Executive Summary:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin has replaced Dagestan Governor Sergey Melikov and his team with Fyodor Shchukin, head of Dagestan’s Supreme Court, after long being unhappy with the situation in that North Caucasus republic increasingly important to Moscow.
- In doing so, the Kremlin leader has continued the approach he first took with Melikov’s predecessor, appointing an outsider and a non-Muslim to head Muslim Dagestan. He is now inserting a judge rather than a general to try to quiet and control the situation.
- Given that both former leaders, who were generals, responded to all problems with repression, that might seem to open the way to improvement. Putin’s continuing use of outsiders to control that ethnically complex republic, however, threatens to make a bad situation even worse.
Long known to be unhappy with the situation in Dagestan, Russian President Vladimir Putin is replacing Dagestan Governor Sergey Melikov with Fyodor Shchukin, head of Dagestan’s Supreme Court (Vedomosti, April 6; Govorit Nemoskva, April 30; Kavkazskii Uzel, May 4). Dagestan is increasingly restive at a time when it is ever more important to Moscow for developing its north–south trade corridor with Iran. The “last straw” in Melikov’s time in leadership was his incompetent handling of recent flooding in the republic (Kavkazskii Uzel, May 1 [1], [2]). In doing replacing him, the Kremlin leader has continued the approach he took with Melikov’s predecessor, Vladimir Vasilyev, who headed Dagestan between 2017 and 2021, by appointing an outsider and non-Muslim to head Muslim Dagestan, something he had avoided doing earlier during his tenure (Agentstvo, April 30).
Putin’s latest action has made two significant changes. On the one hand, he has taken the unprecedented step of declaring his preferred candidate to head the Dagestani government, rather than simply appointing the republic’s head, a departure from his approach in other federal subjects to date. On the other hand, the Moscow leader is now inserting a judge rather than an interior ministry general as head of the republic to try to control a situation that had slipped further out of Moscow’s hands under Melikov (Kasparov.ru, May 1). Given that both Melikov and Vasilyev responded to problems with repression, that might seem to open the way to improvement—as some want to believe (EkhoFM; Akcenty, May 4). In practice, however, Putin’s continuing use of outsiders to control the most ethnically complex non-Russian republic within the Russian Federation threatens to make a bad situation worse (see EDM, October 13, 2017). It may re-energize Muslim and ethnic opposition to Moscow and tarnish Putin’s reputation as the man who brought the North Caucasus to heel (see EDM, April 6, 2023; see Perspectives, September 26, 2025).
Melikov’s five years in office have truly been a disaster from many points of view. Even as Moscow shifted the headquarters of its Caspian Flotilla to Dagestan and made it a key part of Russia’s north–south trade corridor with Iran, the situation in Dagestan deteriorated (Interfax, April 2, 2018; Kaspiiskii Vestnik, January 5, 2025; Kavkazskii Uzel, May 1). Demonstrations against the draft at the start of Putin’s expanded war against Ukraine were larger in Dagestan than in any other federal subject (see Perspectives, September 26, 2025). The 2023 pogroms at the Makhachkala airport and in Derbent attracted negative international attention (see EDM, November 1, 2, 2023). The security situation deteriorated not only in rural areas but also in cities and among elites, calling into question Putin’s claim to have pacified the region (Kavkazskii Uzel, May 1). Relations between key elites in Dagestan and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov deteriorated amid border tensions (see EDM, May 9, 2024; Kavkazskii Uzel, May 1).
Most worrisome, Islamist fundamentalism during Melikov’s tenure spread from rural villages to the republic elites and helped drive armed attacks on officials (see EDM, June 25, 2024, May 15, 2025). Perhaps most striking is that Putin did not act sooner. Instead of waiting until the end of Melikov’s term, he moved to replace him while attempting to present Melikov’s tenure as successful, stating that he would be moved to another, as of yet unannounced, position (Telegram/@rian_ru, April 30). Given Melikov’s ties to the security community, Putin may have done so to avoid further offending the siloviki.
Putin has named 49-year-old Shchukin as the successor to 60-year-old Melikov. Similar to Melikov, the new head who will assume office by the fall is not a native of Dagestan—he was born in Nizhny Novgorod—and is neither a Muslim nor a member of an indigenous nationalities in the republic. For most of his career, he worked in predominantly ethnic Russian Nizhny Novgorod as a judge and finally became deputy head of the oblast court. Then, in April 2024, Putin appointed him to be chief justice of the Supreme Court of Dagestan (Agentstvo, April 30; Kasparov.ru; Kavkazskii Uzel, May 1; TASS, May 4). In that capacity, he attracted attention for taking a far more proactive role in running Dagestani courts during the floods than Melikov (RIA Dagestan, April 17). It is almost certain that Putin selected him in the hopes that the new man in Makhachkala would quiet Dagestan, at the very least through the Duma elections in September.
Many in Dagestan are undoubtedly pleased that Melikov is now gone and that he is being replaced by a judge rather than another member of the military. This is likely especially the case given that it appears Shchukin may be more ready to work with the population rather than treat any dissent as an opportunity for repression. Dagestanis are likely to be alarmed, however, for at least two reasons. On the one hand, yet again, Moscow has named an outsider and ethnic Russian to lead a republic that, until Putin’s time, had been used to dividing up positions based on an ethnic quota system, with the three largest nationalities sharing out the top jobs. On the other hand, Putin has now taken another step against republic autonomy by announcing not only that he wants Shchukin in office come the fall but also that he supports the candidacy of Magomed Ramazanov, the current deputy presidential plenipotentiary in the North Caucasus Federal District, to head the Dagestani government (Kommersant; Agentstvo, April 30; RG.ru, May 1).
The appointment of Ramazanov, who is an ethnic Avar—the largest nationality in Dagestan—might please some Dagestanis. There are good reasons to think, however, most will react negatively. They are certain to be upset that the Kremlin leader is now ready to publicly involve himself in the appointment of officials in republics below the level of their heads. Leaders will thus lose yet another power they had previously exercised. It also signals that anyone in Dagestan who hopes to rise to positions of power will have to spend a significant part of their career elsewhere, something that in many, if not in all, cases will make them an outsider as well.Both nationalists and Islamists in Dagestan will be outraged and likely will be able to increase their influence in rural villages and among elites and the children of elites in the major cities. This influence has been documented in a series of trials following the anti-Jewish protests at the Makhachkala airport in 2023 (see EDM, June 25, 2024; Window on Eurasia, November 5, 2023, November 10, 2023, 2023, August 4, 2024, August 27, 2025). Putin undoubtedly thinks he has now come up with an approach that will be more effective, but, as with so many Kremlin policies, what he intends is not what he is likely to get. The result in Dagestan will be a continued expansion of nationalist and Islamist violence and a continuing decay of Moscow’s ability to respond effectively.
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