Beijing has dramatically ramped up its belligerence toward Japan since Prime Minister Takaichi entered office in October 2025. In the economic sphere, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has tightened its export control regime since the turn of the year, banning the export of dual-use items to Japan on January 6 before blacklisting 40 Japanese firms on February 24 (MOFCOM, January 6, February 24). In the political sphere, Beijing has imposed sanctions on a Japanese lawmaker, Keiji Furuya, who is a close aide to the prime minister (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], March 30). In waters and airspace near Japan, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is dialing up grey zone activities. After conducting patrols of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands on 357 different days in 2025, in January thousands of Chinese fishing boats assembled quietly to form massive floating barriers in the East China Sea; in May the aircraft carrier Liaoning conducted drills off a remote Tokyo island; and from March 27, the PRC imposed a 40-day airspace restriction covering both the East China and Yellow seas (New York Times, January 16; People’s Daily, January 30; UDN News, April 7; Japan Ministry of Defense, April 2026, May 25; Asahi Shimbun, May 21). Domestically within the People’s Republic of China (PRC), state media has been relentless in its criticism of what it calls a “new militarism” (新型军国主义) in the country (China Brief, April 28 [a], [b]).
The ultimate goal of the PRC’s cross-domain operations is to fracture Japan’s domestic political consensus on security normalization. Beijing seeks to obstruct the political conditions that Tokyo’s constitutional amendments require through actions below the threshold of direct kinetic confrontation. At the heart of this hybrid warfare strategy is cognitive warfare aimed at deterring politicians, swaying public opinion, and undermining political support for a new security agenda. This campaign is focused in particular on the Takaichi administration’s plans for defense budget increases, missile deployments, and the establishment of a new intelligence agency.
Figure 1: How PRC Cross-Domain Cognitive Warfare Targets Japan’s Constitutional Reform
(Source: Created by author)
Tokyo Enacts Security-Oriented Measures
Takaichi, widely seen as the inheritor of Shinzo Abe’s political legacy, plans to amend Article 9 of the Japanese constitution to allow for an expansion of the country’s Self-Defense Force. Doing so requires a supermajority in both houses of parliament as well as a simple majority in a public referendum. Overcoming these hurdles will not be easy, but leading the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to a landslide victory in the February 2026 general election has brought Takaichi one step closer to realizing her ambitions (TV Asahi, October 4, 2025; China Brief, April 28 [a], [b]).
Tokyo has recently advanced measures to normalize its security posture and pave the way for constitutional amendment. The government has passed defense budget increases and approved missile deployments in Kumamoto and Shizuoka prefectures; parliament also passed bill to establish a new National Intelligence Council and a National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) to strengthen the government’s intelligence capabilities; and it is currently in the process of creating its own version of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to screen overseas investment in sensitive sectors (NHK, April 14; Japan Times, April 23).
Tokyo frames these moves as defensive, not offensive, decisions designed to deter potential PRC operations. Japan’s deployment of Type-25 surface-to-ship missiles in Kumamoto places the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait theater, and coastal PRC cities, including Shanghai, within its strike envelope (Japan Times, March 31). Its hyper velocity gliding projectiles (HVGPs) in Shizuoka could be used to strike aircraft carriers and amphibious vessels threatening Japan’s Ryukyu island chain, complicating a potential People’s Liberation Army (PLA) blockade or amphibious assault operation (Nikkei Asia, April 1). Along with the planned deployment of surface-to-air missiles to Yonaguni Island, which is located fewer than 70 miles from Taiwan, this posture constitutes a layered defense architecture that bolsters Japan’s deterrence and response capabilities, especially for a Taiwan contingency.
Takaichi is also advancing security cooperation with regional partners who are similarly concerned with Beijing’s bellicose turn over the last few years. Beneath her “drumbeat diplomacy” with South Korea is a new bilateral security dialogue at the vice-ministerial level (NHK, January 14; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), May 19). [1] Takaichi has also signed an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the Philippines, cementing Japan’s pivot from mere member of Indo-Pacific security infrastructure to anchor for U.S. deterrence in the region (MOFA, January 15).
These developments represent a direct challenge to Beijing’s strategic ambitions in the region and likely impact its calculus when it comes to a Taiwan contingency. If Takaichi succeeds in amending the constitution, Japan could provide direct military and logistical support to Taiwan with relative ease, as it would not have to justify such actions as a threat to Japan’s survival and security. This would come with strategic advantages for Japan’s allies outside the region, as it can alleviate some pressure on a U.S. military that is distracted by its war with Iran and a Europe focused on Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Cognitive and Economic Warfare Up Following Takaichi’s Election
Beijing seeks to contain what it sees as the threat of the Takaichi government’s trajectory. It has engaged in aggressive cross-domain operations and persistent attempts to delegitimize Tokyo ever since she became the LDP’s leader. Unable to prevent Japan’s security normalization via military operations or direct coercion, as these would lead to direct engagement with the United States, operations below the threshold of a kinetic conflict are the only viable option. Coercive economic measures have lost much of their bite since they were first deployed in 2010, as Japan has been systematically diversifying supply chains since then (Vox EU/CEPR, July 19, 2023). Coercive diplomacy—such as the threat from the PRC Consul General in Osaka leveled at Takaichi that “the dirty neck that sticks itself in must be cut off”—has been counterproductive (UDN, November 10, 2025). [2] Beijing’s best strategy to stymie Takaichi’s agenda is to fracture the domestic political consensus supporting constitutional amendment. Recent events suggest that it is making inroads in this direction.
Figure 2: Timeline of PRC Cross-Domain Operations Targeting Japan’s Security Normalization
(Source: Compiled by the author)
Beijing’s imposition of sanctions on Diet member Keiji Furuya was an attempt to signal reputational and political costs for those who support Takaichi’s political platform and to deter others from falling in line behind the prime minister. PRC state media have highlighted Furuya’s frequent visits to Taiwan, which they frame as “collusion with Taiwan independence forces” (同“台独”分裂势力勾连) to justify the sanctions as “countermeasures” (反制措施) (CCTV, March 30; China Net, April 4). Defaming and pressuring a Japanese lawmaker in this way is a form of transnational repression, seeking to silence and alienate both critics and potential critics of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and to manipulate the political environment in favor of the PRC.
In Furuya’s case, the parliamentarian has no assets in the PRC, has not visited the country for decades, and has stated that the sanction had no impact on him (NHK, March 30). Yet the coercive mechanism here is not primarily financial, but psychological. Being targeted by the PRC, having one’s reputation publicly defamed, one’s movements surveilled, and the implicit threat of escalation hanging over one’s head takes a toll. As the case of Taiwanese legislator Puma Shen (沈伯洋) illustrates, escalation can involve doxxing through the publication of personal information, exposing him and his family to digital and physical harassment by nationalist individuals and actors linked to the CCP’s united front system (China Brief, October 31, 2025; Central News Agency, January 3). [3] In the PRC’s hybrid warfare playbook, sanctions are the first rung of an escalation ladder that seeks to create a chilling effect, deterring other lawmakers from standing up to Beijing. Its efficacy is difficult to quantify, but Beijing is likely to tailor further threats to individual lawmakers in the coming weeks and months as it seeks to derail the constitutional amendment.
Beijing has supplemented these measures with economic coercion, including export controls on rare earths and tourism-related travel warnings and restrictions. Despite Beijing’s long history of economic coercion targeting Japan, it explicitly frames these actions as a direct response to Tokyo’s attempts at security normalization rather than a motivation for it (Global Times, December 27, 2025; WeChat/CCTV, January 9; People’s Daily Overseas Edition, February 27). The economic impact of these measures is limited given Japan’s years of de-risking, but Beijing sees the measures primarily as part of its cognitive warfare strategy. As such, their psychological impact is the principal reason for their deployment.
Media Influence Operation Distorts Anti-Missile Rally
Beijing’s influence operations targeting Japan consistently advocate economic ties, peace, and stability, but condition these on the absence of security normalization. In practice, it wields threats to erode public support for Takaichi’s government. Recently, they have appeared to focus on amplifying political opposition in Japan, exploiting communication gaps between the Japanese government and the public and fueling discontent.
State media coverage of recent rallies protesting Takaichi’s agenda is illustrative. At the end of March, Xinhua published three articles within 24 hours on the demonstrations. Visual content highlighted civil discord and article titles sensationalized the events. This coverage, however, highlighted a small-scale rally outside the Ministry of Defense in Tokyo that appeared to involve only 20–30 people, rather than protests in Kumamoto or Shizuoka—where new weapons platforms have recently been deployed—that involved larger crowds of directly affected local residents (Xinhua, March 31 [1], [2], April 1). Footage confirmed the presence at the Tokyo rally of a local Shizuoka civil society organization, Stop Missiles in Fuji Association, including a representative, Yamazaki Hiromi, who had been present for the protest at Camp Fuji in Shizuoka earlier that day (Asahi Shimbun, April 1). The involvement of the same group at both events in different parts of the country on the same day suggest that the protests do not represent nationwide civic opposition. [4]
The Xinhua coverage of the protests soon made their way onto domestic channels, even though none of Japan’s five major national newspapers nor NHK covered the Tokyo rally as a standalone news event. [5] The story on the Tokyo rally—and not the others—soon appeared in Xinhua’s Japanese edition (Xinhua Japanese Edition, April 1). Within an hour, it had been republished by local Japanese news aggregators Docomo and AU, which are among the most popular digital news services in Japan (Xinhua Japanese edition; NTT Docomo; AU Web portal, April 1). This may raise questions about the relationship between Xinhua and these aggregators, though no information yet details what this might be. The exclusive focus on the Tokyo rally (the protests elsewhere were not mentioned in the report) was likely intended to suggest that a grassroots movement in the capital was directly pressuring the central Japanese government, rather than that a small external group had traveled into the city to demonstrate. This selective reporting targets Japanese audiences. The fact that Japan’s major outlets did not cover the event could be further leveraged to sow distrust about mainstream media in the country––a narrative consistent with PRC influence operations seeking to undermine like-minded democracies.
Additional reporting has targeted Japanese audiences too, both in the Japanese-language edition of Xinhua and in Japanese-language articles on China.org.cn. These have reported Japanese citizens’ criticism of the government’s response to the protests, the Ministry of Defense’s “vague and inadequate” explanations regarding the missile deployment to Kumamoto Prefecture, and opposition against missile deployment “in disregard of public opinion” (Xinhua Japanese Edition, March 31; China.org.cn, April 1). [6]
Amplifying a minority position and presenting it as widespread is a common tactic in PRC influence operations. State media, including China Central Television (CCTV) and provincial outlets, for instance, constantly amplify U.S. sociopolitical problems to portray the country as a lawless, chaotic society (CCTV, July 10, 2023). Beijing takes a similar approach to Japan, consistently amplifying domestic discontent on controversial issues, such as in the 2023 discharge of water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactor and the G7 Hiroshima summit, to suggest widespread political opposition (People’s Daily, May 20, 2023; Xinhua, August 22, 2023). These tactics have now infiltrated the Japanese information space, long considered relatively resistant to foreign narratives because of the language barrier and the domination of the media by a small number of conglomerates (IRSEM, 2021).
Influence operations work best when they amplify real domestic anxieties. This makes the missile deployment issue ripe for exploitation: people are genuinely concerned, as the military base sits in the city center near schools and a hospital. The frustration and discontent that PRC state media channels emphasize is therefore authentic. As Japanese outlets have reported, local authorities received little to no advance notification regarding the deployment, and Kumamoto Governor Takashi Kimura stated that he first learned about the transport of missile-related equipment through media reports (Kumamoto Asahi Broadcasting, March 9). Local residents have demanded public briefings and greater transparency, though these are yet to take place (TV Asahi, March 10). Inadequate communication by the government, particularly with local authorities and residents, therefore constitute a vulnerability that can be exploited.
Conclusion
Japanese perceptions of the PRC are generally negative. According to polling by Pew Research, 86 percent of Japanese interviewed hold an unfavorable view of the PRC—the most among 25 countries surveyed (Pew Research Center, July 15, 2025). PRC influence operations that seek to amplify domestic opposition and magnify division in Japanese society would therefore be much more effective than merely fueling pro-PRC propaganda––precisely because the content is not foreign but based on local voices. This is all that Beijing needs to do, however, to stymie Takaichi’s proposed constitutional amendment. The latest polling by Kyodo News shows public opinion on Article 9 revision evenly split with 50 percent in favor and 48 percent opposed (Kyodo News, May 2). This suggests that even marginal influence could be sufficient to sway the outcome.
The next two years will be decisive for Japan. The supermajority threshold is still beyond the LDP’s reach in the upper house, which faces reelection in 2028, and majority support from the public is far from guaranteed. In the battle for people’s hearts and minds, the government faces competition from Beijing, which is likely to intensify its cross-domain cognitive warfare across sanctions, lawfare, cyberattacks, defamation campaigns, and other forms of transnational repression. Its microtargeting of the Japanese public will also exploit any and every internal division to advance its agenda.
Japan has been developing countermeasures. A new National Cybersecurity Office under the cabinet to monitor cyber activity, coordinate interagency responses, and work with private communications and infrastructure operators; and a post-election meeting at which a cross-party parliamentary group heard from social media platforms on disinformation and online abuse has improved understanding (Nikkei, July 1, 2025, March 23). These steps meaningfully build resilience but their effectiveness against PRC cognitive warfare remains to be seen. Inadequate strategic communication, such as in the case of Kumamoto missile deployment, is a vulnerability that Beijing will continue to exploit.
Notes
[1] Takaichi’s “drumbeat diplomacy” refers to the joint musical performance by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung during their summit in January 2026, which Japanese media described as cultural diplomacy reflecting a positive personal relationship between the two leaders.
[2] In the original Japanese, the consul general wrote, “勝手に突っ込んできたその汚い首は一瞬の躊躇もなく斬ってやるしかない.”
[3] Puma Shen has previously written for China Brief (China Brief, February 16, 2024).
[4] In the original Japanese, the Stop Missiles in Fuji Association is “富士にミサイルやめて！の会”
[5] The five main Japanese newspapers are Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Nikkei, or Sankei, and are collectively referred to as “zenkokushi” (全国紙).
[6] The original Japanese for these two quotes is “いい加減で内容もあいまいだった” and “民意無視.”
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