Executive Summary:
- Russian media and commentators argue that U.S.–Israeli airstrikes alone are unlikely to defeat the Iranian regime, predicting that Tehran can outlast political resolve in Washington.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin has responded cautiously to the war, condemning the killing of former Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but otherwise staying largely silent to balance Russia’s partnership with Iran while avoiding confrontation with U.S. President Donald Trump.
- Russian analysts predict mixed consequences from the conflict in Iran. The Kremlin may see short-term gains from higher oil prices, but it is also facing disruptions to its sanction-bypassing trade networks and uncertainty about how the conflict could affect its war against Ukraine.
The shock in Moscow from the February 28 launch of ongoing U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran has eased, and extensive Russian commentary has shifted to asserting that superior air power alone cannot guarantee a meaningful victory. The Russian media claims that Iran is resilient and asserts strong local support for the regime, presenting the U.S. demand for “unconditional surrender” as entirely unrealistic (Vedomosti, March 6; MK.RU, March 7). Pro-Kremlin outlets resolutely condemn the killing of former Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, portraying his leadership as spiritual and failing to mention his responsibility for extensive repression (Kommersant, March 1; TopWar.ru, March 6). They argue that Iran’s capacity to absorb air strikes is greater than U.S. President Donald Trump’s resolve to sustain them (RIA Novosti, March 7).
The ambivalence in Russian pundits’ opinions is caused by the lack of direction from Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin has publicly remained silent about the new war after decrying Khamenei’s “assassination” as a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law” in a condolence message (President of Russia, March 1). Putin is apparently trying to perform a balancing act and confirm Russia’s commitment to a partnership with Iran without inviting Trump’s anger amid ongoing talks on Ukraine (Re: Russia, March 5). Putin appears to have taken Khamenei’s killing very personally. Semyon Slepakov, a popular Russian singer and comedian that the Kremlin branded a “foreign agent,” recorded a clip satirizing Putin’s fear of Khamenei’s fate, which has become an instant hit on Russian social media (News Lenta; Facebook/Semyon Slepakov, March 6). Cultivating rapport with Trump remains hugely important for Putin. The Kremlin is shying away from direct criticism of high-level decision-making in Washington (Meduza, March 2).
The Kremlin is allowing the Russian media to speculate about U.S. public opinion about the U.S. and Israeli airstrikes against Iran (Vedomosti, March 5). Russian media typically asserts that the U.S. public wants the White House to wrap up combat operations as soon as possible, but that curtailing the duration of the war will make substantive U.S. victory impossible (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 4; Kommersant, March 6).
Pro-Kremlin commentators also stress the lack of European consensus on the war, and predict the subsequent erosion of trans-Atlantic unity (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 3). Russian pundits ridicule the Baltic states’ solidarity with the U.S. operation. Separately, French President Emmanuel Macron’s March 2 announcement of a major shift in France’s nuclear policy—which would establish nuclear security guarantees for Germany and other European allies—has aroused concern in Moscow (Kommersant, March 2; Izvestiya, March 7). The Kremlin often takes Macron’s rhetoric with a big grain of salt, but this nuclear policy change is a definitive sign of Europe’s growing determination to counter Russia’s nuclear brinkmanship (Novaya Gazeta Europe, March 2; MK.RU, March 7).
Many Russian commentators expect a new windfall of oil export revenue because of turmoil in the Persian Gulf. Some Russian experts, however, warn that volatility in the global oil market may be short-lived because of the U.S. public’s low tolerance for higher gas costs (MK.RU, March 5; Argumenty i fakty, March 8). One lasting change may be India’s position on importing oil from Russia. On March 5, the United States issued India a 30-day license to purchase Russian oil, and dozens of Russian “shadow fleet” tankers that were drifting in the Arabian Sea have rushed to unload at the Vadinar refinery in Gujarat, India, some even before restrictions were officially eased (The Moscow Times, March 6). Even mainstream Russian commentators acknowledge, nevertheless, that any possible increase in oil income would not be enough to eliminate the federal budget’s deficit that has grown at an unprecedented rate since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Izvestiya, March 6). One impact that offsets the positive trade balance is the interruption of trade routes with the Gulf states, particularly the United Arab Emirates, which has become a major logistical hub for Russian imports (Forbes.ru, March 5). The Russian supply chains for circumventing Western sanctions, including those that supply materials and technologies to the Russian military-industrial complex, have been disrupted and will be difficult to quickly reassemble (The Bell, March 5).
Russian experts are primarily concerned about how the conflagration in the Persian Gulf will impact Putin’s war against Ukraine. The intensity of on-ground attacks in the Donbas and missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian cities—except for Russia’s March 7 strike on Kharkiv—have decreased since the February 28 start of the U.S.–Israeli aerial campaign (The Insider, March 6; Radio Svoboda, March 8). One reason may be the slowing of “commercial” recruitment—as fewer Russian men are interested in signing contracts to serve in the “kill-zone,” even for extra-high bonuses—while Russian public support for continuing the war keeps shrinking (Levada Center, March 3; Riddle, March 5). The main reason, however, may be Putin’s reluctance to irritate Trump while his attention has drifted away from Ukraine, postponing talks on a “peace deal” (Re: Russia; March 5). Commentators in Moscow have noted that the duo of Trump’s negotiators, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, conducted talks with Iran that provided a cover-up for preparations for the massive attack, which they argue undermines Russian trust in the U.S.–Ukraine–Russia negotiations format (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 3). Jingoist Russian bloggers argue that Kyiv’s expressed support for the U.S. airstrikes on Iran will not help it to obtain Patriot missiles, which are also needed in Kuwait and Qatar, and may erode European support for Ukraine (Svobodnaya Pressa, March 6).
Russian regime-aligned geopolitical experts predict that Iran will ultimately withstand the U.S.–Israeli attack. U.S. moves against Russia’s partners, however, may be dangerous for the Kremlin. Cuba may come under more U.S. pressure, and Russia’s inability to help its traditional partners would be exposed yet again (see EDM, January 22). Trump may opt to reduce tensions with the People’s Republic of China and offer to cut tariffs during his visit scheduled for April, shrinking Russia’s space for political maneuvering. In any case, Putin does not want to be held responsible for taking the side of U.S. adversaries, so reports that the Kremlin is providing intelligence to Iran are certain to be vigorously denied.
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