The Syrian civil war has shifted into a new phase, one that was unthinkable just a few short days ago. The rebels, largely led by the former al-Qaeda affiliate Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and their leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, have conducted a lightning offensive through major cities, eventually taking the capital of Damascus on December 8th. The Assad regime, which had ruled Syria for over 53 years, suddenly collapsed as Bashar al-Assad fled to Moscow.
Suddenly, HTS have gone from ruling a besieged enclave to the kingmakers of a new Syria. Al-Jolani insists that his organization has changed, promising to protect human rights and minority communities. American policymakers should not be credulous. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s record, the consistent trend of deception in jihadism and western naïveté demands extreme suspicion until proven otherwise.
Nevertheless, some analysts are optimistic. Charles Lister at the Middle East Institute points to some encouraging signs of a substantive shift in HTS’ ideology. For the last few years Lister has highlighted al-Jolani’s willingness to reach out to other opposition groups and promises to protect non-Arab communities. There could be something to this shift. When HTS distanced itself from al-Qaeda, it was accompanied by what appears to be a widespread purge, including arrests and assassinations of members reluctant to sever ties. Additionally, there are some signs that HTS has, for the moment, moderated its stance on various minority communities. For now, Christians in Idlib are allowed to celebrate mass publicly. HTS has also reached out to Druze communities to help them supply water to villages in areas like Jabal al-Summaq. Even skeptic James Jeffrey, our former Special Representative for Syria Engagement admitted in his PBS interview that al-Jolani is likely our least bad option among various Sunni opposition groups.
However, the facts on the ground should caution the US from reaching out to al-Jolani and HTS. His record belies the likelihood of a lasting shift away from radicalism. Al-Jolani got his start as an al Qaeda operative fighting American forces, ironically as part of an Assad regime program to send jihadists to Iraq. There he worked with longtime Osama bin Laden associate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and later Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the eventual leader of ISIS. He returned home with al-Baghdadi’s blessing to found al-Nusra Front, the official al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. His stated goal was not only the overthrow of the Assad regime but also the establishment of sharia in Syria. Even after al-Nusra Front ostensibly split with al-Qaeda, he continued to admonish his forces to reject the West. Unsurprisingly his tenure as an al-Qaeda leader was not a moderate one. While under al-Zarqawi’s command in Iraq, they conducted a campaign of sectarian killings, sparking a Sunni-Shi’a civil war. While HTS was still known as al-Nusra Front, they were responsible for shooting and beheading Christian, Druze and Alawite civilians in 2013.
What’s more likely than a professed “road to Damascus” moment, is that al-Jolani’s rebrand is deceptively tactical. For jihadist organizations, dishonesty is an acceptable strategy of advancing the jihad under the concept of taqiyya. While originally an obscure Shi’a tenet about surviving persecution, Sajjan Gohel points out in his book Doctor, Teacher, Terrorist: The Life and Legacy of Al-Qaeda Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, that it developed into a doctrine of advancing their goals while professing moderation.
Analysts like Thomas Joscelyn believe that this supposed split with al-Qaeda is a ruse. Al-Jolani’s own statement highlighted al-Nusra’s Front relationship with al-Qaeda had justified outside military involvement in Syria. Rather than a split over ideology, al-Jolani’s reasoning was they needed to change their affiliation to better achieve their aims. Even referring to al-Qaeda as an “external entity,” was likely worded to give his fighters wiggle room on future cooperation. This move was likely influenced by longtime Syrian jihadi Abu Jaber, who advised that,”The Jihad must be a popular jihad,” to justify garnering more support for their cause. Even if the split is real, it does not mean that they have abandoned their goal of an authoritarian Syria.
Too often policymakers presume that disagreement among jihadists must mean that one faction is more moderate. In reality this type of infighting between two extremes is quite common. FBI agent Ali Soufan argues in his Black Banners that it goes back to al-Qaeda’s roots. A classic example of this naïveté is how the split between al-Qaeda and ISIS was portrayed in western media. Newspapers like the Guardian wrote of al-Qaeda’s concern that ISIS was too “brutal” and “hardline,” when in reality it was again simply tactical.
Even if HTS is no longer interested in al-Qaeda’s specific brand, it still remains a deeply violent organization that will pose a threat to Christians and other minorities. Aaron Zelin, researcher and author of The Age of Political Jihadism: A Study of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, does not believe that the core of HTS’ philosophy has meaningfully changed since their days as an al-Qaeda affiliate. He reminds us that we need to listen to what, “HTS are saying to their local audience and not merely following their public pronouncements aimed at the West.” While it is true that HTS has transformed into a full blown government, this has not moderated their philosophy.
For al-Jolani, the entire purpose of his government is to implement, “benevolent sharia…the foremost of our priorities.” Zelin’s research indicates that despite their moderating public statements, everything from education to the criminal justice system is about the “rule of Islam.” As such HTS remains predictably brutal to those who are not Sunni Muslims. As of 2022, over five hundred Christian properties were confiscated by HTS in Idlib. Druze and Alawites face similar property confiscations as well as continued executions and forced conversion. Additionally, HTS have instituted religious police to, “beat up, flog, or imprison violators,” especially women who are dressed improperly or traveling without a male relative. Reporting on dissent within HTS territory can be difficult as they have forcibly shut down news on the basis of, “the channel’s bias and hostile policy toward local factions.”
There is not much evidence that terrorists who avoid overseas attacks and begin governing their territory become more just to the people they rule. Zelin notes that this trend is not unique. Since the early 2010s, organizations like the Afghan Taliban, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan all have gone down similar paths only to remain as extreme as ever. The parallel to Afghanistan is especially troubling for Syria’s religious minorities given that al-Jolani has gone out of his way to praise the Taliban as a model in his 2021 “Blessing to the Taliban.”
For the moment, the US should not expect HTS to turn over a new leaf. Despite substantial changes HTS has gone through in the last few years, policymakers should be extremely skeptical of any professed changes regarding religious minorities. While this does not mean anyone should mourn the fall of Assad’s regime which was ruthless to Syrians to all faiths, it does mean we cannot afford to be overly optimistic. HTS’ own background, their double-dealing, and how they currently govern their own territory does not demonstrate a truly changed organization, despite al-Jolani’s recent statements.