Executive Summary:

  • The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) launched operation Herof-2 (“Storm-2”), conducting coordinated attacks across several districts of Balochistan on January 31, demonstrating the group’s advancing capabilities and operational reach.
  • The BLA media agency, Hakkal, further exploits state restrictions on mainstream media—such as censorship, firewalls, controlled reporting, internet shutdown issues, and threats to journalists—to propagate narratives and shape public perceptions of the insurgency.
  • In the weeks following Herof-2, the BLA announced the formation of a specialized drone unit, the Qazi Aero Hive Rangers (QAHR), further demonstrating the group’s designs to transform the conflict into a technology-driven insurgency.

On January 31, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) launched operation Herof-2 (“Storm-2”), conducting coordinated attacks in several districts of Balochistan. [1] The operation displayed the BLA’s most advanced warfare capabilities. The attacks were integrated and sophisticated, targeting high-level security zones.

Herof-2 underscored that the BLA’s operational reach extends beyond rural or peripheral spaces. The attacks near the civil secretariat—100 meters (about 328 feet) from the Chief Minister’s office—exposed the fragility of the state’s security apparatus (Express Tribune, February 8). Herof-2 demonstrated that the BLA’s ability to conduct lethal, synchronized campaigns continues to evolve. Roughly 1,000 to 1,200 fighters carried out the 40 attacks across 12 districts (Business Recorder, February 15). These fighters, moreover, have developed into a lethal and organizationally integrated movement. The BLA is now made up of units such as the Majeed Brigade (suicide squad), ZIRAB (intelligence wing), STOS (special tactical operations), Fateh Squad  (high-profile attacks), and QAHR (the newly established drone unit for multi-aerial purposes), indicating its systematic and strategic shift from conventional insurgent tactics to a technology-driven mechanism.

The Digital Front

A majority of Pakistanis still rely on social media platforms, particularly X and Facebook, for their news (Voicepk, January 2). Militant groups are often able to successfully propagate on these social media platforms, as Pakistani mainstream media faces challenges such as censorship, firewalls, controlled reporting, internet shutdown issues, and threats to journalists. Access to information is a serious challenge in Balochistan. The BLA’s media agency, Hakkal, has therefore strategically exploited this gap to propagate narratives and shape public perceptions of the insurgency (Defence for Peace, September 29, 2025).

As soon as the BLA launched Herof-2, Hakkal media began shaping the narratives of the attack. Hakkal reported on Herof-2 in a professional and organized way, casting the operation as a centralized operation rather than a cluster of disintegrated attacks (X/@bahott_baloch, February 1). Pro-BLA accounts on social media platforms, particularly X, disseminated the developments by amplifying attacks and praising its fighters (X/@Raaji_Haal, February 3). The most striking development of Herof-2 was Hakkal’s visualization of BLA leader Bashir Zaib Baloch, filmed somewhere between Chaghi and Kharan, which is home to natural resources and projects such as Reko Diq and Saindak (Native Voices, January 31). The video not only dismissed rumors of his alleged death in Iraq but also conveyed a message to foreign investors that the BLA will not allow any project that is against the will of the Baloch community.

The representation of female insurgents in operations also marked a shift in the BLA’s strategy by deconstructing established patriarchal norms of Baloch society. Shari Baloch was the first BLA female suicide bomber who carried out a suicide attack against Chinese nationals at the University of Karachi in April 2022. Herof-2 scaled this tactic by launching multiple female suicide bombers, including 60-year-old Hatam Naz Sumalani (alias Gul Bibi) and Maryam Buzdar from Dera Ghazi Khan, Punjab, which demonstrated that the BLA’s recruitment network transcends age and region (X/@HakeemWadhela, February 6).

BLA Expands Drone Operations                             

In the weeks following Herof-2, the BLA announced the formation of the Qazi Aero Hive Rangers (QAHR) unit, showing the group’s designs to transform the conflict into a technology-driven insurgency (Balochistan Post, February 12). The establishment of QAHR—a drone unit attributed to Abdul Basit (alias Qazi)—aims to counter the Pakistani security forces’ asymmetric superiority (X/@bahott_baloch, February 12). The move towards a drone-led insurgency resembles the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) use of aerial operations for precision strikes.

Drone warfare will become highly lethal and pose major threats to Pakistan’s Frontier Corps (FC) in a province such as Balochistan. They are cheap, easy to relocate, and can be modified to carry low-weight explosive payloads. In Herof-2, the BLA extended its operational reach to urban areas, including high-security zones. Drone usage will further extend the group’s strategic range to target isolated security posts and gas pipelines while enhancing surveillance of sensitive military installations, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, as well as the Gwadar port. In simplest terms, QAHR serves notice that the BLA is preparing to act in a more nuanced and advanced fashion in the years to come.

Conclusion

The BLA has modified its operational power to challenge the Pakistani state on multiple fronts. The recent coordinated attacks during Operation Herof-2, a digital campaign for narrative dominance, an alarming resurgence of female insurgents, and the establishment of an intelligence wing and drone unit all underscore the group’s increasing capabilities. The development of counter-drone architecture to protect sensitive installations and mega projects such as the CPEC, Reko Diq, and Saindak must be prioritized by the Pakistani state. Addressing structural grievances through political dialogue and focusing on economic reconciliation could, moreover, help derail the BLA’s separatist narratives.

Notes:

[1] The attacks targeted the districts of Quetta, Mastung, Kharan, Gwadar, Kech, Chaghi, Nushki, Washak, Panjgur, Kalat, and Turbat.

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