Executive Summary:
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) recently launched a nuclear-capable ballistic missile from a strategic nuclear submarine (SSBN) into the Pacific, leading to backlash in the region.
- The missile was Beijing’s first publicly acknowledged submarine-launched ballistic missile test into the Pacific, and the second ballistic missile test into the Pacific in under two years.
- The test coincided with the signing of a defense treaty between Australia and Fiji, the latest of an expanding set of defense agreements Australia has signed with Vanuatu, Nauru, Tuvalu, and Papua New Guinea.
- Pacific Island states, who are especially sensitive about nuclear tests, have criticized the PRC’s actions, with the prime minister of the Solomon Islands saying that “this is not something a friend does.”
On July 6, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) test-fired a nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missile into the Pacific Ocean. The missile flew over the northern coast of the Philippines and landed in waters near the border of Kiribati or Tuvalu’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (USNI, July 6). The PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning (毛宁) described the launch as “a routine military training activity” (军事训练的例行性安排) and not directed at any specific country, adding that relevant countries had been notified in advance (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], July 6).
According to Xinhua, the launch was carried out by a “strategic nuclear submarine” (战略核潜艇, or SSBN) (Xinhua, July 6). Although the specific vessel was not identified in public sourcing, it was likely one of six Type-094 Jin Class SSBNs that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operates as its ballistic missile submarine fleet. The test was the PRC’s first publicly acknowledged submarine-launched ballistic missile test into the Pacific, and its second ballistic missile test into the open Pacific in under two years following a land-based intercontinental ballistic missile fired from Hainan in September 2024. According to defense analyst Andrew Erickson, the test appears to be the PRC’s first publicly acknowledged long-range submarine-launched ballistic missile test since 1982, when the JL-1 was fired from a dedicated trials vessel (Andrew Erickson, July 6).
Figure 1: Flight Path of the July 6 Ballistic Missile Test Launch
(Source: X/Joseph Wu)
Beijing Links Test to Regional Diplomacy
The missile launch coincides with two notable events. Beginning on July 6, the PRC and Russia commenced the naval exercise “Joint Sea-2026” (海上联合-2026), which is expected to run until July 13. According to the PRC’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), the exercise’s stated theme is “jointly responding to maritime security threats” (联合应对海上安全威胁) (MND, July 5). Prior iterations of the series listed responding to maritime security threats as one of several objectives, but since 2024 it has been the exercise’s primary stated theme (MFA, May 20, 2014; Xinhua, May 4, 2019, July 17 2024, August 1, 2025; MND, December 29, 2022). Following the exercise, Chinese and Russian forces are expected to conduct a joint maritime patrol in the Pacific Ocean, as was a feature in 2025 (Xinhua, August 1, 2025; MND, July 5).
The test also coincided with the signing of a defense treaty between Australia and Fiji on July 6, titled “The Ocean of Peace Alliance” (Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade [DFAT], July 6). [1] Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles said he did not believe that the test was designed as retaliation for the defense treaty (ABC, July 6). Whether or not the timing was deliberate, the logistical records suggest it was not a spontaneous decision. Starboard Maritime Intelligence analyst Mark Douglas assessed the exercise had been “planned for a while,” noting that two Chinese satellite tracking vessels—the Yuan Wang 3 and Yuan Wang 6, both recently tracked near the Federated States of Micronesia—had departed the PRC on June 25 (Sydney Morning Herald, July 6; RNZ, July 7). [2] This is consistent with the advance positioning required for a missile test.
The timing of the test has not helped the PRC’s reputation in the region, where Pacific Island nations carry a particular sensitivity to nuclear activity in their waters. The Marshall Islands alone was subject to 67 U.S. nuclear detonations between 1946–1958, while France conducted nearly 200 nuclear tests in French Polynesia until 1996 (ABC, July 15, 2023; The Guardian, August 25, 2023).
Several Pacific nations have confirmed that they received some advanced warning from the PRC this time, but were firm in criticizing the country’s actions. Solomon Islands Prime Minister Matthew Wale stated that “China is a good friend of the Solomon Islands, but this is not something a friend does. This is not good in our region.” Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape joined Wale in stating the Pacific region wants to be “free from nuclear testing and from the testing of harmful weapons and military arsenals of every kind” (ABC, July 7).
Conclusion
The PRC justification for its ballistic missile launch may have inadvertently highlighted Australia’s growing defense diplomacy in the region. In response to what Foreign Minister Penny Wong has repeatedly characterized as a state of permanent contest, Australia in recent years has signed a number of agreements containing security cooperation commitments. In addition to the newly signed treaty with Fiji, these include an agreement with Vanuatu, two treaties with Nauru and Tuvalu, and a mutual defense treaty with Papua New Guinea (DFAT, November 9, 2023, December 9, 2024, October 6, 2025, June 29; Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 6). These may well expand in the near future: New Zealand’s prime minister Christopher Luxon has already voiced interest in joining the mutual defense treaty just signed with Fiji (Reuters, July 6).
The PRC has challenged Australia’s actions and motives in the Pacific. Mao Ning said, “It is hoped that the relevant country will truly respect the independence and autonomy of [Pacific] island nations, focus on their sustainable economic and social development, and avoid targeting any third party or harming the interest of any third party” (希望有关国家切实尊重岛国独立自主，聚焦岛国经济社会可持续发展，不针对第三方，不损害第三方的利益) (MFA, July 6).
Backlash from those Pacific Island nations is unlikely to alter Beijing’s trajectory. Past PRC activity in the region unfolded largely through development aid and infrastructure development, some of which was extended in exchange for countries switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC, alongside police and security exchanges. [3] The latest SSBN test is a more open display of power, which is harder to obscure behind the language of partnership; but because the Pacific remains part of Beijing’s broader strategic agenda, short-term rebukes will not change that calculus.
Notes
[1] The Ocean of Peace Alliance, also known as the “Veitacini Treaty,” commits both Fiji and Australia to mutual defense and mandatory consultation in response to security threats, with provision for other Pacific states to join. The Sydney Morning Herald has reported that the treaty “is expected to be open to the three other Pacific nations with militaries: Tonga, [Papua New Guinea,] and New Zealand,” with Papua New Guinea having recently signed a separate security treaty with Australia last year (DFAT, October 2025; Sydney Morning Herald, July 6).
[2] A third tracking vessel, Yuan Wang 5, was docked in Suva, Fiji, at the time of the treaty signing (Sydney Morning Herald, July 6; RNZ, July 7).[3] For expanded discussion on the PRC’s activities in the region, see for example: Marc Julienne, “China’s Strategy Toward Pacific Island Countries: Countering Taiwan and Western Influence,” ReConnect China Policy Brief No. 31, Ghent University, January 2026, https://www.reconnect-china.ugent.be/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/ReConnect-China-Policy-Brief-31-Countering-Taiwan-and-Western-Influence.pdf; Fabrizio Bozzato, “Contours of Influence: China’s Expanding Footprint in the Pacific Islands,” International Information Network Analysis (IINA), Sasakawa Peace Foundation, July 10, 2025, https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/fabrizio_bozzato_01.html.
[3] For expanded discussion on the PRC’s activities in the region, see for example: Marc Julienne, “China’s Strategy Toward Pacific Island Countries: Countering Taiwan and Western Influence,” ReConnect China Policy Brief No. 31, Ghent University, January 2026, https://www.reconnect-china.ugent.be/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/ReConnect-China-Policy-Brief-31-Countering-Taiwan-and-Western-Influence.pdf; Fabrizio Bozzato, “Contours of Influence: China’s Expanding Footprint in the Pacific Islands,” International Information Network Analysis (IINA), Sasakawa Peace Foundation, July 10, 2025, https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/fabrizio_bozzato_01.html.
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