This August marks the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the end of World War II in Asia and the Pacific. President Harry Truman’s decision to use these weapons remains one of the most controversial decisions of the war. A number of military commanders at the time, including Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur, claimed that it was unnecessary, as Japan was about to surrender regardless. Some of the most vehement critics of the atomic bombings were Christian thinkers; for example, in one of his television broadcasts Bishop Fulton Sheen called it “our national sin.” “When we dropped the bomb,” he continued, “we dropped it not only on the Japanese–we dropped it on ourselves, in the sense that we killed something in our moral consciousness.” On the Protestant side, the Federal Council of Churches in March 1946 issued a statement labeling use of the bomb “morally indefensible” and “unnecessary for winning the war”. Japan, after all, was an “already virtually beaten foe” so to use such a weapon against its civilian population opened the United States to “judgment before God and the conscience of humankind.”
With due respect to these critics, none of them had access to the information that Harry Truman had in the summer of 1945. Contrary to the claims that Japan was on the verge of surrender, there was nothing resembling a formal peace offer coming from Tokyo. Even though its empire had been largely rolled back and its navy obliterated, the generals and admirals who dominated Japan’s government regarded such a surrender as dishonorable. Only the personal intervention of the emperor himself could overcome the resistance of the Army and Navy–and the emperor almost never involved himself directly with political or military decisions. Thus the war would go on, and as long as it did thousands were dying by the day, both in Japan and on the Asian continent, from fighting, starvation, and disease. Historian Richard Frank has referred to this ongoing disaster as a “slow-motion Hiroshima.”
Truman’s critics claim that Tokyo was ready to talk peace, and as evidence for this they often point to the existence of peace feelers from some Japanese diplomats. Significantly, however, these sources were not based in Japan, but rather were diplomats in neutral countries in no way authorized to speak officially for the Japanese government. In Tokyo, the cabinet itself was genuinely hoping for peace, but only on terms that the Army and Navy regarded as “honorable.” Specifically this meant that they would not accept any agreement that would alter Japan’s kokutai, a term that translates roughly as “national polity” or “national essence.” Defined narrowly, this could mean simply that Japan could not accept the removal of the emperor; more broadly it could mean a refusal to consider any change at all to the political status quo. Moreover, the military men who dominated the cabinet also insisted that there be no postwar occupation of Japan, and that any investigations into war crimes be handled by the Japanese government itself.
Critics claim that Truman had alternatives other than use of the atomic bombs, but hastily rejected them. Yet when we consider each of the alternatives, it is clear that they had serious flaws.
The most likely alternative was a U.S. invasion of the home islands, starting with Kyushu, the southernmost of the islands. Indeed, preparations were already underway for such an operation, since the atomic bomb was not successfully tested until July. It was understood, however, that an invasion would be extremely costly. Even on tiny, relatively worthless islands such as Tarawa and Saipan, Japanese forces had shown themselves willing to fight to the death and so their defense of the home islands could be expected to be only more fanatical. In a meeting on June 18, 1945, head of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff William D. Leahy suggested that casualties in the battle of Okinawa be used to project how many U.S. troops would be killed or wounded in an invasion of Kyushu. On Okinawa 35 percent of the forces engaged had become casualties. Given that 750,000 men were expected to take part in the Kyushu landings, that would mean losses of 250,000 killed or seriously injured. (By way of comparison, the United States had suffered only around 400,000 total casualties in both the European and the Pacific Theater up to this point.) This leaves aside the massive numbers of Japanese, including civilians, who would be killed in such an operation. And, of course, Kyushu was only one of four home islands, all of which might have to be invaded in order to bring about a surrender.
Another possibility was to take advantage of the fact that the U.S. Navy had almost complete control of the sea lanes surrounding Japan, and the U.S. Army Air Force almost totally dominated the skies above the home islands. Why not, then, utilize a blockade instead of risking the lives of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, use a combination of conventional bombing and blockade to induce a Japanese surrender? The problem here is that there was no guarantee it would work, and the European theater suggested that it would not. German cities had been pounded by Allied bombers for two years, yet the Nazi regime did not surrender until Berlin was occupied by the Soviet Army. And even if it might work, there was no telling how long it would take. If the goal was to minimize loss of civilian lives, then this would have been the least desirable option. The firebombing of Tokyo on March 9-10 killed at least 100,000, the vast majority of them civilians. Tens or hundreds of thousands more would likely have died of starvation or disease from the ongoing effects of the naval blockade. Continuing this strategy would have undoubtedly resulted in far more civilian deaths than the 250,000 who died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
As a direct result of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Emperor Hirohito intervened against the wishes of the generals and admirals to end the war. The results of the bombings were indeed dreadful, but they also represented the quickest and least costly road to peace. The most realistic alternatives, such as an invasion of the home islands, or a continuation of conventional bombing and blockade, would likely have resulted in even more deaths than the atomic bombings caused. Truman’s critics, therefore, are wrong. In ordering the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki he made the best possible decision based on the information available to him. It was a tragedy that so many had to die for Japan to surrender, but unfortunately there was no better option.