Executive Summary:
- Cuba emerged as a politically loyal but materially limited partner for Russia following the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, providing Moscow with symbolic support amid Western isolation.
- Russia has derived some financial and technological benefits from this partnership, using Cuba to test non-Western payment infrastructure and positioning the island as a regional hub for importing Russian information technology (IT) and digital solutions into Latin America.
- Economic and trade cooperation—including in energy, infrastructure, agriculture, and tourism—remains modest in scale, functioning more as a supplement to Russia’s geopolitical narrative than as a source of profit.
- Russian experts view cooperation with Cuba, including the ratification of a military cooperation agreement, as a symbolic asset reinforcing a multipolar narrative. Moscow views potentially losing Cuba as a partner as a serious reputational and ideological blow, but not an economic setback.
On January 15, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that Moscow is concerned about the escalation of the situation around Cuba and considers the “language of U.S. blackmail” unacceptable (Interfax, January 15). These comments were a response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s remarks that Cuba needs to begin cooperating with Washington “while it’s not too late” following the U.S. ouster of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. Russian commentators, however, do not believe that Russia has recourse should the U.S. decide to take decisive steps in Cuba. Russia’s resources are focused on its war against Ukraine, and the Kremlin is abandoning its strategic allies around the world (Newsru.co.il, January 14).
Cuba emerged as one of Russia’s key foreign policy partners following the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and Russia’s consequent isolation from the West. Russia’s March 2023 Foreign Policy Concept named Cuba, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as Russia’s “priority” partners in Latin America and the Caribbean (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2023). It is becoming clear, however, that if the United States takes more decisive action against Cuba, Russia’s response is likely to remain rhetorical, with no practical steps taken (Smotrim, January 12). If Cuba’s political situation changes, Russia could lose its long-term strategic partner in Latin America.
In 2023, Moscow and Havana agreed to work toward operating Russian banks in Cuba and transitioning project settlements to rubles (TASS, May 18, 2023). Using rubles in transactions meant a reduction in the risks of using dollars or euros, greater manageability of project financing, and the ability to use Cuba as a platform for Russian companies in the region. Cuba also enabled Russia to expand its domestic payment instruments, such as Mir cards, a Central Bank of Russia card for electronic fund transfers (RIA Novosti, April 23, 2023). This expansion allowed Russia to test how well the Russian payment ecosystem can operate in friendly jurisdictions without reliance on Western networks. Russian experts also found it useful in developing circumvention of Western sanctions (Cyberleninka, accessed January 17).
Cuba has emerged as Russia’s “hub” of information technology (IT) and digital technology exports in Latin America. After 2022, Russia began actively promoting the export of its IT solutions and digital platforms to friendly countries beyond its traditional partners and former Soviet republics, with Cuba becoming the key market in Latin America. Cuba has been positioned as a strategic regional hub where Russian products can be adapted and distributed more broadly, enhancing Russia’s economic and technological influence in the region (RIAC, December 25, 2024). Cuba serves as Russia’s “entry point” into the Spanish-speaking world, a testing ground for cooperative formats with friendly states, and a partner that is less sensitive to Western restrictions.
Economic cooperation between Russia and Cuba has remained limited to a few sectors because of the dire state of the Cuban economy and Russia’s limited resources (RIAC, May 23, 2025). They have, however, cooperated in the energy sector. Between 2024 and 2025, Russian sources reported on the implementation and discussion of energy-related projects with Cuba, ranging from the modernization and restoration of Cuba’s power system to broader cooperation in energy supplies (TASS, April 3, 2025). Even though Russian–Cuban economic cooperation nominally encompassed sectors including agriculture, tourism, infrastructure, and heavy industry, its practical impact remained largely symbolic. Economic cooperation is best understood as a supplement to Russia’s broader geopolitical and ideological objectives (The Caribbean Council, May 8, 2023).
Moscow’s relationship with Cuba demonstrated that it retains partners in the Western Hemisphere in close proximity to the United States. Russia’s ability to maintain ties with Cuba fits into its broader approach to engagement with Latin America, reinforcing Moscow’s narrative and strategic thesis of an emerging multipolar world (Cyberleninka, accessed January 15).
Russian-language media have reported that between 1,000 and 5,000 Cuban citizens have fought on Russia’s side against Ukraine since 2022 (Nastoyashee Vremya, October 7, 2025). Some sources claim that up to 10,000 Cubans may have been involved (EXO, November 28, 2025). Cooperation in the paramilitary domain fits a longer-term pattern of the Kremlin outsourcing violence, though the Cuban authorities deny the involvement of Cuban citizens in Ukraine. The Soviet Union relied on Cuban personnel in conflicts across the developing world, using them as proxies, and the reported involvement of Cubans on Russia’s side is consistent with this legacy.
In October 2025, Russia institutionalized military cooperation with Cuba by ratifying an agreement on bilateral military cooperation (Interfax, October 8, 2025). The agreement creates a stable legal framework for regular exchanges of military specialists, the conduct of exercises, consultations, and coordination in the security sector (@ Novosti, October 7, 2025). Russian experts viewed this step as part of Russia’s broader foreign policy strategy aimed at strengthening military and political ties with allies in Latin America. In their assessment, cooperation with Cuba may enhance the flexibility of Russian defense diplomacy and create additional channels of interaction in global security politics, especially “against the backdrop of a changing international environment” (TASS, October 8, 2025). Some ultra-nationalist Russian experts subsequently theorized that Russia could deploy the Oreshnik missile system to Cuba if Washington makes unfriendly gestures toward Moscow, anticipating shock and “hysteria among American politicians” (@ Vfokuse, October 8, 2025).
Russia’s gains from its post-2022 collaboration with Cuba have been largely confined to the rhetorical geopolitical sphere. Cooperation has been primarily symbolic, with Moscow viewing Cuba as an element of Russia’s strategy to promote a multipolar world (RIAC, May 15, 2024). The potential loss of Cuba would nevertheless have negative domestic implications for Russia despite its limited practical significance and meager returns on economic investment. Russian militaristic and nationalist analysts are increasingly focused on Cuba. One recent article by Ruslan Pankratov, published in Moskovskii Komsomolets, argues that Russia losing Cuba would be a major reputational loss for Moscow:
The fall of Cuba would be perceived by the Global South as final proof of the inability of Russia, China, or anyone else to function as an alternative center of power. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, everyone will understand a simple thing: engaging with ‘multipolarity’ is risky because it cannot protect its allies from American pressure. BRICS … all of this will turn into empty rhetoric. Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia will draw conclusions. The domino effect is inevitable. For Russia, Cuba is first and foremost a geopolitical symbol, not an economic asset. The loss of a symbol is often more painful than the loss of resources. If Cuba falls, the concept of multipolarity will be finally discredited. For [Russia], this is a question of choosing between strategic ambition and strategic capitulation, because Cuba historically symbolizes resistance. But symbols fall if no one protects them (MK.RU, January 16).
Coupled with Russia’s deteriorating economic situation and Moscow’s bloody and largely unsuccessful war of conquest against Ukraine, the loss of Cuba as a partner could add to a cumulative effect that deepens divisions within the Russian elite, intellectual circles, and the military-political leadership.
The post Kremlin Views the Potential Loss of Cuba as Major Symbolic Blow appeared first on Jamestown.