Executive Summary:
- The June 17 and 18 Ukrainian strikes on Moscow’s Kapotnya refinery undermined the readiness of the Russian public to accept the Kremlin’s narrative about its steady march to victory, raising doubts about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s promise that Russia would gain the military advantage by summer.
- Kyiv has synchronized high-profile attacks with major diplomatic and economic events, disrupting Moscow’s efforts to project strength, attract investment, and deepen ties with the so-called Global South.
- Russia’s hopes of exploiting divisions among Western allies have yielded limited results as support for Ukraine remains resilient and Ukraine’s expanding long-range strike capabilities have increased pressure on Moscow to consider compromises in a costly war that is becoming harder to sustain.
Building a position of strength and exploiting it without restraint is a fundamental part of Russia’s foreign and security policies. This strategy motivates the Kremlin’s ceaseless assaults against Ukraine even at the cost of colossal casualties. Russian offensive operations, however, have become self-defeating, yielding no territorial gains and consuming more manpower than commercial recruitment can generate (Re: Russia, June 9; The Moscow Times, June 12). Russian President Vladimir Putin does not acknowledge the futility of this strategy because he bears responsibility for Russia’s current weakness.
The June 17 and 18 Ukrainian strikes on Moscow’s Kapotnya refinery undermined the readiness of the Russian public to accept Putin’s narrative about the Kremlin’s steady march to victory (Meduza, June 18; Radio Svoboda, June 19). Official discourse resolutely ignored many previous hits by Ukrainian drones and missiles, but the failure of Moscow’s massive air defense system drove marginal jingoist pundits and mainstream commentators alike to demand explanations (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, June 18; TopWar.ru, June 19). Reassurances from the Kremlin about the build-up of anti-drone capabilities and predictions that Ukraine’s situation would soon become “completely catastrophic” did not alleviate the shock of the attack (Kommersant, June 19; Novaya Gazeta Evropa, June 20). At the start of the year, Moscow’s military experts were keen to promise that its war against Ukraine would decisively turn by summer. This may come true, but to Russia’s disadvantage (Vzglyad, January 8; Zerkalo, June 20).
Ukraine times its attacks to shock Russians and undermine the Kremlin’s diplomacy. Kyiv executed hits on the Kronstadt naval base and refineries around St. Petersburg on the first and the last day of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, subverting Putin’s attempt to talk Russia’s economy out of a recession and investment slump (see EDM, June 8; The Insider, June 12). The attacks on Moscow discomfited the long-planned June 18 Russia–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Kazan, which was long on protocol and ceremony but predictably short on substance (Kommersant, June 18). According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, each visiting leader of Southeast Asian states was briefed by Putin on the progress of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s recycled stories departed so far from the actual situation that the guests were left wondering about his reticence regarding Ukraine’s recent strikes on Tatarstan (RBC, June 18; The Moscow Times, June 19). Putin scheduled the Kazan summit to coincide with the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Evian, France, to demonstrate Russia’s preference for cultivating ties with the so-called Global South, but instead delivered a demonstration of inflated ambitions and degraded energy power (RIAC, June 19).
Moscow expected that trans-Atlantic tensions could upset the West’s unity at the G7 summit (Forbes.ru, June 18). Russian evaluations of the U.S.–Iran peace deal are skeptical and even disparaging, reflecting the Kremlin’s hope that it could drive a new spike in oil prices (RIAC, June 17; Rossiiskaya Gazeta, June 19). Western support for Ukraine, however, shows no signs of weakening, even as U.S. contributions to some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) structures have decreased (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, June 19). Moscow is most worried by prospective U.S. consent for European involvement in peace talks with Ukraine (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 14; Izvestiya, June 16). European leaders find it difficult to appoint a team of negotiators, and Moscow is keen to argue that EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas is unacceptable as their leader. Europe’s position as an indispensable party in any meaningful peace talks, however, is clear (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 17; Izvestiya, June 20).
The Kremlin has expressed hope that U.S. negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner will find time to re-engage with Russia amid U.S.–Iran talks (Vedomosti, June 18). Their role is seen as crucial to reviving the “understandings” allegedly reached by Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump at the August 2025 Anchorage summit, when Russia held a stronger military and economic position (The Moscow Times, June 16). Russian pundits cannot comprehend how Ukraine has escaped the brink of defeat to gain new advantages in long-range strikes that reach as far as Tyumen in Western Siberia and in mid-range strikes that have paralyzed logistics in Crimea (TopWar.ru, June 16; Meduza, June 20).
Russia excels at exploiting disagreements among its adversaries. This game yields diminishing results when played from a position of weakness. Unlike Putin, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy can crisscross Europe, connecting with leaders of various persuasions and messaging his openness to talks with Russia. Zelenskyy probably finds it easier to expose Putin’s obstinacy in demanding concessions that were excessive a year ago than to mark the limits of his own flexibility. The task of drafting compromises that Ukraine would find difficult but necessary to accept is complex and delicate, but Europe cannot expect the Kremlin to produce a meaningful initiative. Putin will be loath to contemplate compromises, but in the last few weeks he has been unable to respond to Ukrainian strikes on his three most sensitive sites—St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Crimea. Putin’s bubble of delusions is repeatedly being punctured, which does not make him an agreeable partner in talks, but cutting losses in his unwinnable war against Ukraine is increasingly difficult to avoid.
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