Executive Summary:
- Energy diplomacy has become a key feature in relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries, with solar projects supporting the declared goal of promoting a full clean energy supply chain.
- Chinese enterprises have capitalized on LAC countries’ interest in securing sustainable energy partners, whether motivated by climate insecurity or, in the case of Cuba, U.S. sanctions.
- PRC–Cuba energy cooperation could go farther, but PRC state prioritization and commercial interests have prioritized relations in the broader region.
In 2019, when Barbados sought an affordable electric fleet as part of a government commitment to achieve net zero by 2035, Chinese electric vehicle firm BYD (比亚迪) submitted the winning bid. In April 2025, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) donated 30 electric buses to the small Caribbean nation, which followed up later in the year to procure an additional 35. Barbados now has the largest fleet of electric public transit vehicles in the Caribbean, but it is only one example of a broader pattern (Barbados Today, April 12, 2025; Barbados Ministry of Transport and Works, December 31, 2025). Across the Caribbean, stable states with credible climate commitments have found in the PRC a willing hardware partner; one that moves at speeds and offers price points that Western institutions have rarely matched.
The PRC’s relationship with Cuba, however, tells a different story. Beijing has helped connect 49 new solar parks to the Cuban national grid since 2023, in one of the fastest ever renewable energy transitions in a developing country. Yet blackouts continue.
Beijing’s commitment and provision of hardware is the same in each case, but the conditions of the recipient state differ significantly. While much of the Caribbean has functioning institutions and open procurement processes, Cuba has endured 60 years of embargo and a collapsing electricity grid. The PRC has become the Caribbean’s dominant green energy partner, but its impact is shaped as much by what it encounters as by what it brings.
PRC Energy Diplomacy in the Caribbean
The PRC’s proactive energy diplomacy has won it many customers across the region. Chinese firms send equipment such as photovoltaic panels, buses, and microgrids, install it in weeks, and hand it over without explicit conditions. Some Chinese analysts contrast this approach with that of the United States, which they argue uses climate aid to small island states as a “strategic lever” (抓手) for expanding influence (Li Mingjie et al., 2024). [1]
Fudan University scholar Cao Ting (曹廷) frames green cooperation with the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region as a “demonstration model” (重要示范) for the PRC’s Global Development Initiative (全球发展倡议) and South–South cooperation (Cao, 2024). [2] The PRC’s most recent LAC policy document commits to cooperation across the full clean energy supply chain and explicitly pledges to accommodate the needs of small island states (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], December 10, 2025).
The demand is real. Climate damage across the Caribbean are projected to consume more than 20 percent of regional GDP by 2100, energy costs are among the highest in the world, and financing has never matched the scale or speed (Council on Foreign Relations, November 13, 2024). Rather than a geopolitical statement, purchasing Chinese green technology is simply the most affordable option for Caribbean governments.
Between 2020 –2024, Chinese green technology exports to the Caribbean grew over 570 percent, reaching $280 million annually across 13 countries (Inter-American Dialogue, July 2025). In Jamaica, the PRC has trained over 140 local solar technicians; and in Guyana and Suriname, Chinese state-owned enterprises SUMEC (苏美达集团) and Power Construction Corporation of China (PowerChina; 中国电力建设集团) are building out solar projects, including 18 megawatts of solar farms rainforest village microgrids (Renewables Now, March 28, 2024; PowerChina, April 29, 2025).
Barbados illustrate how Beijing’s strategy operates when conditions are favorable. The island’s commitment to net zero by 2035 suits Beijing’s investment framework well—the country’s development cooperation agency has noted Barbados’s solar potential clean energy plans, and the PRC’s former ambassador to Barbados named new energy as one of three priority areas for cooperation (MFA, July 30, 2024; PRC Ministry of Commerce, March 2025; SeForall, April, 2025)
Green Energy Meets Geopolitics in Cuba
Between early 2025 and early 2026, the PRC helped Cuba connect 49 new solar parks to its national grid. This followed a surge of solar equipment exports, from $5 million in 2023 to $117 million in 2025, pushing solar’s share of the island’s electricity generation to over 20 percent—one of the fastest renewable energy transitions a developing country has recorded (Microgrid Media, February 23; Ember, accessed April 14). The country has also committed to building 92 parks generating 2 gigawatts of electricity by 2028 (The Guardian, February 18).
The PRC government’s own commercial guidance notes that while Havana actively courts foreign investment in green energy, most foreign investors remain cautious due to U.S. sanctions—a gap Chinese enterprises are encouraged to fill (PRC Ministry of Commerce, December 2025). In Artemisa province, Ambassador Hua Xin (华昕) highlighted the PRC’s “commitment to Cuba’s sustainable development” (中方对古巴可持续发展的承诺), outlining a range of solar deployment projects (Xinhua, November 13, 2025). Cuba’s Vice Minister Rivas framed it in Beijing’s own vocabulary, pledging to build toward a “Cuba–China community of common destiny” (中古命运共同体) (PRC Embassy in Cuba, March 17, 2025).
Structural limits to the partnership remain, however, as evidenced by Cuba’s recent grid collapse following Washington’s decision to block Russian petroleum shipments in March 2026. Although Chinese-supplied solar parks kept generating electricity, Cuba’s Soviet-era grid, starved of fuel and investment, failed to maintain stable its provision. PRC coverage consistently blames U.S. sanctions for Cuba’s ongoing energy problems, but there is more that the PRC could do (CEPAL, December 16, 2025; Xinhua, March 22). Only four out of 55 solar parks have battery storage, and 16 percent of generation is lost in aging transmission infrastructure (Microgrid Media, February 23). A full transition would cost an estimated $8–10 billion, though no progress has been made toward bridging that gap (The Paper, March 17).
Conclusion
For Caribbean states with functioning institutions and real climate commitments, the PRC has become a welcome partner—greatly outpacing decades of efforts by Western institutions. From Barbados to Jamaica to Guyana, the pattern is consistent: green energy on the political agenda, open procurement, and a government willing to move fast. Cuba is where that model reaches its limit, however, because solar panels alone cannot substitute for the fuel Washington is actively cutting off, or a hollowed-out electricity grid. This shows the limits of ideological alignment, as revolutionary solidarity is deprioritized in preference of broader influence-building across the LAC region.
Notes
[1] Li, Mingjie; Zhang, Haiwen [李明杰、张海文]. “Practices and Implications of Climate Assistance to Small Island States from Major Powers: From the Perspective of the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty” [大国对小岛屿国家气候援助的实践及影响：以“澳图条约”为视角]. Pacific Journal [太平洋学报], 32, no. 4 (2024): 60–73.
[2] Cao, Ting [曹廷]. “China-Latin America Green Cooperation under the Global Development Initiative: Progress, Challenges and Approaches” [全球发展倡议下的中拉绿色合作：进展、挑战与路径]. China International Studies [国际问题研究], no. 2 (2024). https://www.ciis.org.cn/gjwtyj/dqqk/202406/P020240606452608243732.pdf.
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