Executive Summary:
- Taiwan plans to forward deploy U.S.-supplied HIMARS systems to the offshore islands of Dongyin and Penghu. This would extend counterstrike coverage deeper into Fujian and reach southern Zhejiang, including key People’s Liberation Army (PLA) naval and air bases.
- With 111 launchers on order, Taipei can disperse HIMARS beyond deployments on its west coast to its outer islands for a counter-assembly posture focused on preempting PLA embarkation operations.
- Taipei may view the current timing as opportune to forward deploy due to the reduction of U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific following the commencement of Operation Epic Fury against Iran.
- Hardened tunnel infrastructure on Dongyin and Penghu enhances survivability and enables shoot-and-scoot tactics against PLA ISR and missile threats.
In early May 2026, Taiwanese military officials confirmed reporting from January by announcing plans to deploy U.S.-supplied M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) to Taiwan’s offshore islands, remarking that “offense is the most effective defense” (攻擊就是最有效的防禦) (LTN, January 28, May 9). This followed approval from Taiwan’s legislature, which on March 13 voted to allow the Executive Yuan to sign the Letter of Acceptance with the United States for an arms package that included HIMARS and M57 MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) (Storm Media, March 13).
Taiwan had originally procured 29 HIMARS launchers to place along its western coastline facing the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but the government’s 2026 special defense budget called for an additional 82 HIMARS units, allowing Taipei to consider allocating assets for forward deployment beyond Taiwan’s main island. The HIMARS purchase was paired with the purchase of 420 ATACMS, which have a maximum operational range of approximately 190 miles (U.S. Department of Defense [DoD], December 17, 2025).
The two locations under consideration for the deployment are Dongyin Island in the Matsu Archipelago to the northwest of Taiwan’s main island and Penghu, also known as the Pescadores, to its west. These islands are roughly 30 miles and 70 miles away from the PRC mainland, respectively, and extend the counterstrike envelope of ATACMS deeper into PRC territory, closer to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) mobilization hubs in coastal Zhejiang and Guangdong, and inland Fujian. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) has said that forward deployment allows the Taiwanese armed forces to engage in “origin strikes” (源頭打擊) against PLA assembly points on the PRC mainland in a potential Taiwan campaign. The aim is to decapacitate PLA forces before they have embarked into the Taiwan Strait or the East China Sea. The deployment would also compress missile intercept timelines for the PRC and increase target density within range of Taiwanese HIMARS.
Figure 1: Taiwan HIMARS Range
Source: Author research from open-source data
Extending the Strike Envelope
Dongyin
Dongyin lies roughly 30 miles from the mainland PRC near Fuzhou . As the furthest Matsu island from the PRC mainland, it is positioned just beyond the strike range of traditional 155mm artillery and at a distance that would make an amphibious landing difficult. It is also the only island in the archipelago that lacks a beach. This historically made it an ideal defensive outpost, and led Taiwan to develop an extensive Cold-war era tunnel and bunker system on the island (Matsu National Scenic Area Administration, May 4, 2020; TVBS, August 9, 2022; Dongyin Township Government, accessed March 24).
Dongyin consequently hosts the brigade-level Army Dongyin Area Command, separate from the Army Matsu Defense Command. It currently possesses significant anti-air and anti-ship capabilities including Sky Bow (天弓飛彈) anti-air missiles and the Hsung-Feng III (雄風三型) anti-ship missiles, and the proposed HIMARS units will be able to take advantage of upgraded and expanded barracks when they arrive (TVBS, August 9, 2022; Matsu News, April 22, 2025). Targets exclusively in range from Dongyin include Wenzhou, Yuhuan Naval Base, and Taizhou, as illustrated in Figure 2 (INDSR, May 2022; Upmedia, September 5, 2025).
Figure 2: HIMARS Range from Dongyin
Source: Author research from open-source data
Penghu
The Penghu Islands sit in the middle of the Taiwan Strait, approximately 100 miles from Xiamen and 25 miles from Taiwan. Although the MND did not specify where HIMARS batteries would be deployed, the archipelago’s main island is most likely due to an existing military presence near the administrative capital of Magong (Facebook/Penghu County Government Tourism Bureau, November 20, 2020; Office of the President, Taiwan, January 30, 2024). If Taiwan wanted to extend the strike envelope further west, it could deploy HIMARS on the island of Huayu (花嶼), a further 20 miles to the southwest. Huayu is one of the westernmost points of Penghu but still sits well outside the range of PRC artillery. The islands were nevertheless a key focus of the PLA’s Justice Mission 2025 (正义使命—2025) military exercise at the end of last year, which rehearsed operations to seize them (China Brief, January 9). Targets exclusively in range from Penghu include Chaozhou, Shantou, and Shantou Waisha Airfield, as shown in Figure 3 (CNA, October 29, 2021).
Figure 3: HIMARS Range from Two Penghu Locations
Source: Author research from open-source data
Key Sites
The coastal southern Zhejiang cities of Taizhou and Wenzhou host military airfields and port facilities that could be used as an assembly point for an invasion force, as evidenced by previous PLA Eastern Theater Command drills that simulated an attack on Taiwan (Weibo/@CCTV, April 2, 2025; China Brief, April 11, 2025). Wenzhou is one of the secondary harbors of the PLA Navy (PLAN), and satellite imagery reveals that the PLAN is expanding Yuhuan naval base to accommodate additional berthing capacity for larger ships, increasing surge deployment capability along the coast (INDSR, May 2022; Upmedia, September 5, 2025). In inland Fujian, targets include Wuyishan Airport, a dual-use airfield that hosts J-20 and J-11 aircraft capable of reaching Taiwan (Sina, December 24, 2017; 163.com, May 25, 2025). Nanping Missile Base, from where the PLA Rocket Force launched missiles during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, would also be within reach (Storm Media, January 15, 2017; CTEE, March 28, 2021).
Within range from Penghu are the coasts of southern Fujian and northern Guangdong. Shantou port, which hosts the 2nd Coastal Thunderbolt Regiment (海岸霹雳第二团) under the Eastern Theater Command (Miller et al., May 2025, p.176; Southern Metropolis Daily, April 18). [1] According to Party media, forces stationed here “bear the sacred mission of … safeguarding national reunification” (担负着维护祖国统一 … 的神圣使命) (China Reader’s Journal, May 9, 2013). Other facilities include Shantou Waisha Airfield, which the PLA Air Force frequently uses in its current gray zone campaign against Taiwan, and Dachengwan Training Base, where PLA marines simulate amphibious landings on Taiwan with roll-on/roll-off vessels (CNA, October 29, 2021; LTN, September 22, 2023; Newtalk, September 5, 2024). Nearby Chaozhou also hosts the PLA Marine Corps Headquarters Command (PLA Daily, October 13, 2020; Miller et al., 2025, p.154).
Locations within the counterstrike envelope from Taiwan can also benefit from HIMARS fire support from offshore islands. Taiwan recently conducted military exercises simulating repelling a PLA amphibious assault concentrating fire on the Penghu islands of Wang’an (望安) and Chimei (七美), which wargames suggest may be the first target of a PLA helicopter assault (CNA, November 15, 2024; UDN, June 11, 2025; LTN, February 4). This could indicate that Huayu is a strong contender for a HIMARS base. The same concept of concentrating fire can be extended to key locations such as Zhangzhou Zhangpu Airfield and Nanji Island, which both would sit within range of HIMARS deployed on Taiwan’s main island, albeit close to the edge of the strike zone (Guancha, June 14, 2015; X/@JosephWen___, November 20, 2023; UDN, January 27).
Other key PLA sites sit just outside the strike envelope. Yongan and Jinhua missiles bases are significant outposts, and served as PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) missile launch sites during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis; and Liancheng Guanzaishan Airport, a dual-use facility, is has been undergoing an expansion since 2024 (Taiwan Ministry of National Defense [MND], December 1, 2017; TechNews, October 22, 2021; X/@JosephWen___, August 24, 2023; Sohu, July 16, 2024; Iport Group, accessed March 24). Forward basing increases the density of PLA infrastructure within Taiwan’s strike range and shifts Taiwan’s long-range fire closer to embarkation points rather than the Taiwan Strait.
Constructing a ‘Kill Chain’ Faces Challenges
Taiwan’s military will pair HIMARS units with long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including the U.S.-supplied MQ-9B SeaGuardian and Taiwan’s indigenous Teng Yun system (騰雲無人機). Operating at high altitude along the mainland coastline, these UAVs could provide real-time targeting data on mobile missile launchers, armor concentrations, and logistics nodes. The Dongyin Command appears to be integrating UAVs through the establishment of a UAV club to train troops in their operation (Matsu News, August 25, 2025). Taiwan’s special defense budget had originally called for procuring the Tactical Mission Network, a battlefield networking system designed to integrate with Taiwan’s existing Team Awareness Kit, producing a shared operational picture and allowing for direct transmission of target coordinates to dispersed HIMARS units. This also improves interoperability and real-time fire coordination across units (DoD, December 17, 2025; LTN, December 18, 2025). Four MQ-9Bs are set to be shipped to Taiwan in 2026 and 2027, as confirmed by a recent handover ceremony in the United States attended by Deputy Defense Minister Hsu Szu-chien (徐斯儉) (CNA, March 22). These capabilities enhance Taiwan’s ability to maintain a “kill chain” to detect, track, target, and engage PLA assets. In theory, they will allow Taiwanese forces to hit the PLA during mobilization phases, when units are concentrated and more vulnerable.
Certain figures have expressed skepticism that this can work in practice. Admiral Lee Hsi-ming (李喜明), for instance, has argued that Taiwan’s current limitations in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and battle management systems make it difficult to reliably identify and engage targets at extended ranges, raising both operational and escalation risks (Storm Media, September 9, 2025). In the final special budget approved by the Taiwanese legislature on May 8, provisions for procuring the Tactical Mission Network, alongside AI-assisted intelligence decision modules, and other “full-domain ISR” (全域偵知) capabilities were cut (Military News Agency, May 8; Executive Yuan, May 14). This development may hinder Taiwan’s quest to develop indigenous ISR capabilities and reduce the targeting effectiveness of HIMARS units.
HIMARS survivability is also a challenge on these small offshore islands because the PRC can concentrate fire on a smaller surface area. Units have limited areas to conceal positions and reinforcements may be easier to disrupt due to limited resupply routes. If deployed in Dongyin and Penghu, launchers could remain concealed within fortified shelters attached to the islands’ Cold War-era tunnel systems, emerging only briefly on underground rail systems to fire. Recent exercises focused on repelling amphibious PLA landings with the goal of achieving “independent combat” (獨立作戰) capabilities without external reinforcement is also aimed at improving unit survivability. (Tai Sounds, July 18, 2025). [2] Island geography still limits maneuver space, however, meaning that survivability would depend heavily on deception. PLA espionage, which has already compromised army personnel associated with previously delivered HIMARS, therefore constitutes a serious threat (LTN, October 7, 2025; Mirror Media, January 20).
The PRC’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) has framed the potential deployment as “provoking and inciting conflict” (挑衅引战), claiming on two separate occasions that “‘Taiwanese independence forces’ are increasingly absurd and biting off more than they can chew” (“台独”分子的想法越来越荒诞不经、自不量力) (Xinhua, January 30; MND, February 10). At the same time, there are signs the PRC views Taiwanese HIMARS as a serious threat (Sohu, January 4). From Beijing’s perspective, forward-deployed HIMARS reduce warning time and increase vulnerability of key Eastern Theater Command facilities. Chinese commentary has also suggested that expanding long-range fires may reflect Taipei’s confidence in asymmetric capabilities (Zhonghua Net, December 31, 2025). This is evidenced by its construction of airfields on the far side of mountains in Fujian away from the Taiwan Strait, likely to defend against long-range Taiwanese fire (LTN, January 27).
Basing HIMARS on its offshore islands signal resilience but comes at a moment of vulnerability. Taipei’s decision underlines the political will to defend territory that some have called to abandon during periods of heightened tensions. [3] The timing, however, coincides with the redeployment of U.S. naval assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, thinning the visible U.S. presence in the region (Atlantic Council, May 15). These include the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier, the Marine Expeditionary Forces, and the USS Tripoli (Naval News, March 13, U.S. Central Command, May 23). Forward positioning HIMARS may therefore serve as a deterrence measure until U.S. forces return. The present moment might also be the best window to act when factoring in potential responses from Beijing, as there is reasonable cause without seeming overly aggressive.
Conclusion
Taipei seeks to deny the PRC’s ability to assemble an invasion force through its forward HIMARS basing counterstrike strategy. Its offshore islands of Dongyin and Penghu will play a key role, preventing PLA forces from even reaching the Taiwan Strait, and ISR integration will improve the accuracy of HIMARS and allow the construction of a complete “kill chain.”
The current moment is one of a certain military vulnerability for Taipei, incentivizing an increase to its deterrence capabilities. While the HIMARS proposal was initiated in January 2026, the recent transfer of U.S. assets to the Middle East has heightened the case for Taiwan’s forward deployment. The Trump administration’s indication that it will pause the latest arms sale package to Taiwan on May 21 only reinforces a sense of urgency (The Hill, May 21).
Leadership in Taipei could be seizing the current moment to achieve a more favorable balance of power long-term by forcing the PLA to push assets out of the 190 mile radius of its ATACMS. These are set to be phased out by the newer Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), which has an expanded range of 310 miles. Procurement of PrSMs would but the PRC’s key naval port cities of Ningbo and Zhoushan within strike range from its offshore islands. Taiwan is yet to purchase any, however, and domestic political strife may hinder its procurement prospects. [4]
Notes
[1] Miller, Frank, Tung Ho, Kenneth Allen, and Arran Hope, eds. The People’s Liberation Army as Organization Volume 3.0. Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation; Vienna: Exovera, 2025.
[2] HIMARS is operationally efficient, as it can shoot-and-scoot in around one minute, and typically requires no more than three crew members to operate. The system’s high automation and rapid reload capabilities make it well-suited for operations on these islands, and these tactics would complicate PLA reconnaissance and surveillance efforts.
[3] This was boosted in 2025 by the redeployment of the Taiwanese Army’s elite 101st Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, commonly known as the Sea Dragon Frogmen (海龍蛙兵) from Kinmen to Penghu, citing a desire to improve “defensive depth and integrated defense capability” (防禦縱深與整體防衛能力) (LTN, October 7, 2025).
[4] The United States has been scaling up production of PrSM since 2025, and especially following the launch of Operation Epic Fury, where the missiles were launched for the first time in combat (Defense News, October 13, 2025; Defense Scoop, March 5). Taiwanese officers have written articles analyzing PrSM’s capabilities and have been calling for Taiwanese procurement as early as 2024 (Taiwan MND, December 2024). There is speculation that part of the special defense budget’s unearmarked items may have been reserved for future PrSM purchases under the name “long range precision strike missile” (遠程精準打擊飛彈) (Executive Yuan, November 27, 2025; SETN, March 5; LTN, March 11).
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