise begun under sensitive circumstances.
A diplomatic scandal in Georgia preceded the outbreak of U.S.–Israeli military action in Iran. On February 11, the Iranian embassy in Georgia hosted an event celebrating the 47th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In honor of this date, the Tbilisi TV tower was illuminated in the colors of the Iranian flag, in line with a recent Georgian tradition of lighting the TV tower in the colors of friendly countries’ flags on their national holidays (Netgazeti.ge, February 12). The Israeli embassy in Georgia expressed puzzlement. The Israeli ambassador described this as a gesture of support toward the terrorist regime of Iran, especially against the backdrop of the brutal crackdown on anti-government protests in Iran (Interpressnews.ge, February 26).
The Iranian embassy’s invitation to this event—sent to representatives of academic, political, and diplomatic circles in Georgia—was inscribed in English with “[t]he 410th anniversary of the arrival of Georgians in Iran.” Information about this was first disseminated by well-known Georgian professor and Iran expert George Sanikidze (Facebook/george.sanikidze.3, February 13). In 1616, during the campaigns of Shah Abbas (1613–1617), the Iranians destroyed most of the population of the eastern Georgian region of Kakheti, and a significant portion of the survivors were forcibly relocated to Iran. In February, the Iranian embassy, at the initiative of the new Iranian ambassador, effectively invited the Georgian elite to “celebrate” a tragic page in Georgia’s history—an ethnic cleansing of Georgians—by presenting it as part of a festive package alongside the event dedicated to the 47th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia Lasha Darsalia attended this event at the Iranian embassy (Facebook/iraningeorgia, February 12). The Georgian government did not respond to the Iranian embassy’s provocative move, although it sparked protests against the Iranian diplomatic mission (Publika.ge, February 12).
In recent years, Georgian Dream has grown closer to Iran. Among local media and international observers, suspicions have emerged that Georgia may be helping Iran circumvent international sanctions by creating fictitious companies through which Iran may sell its oil and various products (Radio Tavisupleba, October 8, 2025). During the peak of the anti-regime protests in Iran and their harsh suppression, reports appeared about the presence of Russian cargo aircraft in Georgian airspace heading toward Iran. In late December 2025 and early January of this year, a military transport aircraft carrying unknown cargo made several flights from Russia to Iran, transiting through Georgian airspace. The Civil Aviation Agency of Georgia confirmed the overflights, emphasizing that these were standard transit operations (Gruziya Online, January 3).
Russia and Iran may have used Georgian airspace to transport cargo, including potentially military shipments. Georgia, however, does not share a direct border with Iran. For cargo to be delivered by air from Russia to Iran via Georgia, Russian military transport aircraft would also have had to fly through Armenian airspace. There were no reproaches, however, directed at Armenia. Georgian Dream’s reputation has been so severely damaged on the international stage—and suspicions about its questionable ties with Iran and Russia have become so entrenched among Western elites—that all the blame for providing airspace was placed solely on Georgia.
In 2024, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze visited Iran twice in an unusual role for him. On May 22, 2024, he attended the official funeral ceremony of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and the inauguration of Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, on July 30, 2024 (1tv.ge, May 22, 2024; Interpressnews.ge, July 20, 2024). These visits underscored Georgia’s ambition to strengthen ties with Iran (see EDM, July 14, 2025).
Recently, Iran has intensified its efforts to expand its influence in Georgia. In December 2025, the Georgian service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty published an article titled “The Sword of Love,” examining how Iran, through the introduction of religious and educational programs, is attempting to strengthen its influence in Georgia—particularly in regions predominantly inhabited by ethnic Azerbaijanis, who practice Islam (Radio Tavisupleba, December 26, 2025). In three Georgian cities, including the capital, a branch of the radically oriented Iranian Al-Mustafa International University has operated for 15 years without an official license from Georgia’s Ministry of Education. The university is under sanctions imposed by both the United States and Canada due to allegations of espionage and extremist activities. For reasons that remain unclear, however, this university continues to actively pursue its ideological agenda in Georgia (Radio Tavisupleba, December 26, 2025). Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty suggests that this occurs with the tacit consent of the ruling Georgian Dream party. The outlet notes that, within Iran’s development strategy, this network of universities serves as an instrument of “soft power” through the teaching of Shiism, Persian language, the Quran, and related subjects.
Even though Georgian Dream apparently places a high value on its relations with Iran and follows Moscow’s recommendations, the escalation of the military conflict in the Middle East has seriously disrupted its plans. The outbreak of military actions in Iran has further undermined the strategy under which the ruling party had gradually shifted the focus of its foreign policy from the West to the Persian Gulf region. By distancing itself from Western partners while simultaneously building ties with the Middle East—aiming for close official economic relations with the United Arab Emirates and unofficial rapprochement with Iran—Georgian Dream now finds it increasingly difficult to navigate its own geopolitical priorities. The deterioration of Iran’s relations with countries such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates effectively forces Tbilisi to choose with whom to build stronger ties.
Iran has become an important partner for Georgian Dream in recent years, as evidenced by frequent visits by the party’s leadership to Tehran and their demonstrative political activity. The Arab states of the Persian Gulf, especially the United Arab Emirates, however, have acquired a different significance for Georgia’s ruling elite. As local Georgian media note, the Emirates were, before the start of the war in the Middle East, a safe jurisdiction for storing the capital of the leaders of Georgian Dream, which was quickly transferred there amid concerns about potential Western sanctions (Formulanews.ge, October 6, 2024). Moreover, Abu Dhabi has become a favorite vacation destination for the country’s political elite. For example, following the outbreak of military action in Iran, Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze was stuck in Abu Dhabi celebrating a family holiday (Netgazeti.ge, March 2).
On March 1, Kobakhidze called United Arab Emirates President Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan to personally express solidarity regarding the attack on its territory (X/@PM_Kobakhidze; 1tv.ge, March 1). Similar steps were not taken regarding Israel, with which—or rather, with Israelis—Georgia has longstanding relations. Questions also arise about the absence of expressions of solidarity with Cyprus, with which Georgia shares religious and historical ties, and which is an EU member, at a time when Georgia aspires to join the European Union. This highlights the inconsistency and growing blurring of the country’s foreign policy, where the pursuit of closer ties with Russian partners faces new challenges, making Georgian Dream particularly vulnerable.
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