Executive Summary:
• The Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) capture of al-Fashir, accompanied by exterminatory extrajudicial killings after an 18-month siege, represents the militia’s most significant territorial victory to date and accelerates the effective partition of Sudan.
• With control over most of Darfur and parts of Kordofan and Blue Nile, the RSF is consolidating a parallel “Tasis State,” seeking external legitimacy despite its reliance on predatory militias and systematic abuses.
• The Sudanese Armed Forces–Transitional Sovereignty Council (SAF–TSC) coalition remains internally divided and constrained by Islamist-aligned networks, leaving both major coalitions dependent on abusive partners and limiting prospects for a negotiated national political settlement.
Sudan’s civil war has opened the door to an emerging Rapid Support Forces (Arabic: قوات الدعم السريع, RSF)-controlled rival state in Darfur. The RSF originated as the direct descendants of the Janjaweed (Arabic: جنجويد, “militants on horseback” or “plunderers,” of uncertain etymology) militants responsible for crimes against humanity during the War in Darfur in the mid-2000s.
The RSF’s stated intention is to form a new government for all Sudan. It is now focusing on consolidating its control of the western regions of Kordofan and Darfur (Arabic: دار فور, “realm of the Fur people”), having been ejected from Khartoum and the central region of Gezira (Arabic: الجزيرة) by the Sudanese Armed Forces (Arabic: القوات المسلحة السودانية, SAF) and their allies.
The initiative is designed to provide legitimacy and access to aid and arms for the RSF despite accusations of genocide, ethnic cleansing, looting, destruction of cultural institutions, sexual violence, war crimes, and widespread atrocities.
The Battle for al-Fashir
The RSF needed to seize al-Fashir (Arabic: الفاشر) to consolidate its control over Darfur. Al-Fashir, home to 1.1 million before the war, has been the traditional capital of Darfur since its founding in the late 18th century as the capital of the Fur Sultanate. After an 18-month siege, the city was taken by the RSF on October 27, when the movement overran the SAF’s 6th Infantry Division and elements of the Sudan Liberation Movement-MM led by Darfur Governor Minni Arko Minnawi (Arabic: سليمان “مني” أركو مناوي), who now resides in Port Sudan. Taking al-Fashir frees up RSF forces for the ongoing battle for the neighboring Kordofan region and solidifies its control of Darfur (Mada Masr, July 11).
The RSF imposed a devastating siege on al-Fashir that starved and terrorized the population. During the siege, which began in April 2023, the RSF constructed 68 kilometers (42 miles) of 3-meter (10 feet) tall sand berms alongside 3-meter-deep ditches as wide as five meters (16 ft) around al-Fashir to prevent escape from the siege (Mada Masr, September 5; Radio Dabanga, September 30). [1] People fleeing al-Fashir along the so-called “road of death” to nearby cholera-stricken Tawila (Arabic: طويلة) were routinely deprived of all their possessions before being killed or raped as suspected supporters of the SAF. Others were forced to provide blood for wounded RSF fighters; many of these died soon after (Sudan Tribune, September 6). Those remaining in al-Fashir were reduced to eating leaves or a diminishing supply of animal feed as supplies of food, medicine, and other aid were interrupted by the RSF’s siege lines (Al Jazeera, September 4).
The fall of al-Fashir triggered mass-atrocity killings targeting the city’s non-Arab population. Early reports confirmed at least 1,500 deaths, including 460 patients and health workers killed at the Saudi Maternity Hospital (Al Jazeera, October 30). While the final death count of the al-Fashir massacre is uncertain, RSF sources place the death count at around 7,000, with thousands still uncounted (Lighthouse Reports, November 3). According to the Sudan Doctors’ Network, “hospitals in El Fasher have been transformed into human slaughterhouses” (Radio Dabanga, October 30). Some observers characterize the violence as “genocidal” in intensity, scope, and for its specific targeting of non-Arab Darfuris.
RSF commanders played central roles in the atrocities and showed no intention of stopping them. Field commander Abu Lulu (Arabic: “الفاتح عبدالله إدريس, “ابو لولو) appears to have been an important figure in the massacre, appearing in several videos where he personally executed or ordered the execution of scores of captives (Facebook/قناة الحدث, October 30). Hemedti (Arabic: “محمد حمدان دقلو, “حميدتي), who commands the RSF, acknowledged he had “observed abuses occurring in al-Fashir” and pledged to hold RSF personnel accountable for their crimes (Sudan Tribune, October 29). Abu Lulu was subsequently detained by the RSF, then acquitted within days, further indicating the RSF has no qualms about the violence it commits (YouTube/AlarabyTv_News, November 4). There are also reports that the group kept its non-Arab fighters stationed outside the city so that they would not be able to halt the massacre of their own ethnic groups by fellow RSF fighters of Arab background (Lighthouse Reports, November 3).
The RSF is expanding its military capabilities in Darfur through new drone and air-defense systems. South of al-Fashir, there are indications that the RSF has turned the airbase at Nyala (Arabic: نيالا) into a base for Iranian and Chinese-designed drones capable of striking any target within Sudan (Sudan Tribune, September 29). The RSF has also made major improvements in its air-defense systems through the use of Wagner Group-supplied surface-to-air missiles capable of downing the SAF’s Turkish-made Bayraktar Akıncı high-altitude, long-endurance drones, once expected to be a game-changing weapon in the struggle to relieve al-Fashir (Military Africa, September 28).
The Tasis State
The RSF and its allies have created a parallel “Tasis State” to legitimize their rule in western Sudan. A political charter to form a parallel “transitional peace government” was signed in February by the RSF, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (Arabic: الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان- شمال, SPLM-N) and other armed groups to form the Tasis Alliance (Arabic: “تحالف السودان التأسيسي, “تأسيس, “Founding Alliance”) (Al Jazeera, July 28). The new state was declared on July 26 as the Government of Peace and Unity (Arabic: حكومة السلام والوحدة) but is more commonly known as “the Tasis State.” Though the new state insists it represents all parts of Sudan, it can only govern those regions currently controlled in whole or part by the RSF and the SPLM-N—Darfur, parts of Kordofan, and parts of Blue Nile State.
The Tasis Alliance brings together a wide coalition of armed and political groups under RSF leadership. The Tasis Alliance is formed from 24 armed and civil groups, including the RSF, the SPLM-N, the Beja Congress (Arabic: مؤتمر البجا) of eastern Sudan, the Free Lions (Arabic: الأسود الحرة) of eastern Sudan composed of Arabs from the Rashaida (Arabic: الرشايدة, بنو رشيد) tribe, and factions of the National Umma Party (Arabic: حزب الأمة القومي, UP), Democratic Unionist Party (Arabic: الحزب الإتحادي الديمقراطي, DUP), and the largely Zaghawa Justice and Equality Movement (Arabic: حركة العدل والمساواة, JEM) (Sudan Tribune, January 22; Ash Sharq al-Awsat, March 4). To maintain a facade of ruling all Sudan, Tasis has appointed regional governors for Khartoum and the Eastern region, despite the RSF currently having no presence in these areas (Sudan Tribune, July 26; Arab Weekly, July 28).
The Tasis State is led by Hemedti and SPLM-N chief Abd al-Aziz al-Hilu (Arabic: عبد العزيز الحلو) through a shared presidential council (see Militant Leadership Monitor, July 31, 2011; June 2, 2023). Both attended the swearing in of the presidential council in Nyala on August 30. Hours later, the ceremony site was bombed by the SAF (Mada Masr, September 5).
The RSF’s choice of a prime minister from the Ta’aisha (Arabic: التعايشة) Arab tribe of Darfur carries deep historical and political symbolism. The Darfur Arabs controlling the RSF have appointed Mohammed Hassan al-Ta’aishi (Arabic: محمد حسن التعايشي), a known ally of Hemedti, as prime minister. The appointment has significant symbolic value with reference to the rivalry between the Baggara (Arabic: البقارة, “cattle-herding”) Arabs of Darfur and the settled Arabs of northern Sudan in the time of the Mahdist State (1885–1898), when the northern Arab relatives of the Mahdi were repressed by the Mahdi’s successor, Abdullah (Arabic: عبد الله بن محمد الخليفة), a member of Darfur’s Ta’aisha tribe. Sudan’s northern Arab minority has dominated Sudan since independence in 1956, and the appointment of a Ta’aishi as prime minister is a political signal understood by all Sudanese.
The RSF seeks international legitimacy for its new state despite limited external support. The RSF justifies its declaration of a new state by claiming there is an urgent need for currency, security, medicine, healthcare, education, and identity documents (Mada Masr, August 16). One other purpose of establishing the rival state is to establish legitimacy in talks hosted by outside parties including the Quartet: the United States, UK, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. For now, only the UAE recognizes the RSF as a de facto authority (Mada Masr, September 28). Sudan’s government has complained to the UN about the UAE’s alleged involvement in supplying arms, logistical support, and Colombian mercenaries to the RSF (AIS Special Report, June 13; Mada Masr, September 14).
Most regional and international actors reject the Tasis State as a threat to Sudan’s sovereignty. The UN Security Council rejected the declaration of a rival state in Sudan, calling it “a direct threat to Sudan’s territorial integrity” (UN News, August 13). It has also been opposed by many Arab states, including Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia (The New Arab, March 6). Other opposition comes from the United States and the African Union (AU), which suspended Sudan’s membership in 2021. Besides the UAE, the Tasis State’s supporters include Khalifa Haftar’s (Arabic: خليفة حفتر) eastern Libya, Chad, Kenya, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic.
THE SAF–TSC Government
The internationally recognized SAF–TSC (Arabic: مجلس السيادة الانتقالي, “Transitional Sovereignty Council,” TSC) government is struggling to assert legitimacy against both domestic rivals and international skepticism. Based in Port Sudan, it is making its own bid for legitimacy in the face of what it regards as exclusion from international peace efforts supported by the Quad, the UN, and the AU. Declaring it will not negotiate without a declaration of its legitimacy, the SAF–TSC has also rejected all efforts to place the RSF on an equal footing. It insists only a military resolution can bring peace to Sudan (Mada Masr, September 20).
The new civilian prime minister faces internal resistance from powerful rebel leaders-turned-officials. On May 19, Kamil Idris (Arabic: كامل الطيب إدريس) was appointed Sudan’s first civilian prime minister since 2022 by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the SAF, chair of the TSC, and the de facto ruler of Sudan. Shortly afterward, the new prime minister tried to expel two powerful former rebel leaders from the TSC cabinet: JEM’s minister of finance, Dr. Jibril Ibrahim (Arabic: جبريل ابراهيم), and Darfur governor Minni Arko Minawi. This was quickly overruled by al-Burhan, who doubtless has no desire to see these leaders and their valuable troops depart the SAF-led coalition (Al Jazeera, July 23). Many former rebel leaders and their subordinates gained their positions as TSC ministers under the terms of the 2020 Juba peace agreement (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, April 21, 2021).
Traditional Parties Divided
Sudan’s National Umma Party is divided between factions backing either the SAF–TSC or the RSF. The National Umma Party is the political arm of Sudan’s neo-Mahdist movement, a particular form of Sudanese nationalism with a history of influence. It has been a strong political force in Sudan since independence under the leadership of descendants of its founder, Abdul Rahman al-Mahdi (Arabic: عبد الرحمن المهدي), the son of Muhammad Ahmad, “the Mahdi” (1843–1885), who led the Mahdist state in Sudan. The party is currently divided, with a faction led by acting head Mohamed Abdallah al-Douma (Arabic: محمد عبدالله الدومة) backing the Port Sudan SAF–TSC government while a faction led by Fadlallah Burma Nasser (Arabic: فضل الله برمة ناصر) supports the RSF and the creation of a parallel Sudanese state (Sudan Tribune, July 8). Nasser has accepted an appointment to be speaker of the Tasis government’s legislative council.
The Democratic Unionist Party (Arabic: الحزب الإتحادي الديمقراطي, DUP) is engulfed in a leadership struggle that has spilled into the wider conflict. The DUP is the NUP’s historical rival, led by Sayyid Muhammad Othman al-Mirghani (Arabic: محمد عثمان الميرغني), the 89-year-old leader of the historically pro-Egyptian Khatmiyya Sufi order (Arabic: الطريقة الختمية) and descendant of the order’s founder, Ali al-Mirghani (Arabic: علي الميرغني), who died in 1968. The leadership of the DUP is in turmoil after decrees allegedly issued by Sayyid al-Mirghani on June 24 replaced the party leader’s son, Jaafar al-Sadiq (Arabic: جعفر الصادق الميرغني), as deputy leader with Ahmad Saad Omar (Arabic: أحمد سعد عمر), a loyalist of deposed president Omar al-Bashir. Many DUP leaders allege the maneuver was the work of another of al-Mirghani’s sons, Abdallah al-Mahjub (Arabic: عبدالله المحجوب الميرغني), taking advantage of the elderly Sufi leader—known publicly for expressing support for the SAF, but who boasts little other political involvement (Altaghyeer.info, July 8, 2024; Sudan Tribune, June 25).
A faction of the DUP under Ibrahim al-Mirghani (Arabic: ابراهيم الميرغني) has come out in support of the RSF and the Tasis alliance. A DUP spokesman declared in February that “the presence of Ibrahim Ahmed al-Mirghani does not represent the party in any way, and he only represents himself and the constituencies that entrusted him with the mission” (SUNA, February 20). Ibrahim al-Mirghani is married to Sky News Arabia reporter Tasabih Mubarak (Arabic: تسابيح مبارك), who received exclusive access to al-Fashir after the RSF captured the city (X/@TsabihAli, November 10). Some criticized her as a propaganda tool, alleging her goal was to whitewash or deny the RSF’s crimes in the city (X/@aloqeliy, November 10).
The Islamists Return
Bashir-era Islamists have reentered Sudan’s conflict through SAF-aligned militias and political networks. Much like the RSF-led Tasis coalition, the “official” SAF–TSC government and its armed supporters also constitute a tenuous alliance. Complicating its own search for legitimacy is the presence within the coalition of many Islamists, including veterans of the discredited military-Islamist government of Omar al-Bashir, who was deposed in 2019 and is currently wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of war crimes, torture, and genocide. Islamist militias under SAF command have played a major role in the fighting, most notably the al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion (Arabic: كتيبة البراء بن مالك), which is tied to the National Congress Party (Arabic: حزب المؤتمر الوطني, NCP).
The current NCP leadership rejects liberal political models and calls for a military-supported state. The NCP, which ruled Sudan from 1998 to 2019, is currently led by Ahmad Haroun (Arabic: أحمد هارون), who is wanted by the ICC on charges of war crimes and genocide in Darfur. Haroun believes Western political models are inappropriate for Sudan and that there must be a political role for the army, but insists the Islamists will wait to seek power via the ballot box after the war’s conclusion (Sudan Tribune, July 25; Arab Weekly, July 26).
The RSF views the Islamists as central architects of the conflict and vows to dismantle their militias (Sudan Tribune, July 25). Tasis’ prime minister al-Ta’aishi explained in an interview that General al-Burhan has “benefited from the Islamists’ infiltration of the military establishment” and that he “became the general who served the Islamists most after the [2019] revolution” (Assayha, October 16). The Tasis Alliance has declared it will dissolve all Islamist militias affiliated with the NCP after they take control of Sudan (Ash Sharq al-Awsat, March 4).
Conclusion
Sudan’s conflict is driven by competing coalitions whose internal divisions prevent any stable outcome. There are not just two groups fighting for power in Sudan, but many who flocked to one or the other of the major coalitions (RSF and SAF) to further their own interests, even when that has meant splitting existing movements. In turn, the leaders of the major coalitions have become beholden to unreliable partners with a track record of opportunism. In this situation, a victory by either side may mark not the end of the conflict, but the starting point of a new one. In Sudan’s prior War in Darfur, the SAF and the Janjaweed (the precursors of the RSF) led by Hemedti were allies. Now, they lead opposite sides of the current conflict. There is no reason to believe this cycle should not repeat—regardless of whether the SAF or RSF emerges victorious in the short term.
The internationally supported SAF–TSC coalition remains constrained by military dominance and the legacy of Islamist rule. The civilian leaders in the TSC are in thrall to the military, particularly chairman General al-Burhan. While many civilian members reject a return to the political Islamism of the era of President al-Bashir, they must contend with the fact that the northern Arab generals of the SAF are precisely those who survived the frequent purges of non-Islamist officers during the Bashir regime, and therefore are far more prone to be sympathetic to, or explicitly advancing, the interests of Islamists.
Similarly, the RSF’s new bureaucratic facade cannot hide its reliance on a predatory paramilitary elite. The new Tasis State is not without its own international support, but these backers remain focused on what can be gained by supporting a paramilitary that has adopted a veneer of statehood. In spite of attempted external appearances, the Tasis Alliance is incapable of running a 21st-century administration with any objective beyond the enrichment of its leadership. Likewise, the inability of both RSF and SAF commanders to envision the possibility of a Sudanese nation led by a member of Sudan’s non-Arab majority guarantees further rounds of combat focused on the pursuit of ethnic-based power sharing.
Both the SAF and the RSF rely on deliberate atrocities to secure political and territorial gains. On the battlefield, ongoing atrocities by both the SAF and the RSF mean there is little to choose between them in a humanitarian sense. Beyond the deliberate destruction of national infrastructure (much of which is the now ruined and irreplaceable legacy of the brief days of oil wealth before the separation of South Sudan), a recent UN report entitled “A War of Atrocities” found both sides guilty of adopting a brutal approach to achieving their attainment of power: “Both sides have deliberately targeted civilians through attacks, summary executions, arbitrary detention, torture, and inhuman treatment in detention facilities, including denial of food, sanitation, and medical care. These are not accidental tragedies but deliberate strategies amounting to war crimes” (UN Human Rights Council, September 5).
Sudan’s emerging two-state trajectory promises only prolonged instability and renewed cycles of conflict. Ultimately, the division of Sudan into two dysfunctional states rather than one cannot offer the Sudanese people the prospect of stability or prosperity.
Notes:
[1] “Special Report: No Safe Haven: Bombardment of Abu Shouk IDP Camp and El-Fasher’s Increasing Berm Encirclement,” September 11, 2025, https://files-profile.medicine.yale.edu/documents/e3d32307-89f9-4573-8c87-fc7d15239a9f
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