Executive Summary:
- Russia is attempting to claim relevance in the Middle East while siding with Iran and providing intelligence on U.S. assets, while being sidelined by both the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
- The PRC is conducting its own mediation efforts without acknowledging any Kremlin role and continues to keep Moscow at arm’s length.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to retain Iran as a vital partner and extract leverage in negotiations over Ukraine, yet he is failing to accept the reality of Russia’s dwindling relevance in the Middle East.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to claim a relevant role in the Middle East while being largely ignored and pushed aside by major actors, including the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Putin told U.S. President Donald Trump during a phone call on March 9 that Russia wants to “be helpful” in the Middle East. Trump replied that Putin could be more helpful by meaningfully engaging in efforts to end Russia’s war against Ukraine (The White House, March 10). The Kremlin has not budged on its demands for full control of Ukrainian territory that it illegally annexed in 2022, yet it continues to blame Kyiv for stalling progress in talks (see EDM, February 24; President of Russia, March 9). Meanwhile, the PRC has already begun mediation efforts in the Middle East with no public recognition of the Kremlin’s stated desire to do the same (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 10). Putin is failing to recognize that Russia’s role is irrelevant and unwanted in the Middle East right now and that he is being pushed aside as a result.
Putin has been upping the ante on building friendly relations with Iran’s new leadership as the Kremlin worries about losing another important international partner since the U.S.–Israeli strikes began. Putin hopes to mediate peace negotiations, likely to gain concessions from the United States on Russia’s position toward Ukraine (see EDM, June 27, 2025, February 23; RBC, March 10). The Kremlin continues to tout this potential mediation role even as reports circulate that it provided Tehran with information that could help strike U.S. warships, aircraft, and other assets in the region (Associated Press, March 7).
The Kremlin’s behavior is echoing that of June 2025, when it was quick to condemn U.S. military action against Iran as a violation of international law and global nuclear norms, and to express Putin’s role as mediator (RBC, June 20, 26, 2025; see EDM, June 27, 2025). Whatever chance the Kremlin stood then of attempting to mediate is all but forgotten and ignored as Putin has clearly and fully now sided with Iran. Putin initially expressed condolences for the killing of former Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s “assassination” as a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law” (President of Russia, March 1; see EDM, March 2). Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called the U.S.–Israeli strikes against Iran “an unprovoked armed attack” and a violation of international law (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 28). Putin has now endorsed the newly appointed Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei, with unwavering support and encouraged him to continue his father’s work in the “face of severe trials” (President of Russia; Interfax, March 9).
Putin’s phone call with Trump occurred a few hours after his message to Mojtaba. The call lasted more than an hour, according to the Kremlin, and was the first between Putin and Trump since December 2025 (President of Russia, March 9). The Kremlin’s press release emphasizes Putin’s attempts to offer solutions for a “speedy political and diplomatic settlement,” while omitting the Kremlin’s support for Mojtaba, which was given only a few hours prior (President of Russia, March 9).
The PRC has already begun mediation efforts by sending a special envoy to the region, according to its foreign ministry (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 10). Beijing has remained formulaic in its language toward the international legality of the strikes, calling for restraint and de-escalation while focusing on preventing risks to international trade through the Strait of Hormuz (PRC State Council Information Office, March 5; PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 6). PRC messaging has avoided mentioning Mojtaba Khamenei beyond his appointment under the Iranian constitution and has emphasized non‑interference in Iran’s internal affairs (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 10). Beijing has not acknowledged any Kremlin role in its mediation efforts, even though the Kremlin has tried to align with the PRC in condemning the U.S.–Israeli strikes (Interfax, February 28).
Russia itself is hemorrhaging domestically and desperate to remain relevant internationally while bringing nothing meaningful to the table (see EDM, November 26, 2025). Russia has offered no material support to Iran since the recent U.S.–Israeli strikes despite its Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Iran, signed in January 2025 (Russian Foreign Ministry, October 2, 2025; Radio Svoboda, February 23). The strikes on Iran come as Putin has been attempting to manage problems across some of Russia’s most important international partnerships (see EDM, February 27). The Kremlin may temporarily benefit from rising oil prices resulting from the conflict, as Russian crude oil has surged above $70 a barrel since the interruption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz (President of Russia, March 9; The Moscow Times, March 11). This would help a Russian war economy that has become reliant on the PRC for capital, technology, and resources (see EDM, January 30, February 13, 27). It is unclear, however, how long the price boost will hold after the International Energy Agency (IEA) announced on March 11 the release of 400 million barrels of oil to ease market fears, the largest oil stock release on record (IEA, March 11).
As Putin continues to push for Russia’s relevance in the Middle East, the gap between his self-perception and the reality he refuses to acknowledge is becoming more visible. The real issue is that no one seems to want the Kremlin involved in the Middle East, and Putin cannot accept that, nor what it means for his own relevance.
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