Executive Summary:
- On January 22, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly publicly stated that increasing “competition” from Russia in the Arctic and the region’s strategic importance make strengthening Allied deterrence and defensive posture in the High North essential.
- Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has increased the securitization of the High North by reframing its approach to the Arctic from development-focused to a region essential for military deterrence.
- Russia’s military posture in the Arctic relies on a blended toolkit of government tools, dual-use infrastructure, and diplomatic posturing to strengthen Russian control over access routes and to impose uncertainty on NATO planning.
On January 22, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly publicly stated that increasing “competition” from Russia in the Arctic and the region’s strategic importance make strengthening Allied deterrence and defensive posture in the High North essential (NATO PA, January 22). There is a growing consensus within NATO that developments in the Arctic should be regarded as an indispensable aspect of the Allied efforts to adapt to its evolving Northern Flank (NATO, January 12). Since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has increased its engagement in the Arctic. The Arctic has gained a central importance for Russia’s deterrence credibility, reinforcement routes, and escalation management amid growing pressure from Western Allies, including sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and post-2022 NATO enlargement (see EDM, March 31, April 7, 2025).
Before 2022, Russia’s Arctic engagement was mainly framed in terms of economic development, modernization, and regional cooperation (Security Council of Russia, March 5, 2020). Russia’s 2021–2023 chairmanship of the Arctic Council, which was mostly focused on economic and cultural activities aimed at enhancing regional cooperation, illustrates this point (Government of Russia, May 15, 2021).
Since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, securing Arctic military interests for deterrence and pressure on NATO has become Russia’s core objective in the region. The Kremlin claims that the main drivers of this shift are Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO accession, which allows the alliance enhanced coordination across the Baltic–Nordic–Arctic regions, strengthens NATO’s air and maritime capabilities, and expands its situational awareness and reinforcement options in the High North (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 28, 2022; The Arctic Institute, October 31, 2024). In Russia’s 2023 foreign policy concept, the Kremlin explicitly stated that its core objective in the Arctic is to “neutralize” the ongoing “militarization of unfriendly states” in the region. Russia views this militarization as “limiting [its] ability to exercise its sovereign rights in the Arctic zone” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2023). Russia’s 2022 maritime doctrine stated that the principal threat to Russia’s national security is the expansion of foreign naval presence in the Arctic, which Moscow views as a threat to its control over the Northern Sea Route (NSR) (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 31, 2022)
Russia’s military buildup in the Arctic is not about responding to the “hostile actions” of NATO. Russia’s Arctic buildup is driven by its fear of having limited space for its maneuvers in other theaters traditionally used by Russia as tools of deterrence and pressure against Europe and NATO. Russia seeks to shape NATO’s decision-making process by creating uncertainty. The Arctic is a space where Russia can demonstrate resolve, test NATO response thresholds, and preserve escalation leverage without engaging in overt military conflict.
The core objective of Russia’s post-February 2022 Arctic strategy is to preserve its deterrence credibility while shaping the operating environment to limit NATO’s freedom of maneuver. Russia’s “bastion” concept—a strategy with origins in the 1970s to protect its nuclear submarines in heavily defended near-shore zones—remains central (Upravlenie, August 27, 2024). This strategy is primarily implemented around the Kola Peninsula, where Russia’s strategic nuclear assets are based. For decades, Russia has used this system in combination with anti-access and area-denial tactics to prevent foreign vessels from entering the waters within Russia’s professed sphere. This build-up intensified after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which Russia reinforces with nuclear-powered icebreakers, strengthening its ability to control and develop Arctic territories and complicating the deployment of foreign forces in the region (Upravlenie, August 27, 2024).
Russia has bolstered its Arctic military posture in the High North since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian long-range military patrol aircraft, Ту-142МК, have conducted unique aerial refueling in regional skies, demonstrated improved surveillance capabilities, and shown anti-submarine and wide-area control capabilities (TASS, February 9). Russia is also deploying new satellite constellations to ensure uninterrupted monitoring of the air, surface, and maritime domains in the Arctic (Paluba, January 31, 2023). Russia’s introduction of the nuclear icebreaker, Yakutiya, capable of escorting vessels through heavy Arctic ice year-round, strengthens the Kremlin’s ability to control navigation and logistics along the NSR (Glavnii Regional’nii, January 14, 2025).
The implementation of dual-use infrastructure is also an important aspect of Russia’s recent Arctic strategy. Russia builds port, airfield, and logistics hubs, and enhances communication capabilities under the guise of economic development, while also positioning these capabilities to support military mobility and operational sustainment (see EDM, June 18, 2025). In December 2025, for instance, Russia President Vladimir Putin issued a decree “On some issues of the Maritime Collegium of the Russian Federation,” which envisions the development of Transatlantic Transport Corridor, a system of maritime, railway, and transport routes connecting the European part of Russia (Murmansk, Arkhangelsk) with the Far East via the NSR (President of Russia, December 8, 2025). Dual-use assets, which can rapidly switch between civilian and military functions, create ambiguity and reduce response times during armed conflict. Military use of civilian infrastructure makes Russia’s intent harder to interpret and NATO response options harder to calibrate, supporting the Kremlin’s broader strategy of escalation management and uncertainty maintenance.
Russia has strengthened its Arctic military posture since February 2022 through new legislation and diplomatic signaling. On November 30, 2022, the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation adopted the “Law on navigation along the Northern Sea Route,” which established a permit regime for the passage of foreign warships and other government vessels, requiring diplomatic notification or authorization at least 90 days before the planned transit (Federation Council, November 30, 2022). The law also limits the presence of these vessels to one at a time. On September 24, 2025, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published its position on “Definition and Legal Status of the Northern Sea Route,” asserting that the navigation through these waters is subject to a Russian permit regime and regulatory controls (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2025). Together with military exercises and patrols, these administrative restrictions, enforcement patterns, and “sovereignty” narratives allow Russia to introduce uncertainty into NATO planning by projecting control below the threshold of open confrontation (Bezopasnaia Arktika 2025).
Unlike NATO—which has not increased its collective presence in the region even after Finland’s and Sweden’s membership—Russia considers the Arctic a vital element of its national security and power projection (see EDM, June 18, 20, October 3, 2025). This prioritization allows Russia to increase the uncertainty and risks of NATO activity in the Arctic through investments in military infrastructure, deployments, and operational activity, while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict to test NATO decision-making and transatlantic unity under ambiguous conditions. If Russia concludes that imposing gradual costs is feasible without triggering a meaningful response, it may be encouraged to continue to push Allied resolve.
Since at least 2024, NATO leadership has publicly stated the importance of strengthening deterrence, resilience, and risk management capabilities in response to Russia’s activities in the Arctic. NATO has highlighted the necessity of integrating the region into the collective defense and transatlantic reinforcement (NATO, October 21, 2024). Given weather restrictions, conducting NATO operations in the Arctic depends on fragile infrastructure, undersea connectivity, port access, and other logistical considerations, all of which are increasingly vulnerable to Russian sabotage.
Following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has regarded the Arctic as an essential deterrence space and escalation management platform. To reinforce this objective, Russia has been actively utilizing a blended toolkit of securitized access, dual-use infrastructure, new legislation, and selective signaling to preserve strategic flexibility and restrict NATO’s freedom of action in the region. Headline deployments do not define Russia’s threat in the Arctic, but by the uncertainty and escalatory leverage that the Kremlin seeks to sow.
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