Executive Summary:
- Amid the systemic crisis in Russia, evidence of elite divisions over the war against Ukraine is growing. Some Russian elites reportedly favor an end to the conflict, while hardline “hawks” continue to advocate escalation, retaining influence over Kremlin decision-making.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin appears increasingly insulated within a pro-war information environment, reinforcing expectations of victory. Support for the war among elites, hawks, and propagandists continues as they can only hold on to power, wealth, and freedom in the case of victory.
- Despite limited public discontent and stable regime support in Russia, Putin’s continued reliance on hawkish advisers raises the risk of further escalation, including deeper Belarusian involvement or heightened confrontation with the Baltic states.
Independent researchers have more frequently noted a clear rift emerging among Russian elites, while hawks in Russia that are demanding “war to a final victory” are losing influence in the information sphere (see EDM, June 4). This confrontation can be seen not only at the federal level, but also between Moscow and the provinces (see EDM, June 4). Sociologist Igor Eydman has suggested that Putin “is under heavy pressure from the Russian elite who want to end the war which has reached a dead end.” He says that it is precisely because of this that Roman Abramovich was permitted to see Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for talks (Facebook/IgorEydman, June 9).
This hypothesis is partially supported by a rather conspiratorial article that appeared on the website of the far-right Russian TV channel Tsargrad on June 6. Its authors claim, “The elites are ready to sell out Russia and demand that Putin admit defeat.” At the same time, they insist that “Ukraine is at the limit of its capabilities,” making it crucial for Russia to continue the fight to achieve a turning point (Tsargrad.tv, June 6). Such a point of view is shared not only by radical commentators, but also by some of the elite. Independent journalists at the Verstka media outlet spoke with Russian officials and found that, despite the crisis, most hope the system can navigate the turbulence and survive. They say that the security services in the present situation “feel like they are on horseback,” and the contradictions among them are not of a fundamental character. Political scientist Fyodor Krashennikov is convinced that Putin’s inner circle does not feel any of the hardships of the war and, on the contrary, understands that in the event of a coup attempt they could “go to jail” and therefore will take no action against Putin (Verstka, May 22).
The direct beneficiaries of the war are not the only people who advocate for its continuation. Those who participated in its propaganda, analytical justification, war crimes, and repression understand that in peacetime, they will sooner or later bear responsibility for what they did. For these people, as for Putin himself, maintaining a besieged fortress mentality has become a means of personal survival and continues to lobby for an aggressive policy. Former spy and current member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Andrey Besrukov, declared at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum during a session on “The Main Threats to Russia in the Second Quarter of the 21st Century” that Russia will be on a war footing for the next “couple of decades,” during which two “warring” generations will emerge (Meduza, June 6).
Political scientist Tatyana Stanovaya suggests that Putin is inclined to listen only to the opinion of the “hawks.” She says that within the prevailing decision-making environment, “entrenched worldviews have taken shape” that “limit the pool of individuals admitted to the circle and filter out information contradicting the established worldview.” This worldview encompasses beliefs that “the West is in decline, the United States is losing its hegemony, Ukraine is falling apart, and its army is disintegrating, Europe is in chaos, Russia is advancing on all fronts, and victory is inevitable” (Тelegram/russicaRU, June 8).
As for popular dissatisfaction with the war, sociologists note that the drop in Putin’s ratings does not yet threaten the regime’s stability (Re-Russia, May 25). This dissatisfaction can still be deflected toward Ukraine rather than the Russian authorities. According to a recent poll from the Levada Center, 74 percent of respondents support the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine. Compared with previous months, this indicator rose by 6 percent (Levada Center, June 9). The rise in Ukrainian strikes within Russia could be one reason for this rise.
No less alarming is the rhetoric of the famous Kremlin hawk, Sergey Karaganov, honorary chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. According to him, Russia has entered “a battle of world-historical proportions, already in the medium term threatening the destruction of our country and all of humanity,” and the only way out is “obvious: militarization, ‘conversion to a national defense mode’ of our thinking in politics and economics.” In particular, Karaganov again demands “strengthening the policy of reliance on nuclear deterrence” (Russian in Global Affairs, May 12). Such a position is identical to Putin’s worldview.
Putin is more inclined to trust the hawks surrounding him. There is a danger that Putin may seek further escalation, continuing to believe that he needs only to push aggression further to break the resistance of Europe and Ukraine and escape the deadlock. Such escalation could take the form of either dragging Belarus more deeply into the war or aggression against the Baltic states. Zelenskyy declared in May that Moscow plans to draw Belarus deeper into the war, and other commentators see danger signals in Belarusian preparations for a possible attack on Ukraine (see EDM, June 4). The Baltic states—where Russian drones are increasingly straying—could also become a target for an attack (Novaya gazeta Evropa, June 5). If Putin and the Kremlin continue to listen to these hawks, escalation is ever more likely.
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