While the LAF has redeployed troops to areas south of the Litani River as stipulated by Resolution 1701, this measure remains inadequate as Hezbollah will seek to build its terror army.
By Yaakov Lappin, JNS
The Jan. 26 deadline for Israel Defense Forces withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, as stipulated in the 60-day ceasefire agreement, leaves critical questions unanswered about how Jerusalem can enforce a Hezbollah-free zone after the military leaves.
One possibility could see Israel maintain some military posts in Southern Lebanon, while launching airstrikes, and possibly targeted ground raids, in response to intelligence of new Hezbollah entrenchment activities.
There are elements within the defense establishment that align with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s position that Israel should consider maintaining a presence in Southern Lebanon beyond the Jan. 26 deadline.
However, this decision hinges on approval from United States President Donald Trump, Army Radio reported on Thursday.
Netanyahu, via Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, reached out to Trump to request permission to retain several military posts in Southern Lebanon, Channel 13 reported.
Professor Eyal Zisser, vice rector and holder of the Yona and Dina Ettinger Chair in Contemporary History of the Middle East at Tel Aviv University, told JNS on Wednesday that he was skeptical about the Lebanese Armed Forces enforcing control over Southern Lebanon or countering Hezbollah.
“The Lebanese Army cannot, and likely does not want to, assert its authority or force Hezbollah to withdraw from the area, let alone dismantle its military infrastructure,” Zisser said.
In Lebanon, “they simply hope that we will withdraw and leave matters alone—until the next war, hoping that in the meantime Hezbollah will maintain a low profile,” he added.
Should Israel refuse to assume such a passive role, Zisser assessed that continued airstrikes against Hezbollah’s infrastructure would likely occur. However, ground operations would be more complicated, he argued.
“On the ground, it’s more problematic because the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL [the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon] are there. It’s unclear how we could operate militarily in such a scenario, but, if necessary, even that could happen,” he said.
Zisser sees parallels with Israel’s security approach in Judea and Samaria, in terms of Israel’s ongoing targeted security activities aimed at preventing adversaries from building up capabilities.
He warned, however, that the LAF’s and UNIFIL’s presence could restrict Israeli operations, requiring creative solutions to overcome such obstacles.
“To my understanding, Hezbollah wants to maintain a low profile. It is in their interest right now to keep quiet and recover, so they are not necessarily likely to act against us but will instead hope that Israel leaves them alone to rebuild, if they do not provoke Israel.”
Operate when necessary
Israeli Navy Cmdr. (res.) Eyal Pinko, a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University in Ranat Gan and a former member of an intelligence organization, described a possible reality post-Jan. 26 as one where the IDF would no longer maintain full control over Southern Lebanon, but could still operate when necessary.
“Israel turned to Trump to receive approval to preserve five outposts” in Southern Lebanon, Pinko said, adding that the LAF will limit IDF activities significantly and that the Israeli military will seek to deconflict with the Lebanese military.
Regarding Hezbollah’s likely response to future Israeli operation, Pinko said the group is focused on rebuilding its capabilities over the next two years and will likely seek to avoid direct confrontations with the IDF, particularly clashes that could lead to further escalation.
“I think that there won’t be a significant Hezbollah response to the IDF but rather symbolic actions, such as rocket fire or tactical skirmishes if there are IDF moves interpreted as unusual in the area,” he said.
Inherently asymmetric
Lt. Col. (res.) Sarit Zehavi, founder and president of the Alma Research and Education Center, an independent organization focused on Israel’s northern security challenges, said, “The ceasefire agreement that Israel signed is inherently asymmetric. Under its terms, Israel is obligated to withdraw within 60 days (by January 26), while the LAF are merely required to commence implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, an 18-year-old mandate that has never been fully enforced.”
Zehavi emphasized the ongoing ineffectiveness of the Lebanese Armed Forces in enforcing Resolution 1701, pointing to a recent discovery of outdated, poorly maintained rockets purportedly seized by the LAF.
“Such actions fall far short of the robust enforcement needed to dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in Southern Lebanon or prevent Hezbollah’s re-entrenchment,” she said.
While the LAF has redeployed troops to areas south of the Litani River as stipulated by Resolution 1701, this measure remains inadequate, she argued.
“True enforcement requires the removal of Hezbollah’s weaponry from civilian homes and strongholds, their transfer to secure locations, and transparent reporting.”
She added that the LAF’s track record includes instances where weapons seized were later returned to Hezbollah.
Zehavi warned of the possible consequences of a failed ceasefire, including renewed hostilities that would threaten civilians in northern Israel. For the ceasefire to succeed, she argued, Lebanon’s government must take decisive action to disarm Hezbollah and assert its authority.
“Without confronting Hezbollah’s role as a state within a state, disarmament efforts of Hezbollah will remain ineffective,” she said.
The United States, she argued, has a critical role to play as both mediator and guarantor of the truce, especially in holding Lebanon accountable for commitments under Resolution 1701. The U.S. must demand transparency and measurable progress, Zehavi said.
For Lebanon, the choice is stark, Zehavi argued. It must it either assert sovereignty as an independent state or continue serving as a passive host for Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy.
Without addressing this core issue, the ceasefire and any subsequent agreements will remain temporary and unstable solutions to a deeply entrenched underlying threat, she said.
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