Executive Summary:
- The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law creates statutory obligations that will lead to more comprehensive enforcement of Beijing’s assimilationist agenda. Local governments will create new regulations and update old ones to bring their practices in line with its mandates, and appropriate more resources for “forging a common Chinese national consciousness.”
- The law builds on more than 20 provincial regulations and laws that have accumulated over more than 15 years. It also complements the newly revised Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language Law that since January has accelerated the removal of minority language scripts from public life.
- The United Nations has led pushback to the law, with a letter warning that it likely violates at least 12 international human rights laws that the People’s Republic of China has ratified. International support for the law has been notably absent, even among Beijing’s closer partners.
The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law (民族团结进步促进法), passed by the National People’s Congress in March, does not take effect until July 1 (Xinhua, March 12). The intervening months have not been quiet, however, as officials across the country have been busy studying the law’s spirit and preparing plans for its implementation. Commentaries, press releases, and interviews published since the law’s passage provide important context, framing the law as the culmination of over a decade of legal and regulatory innovation starting at the local level. These sources also outline the perceived problems that this new “legal weapon” (法律武器) is set to solve, framing it simultaneously as a “new beginning” (新的起点) for the central government’s assimilationist agenda (Today’s Nationalities Magazine, May 13; Yunnan Rule of Law News, May 14).
A Decade Of Ethnic Unity and Progress Legislation
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) ethnic unity law emerged out of more than 15 years of local legal development. Yunnan Province has been a driving force in this domain since before General Secretary Xi Jinping came to power. In 2010, a sub-provincial government passed the Regulations on Ethnic Unity and Progress of Diqing Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan Province (云南省迪庆藏族自治州民族团结进步条例), which was the first regulation in the country that specifically targeted ethnic unity and progress. These were followed in 2018 by the provincial-level Regulations on the Construction of Yunnan Province as a Demonstration Zone for Ethnic Unity and Progress (云南省民族团结进步示范区建设条例), which also broke new ground as the first regulations to include the concept of “forging a common consciousness of the Chinese nation” (铸牢中华民族共同体意识). By the time the national law passed this year, more than 20 provinces had enacted similar regulations, in what one article refers to as a “bottom-up legislative exploration practice” (自下而上的立法探索实践) (Yunnan Rule of Law News, May 14).
In the last few months, other related laws and regulations have been enacted that officials have explicitly linked to the new ethnic unity law. The most prominent is the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language Law (国家通用语言文字法), which was heavily revised in late 2025 and effective as of January 1 (CCP Members’ Net, December 27, 2025). [1] One of the key changes is to more deeply link the regulations to notions of nationalist and Party loyalty. For instance, “forge a common Chinese national consciousness and strengthen cultural confidence” (铸牢中华民族共同体意识，坚定文化自信) now appears in the very first article of the regulations; the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is referred to where previously it was not mentioned; and references to the nation (国家) are now much more frequent throughout the text. Importantly, article 7 mandates that governments assign a portion of their budgets toward implementing the law. This will ensure that officials follow through with “promoting and popularizing the national standard language and script in ethnic minority areas, rural areas, and remote areas” (民族地区、农村和边远地区推广普及国家通用语言文字).
As with the new ethnic unity law, the revised language law articulates an explicit linguistic hierarchy. This is clear in its prescriptions for education, which include deleting a prior provision that had allowed exceptions to the use of Mandarin as the medium of instruction in schools. It also features in provisions that mandate all public service entities to ensure that “standardized Chinese is the primary script” (以规范汉字为主). This was recently reiterated in an article on the theory page of Procuratorial Daily, where the Party Secretary of the Urumqi Municipal People’s Procuratorate called for using “the power of the law” (法治力量) to “standardize the placement and order” (在位置、顺序等方面规范设置) of writing in public places, “highlighting the dominant position of the national common language and script” (突出国家通用语言文字的主体地位) (Procuratorial Daily, May 7).
A separate ruling that came into force on March 1 is the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulations on Protecting State Secrets (新疆维吾尔自治区保守国家秘密条例). While these are not explicitly related to the new ethnic unity law, they complement its ambitions by creating an environment that makes the more hostile aspects of its implementation less visible. These regulations call for “grassroots self-governing organizations” (基层群众性自治组织) and “secrecy liaisons” (保密联络员) to assist local governments in protecting state secrets. They also lay out processes for the destruction of classified material, and rules for blocking any potential leakage of classified information, including by preventing employees who leave the system from leaving the country for an unspecified period (Xinjiang Government, December 5, 2025).
Online reports from the first few months of the year have often captured how the enforcement of linguistic hierarchy is homogenizing urban landscapes in the PRC, with signs in non-Mandarin scripts being taken down or papered over. These changes, however, likely only follow the enactment of the revisions to the national language law and are not a response to the passing of the ethnic unity law.
Renewed Authority is Already Deepening Unity Work
The implementation of the ethnic unity law may be much more far-reaching. Although the history of local ethnic unity laws suggest that the Party’s new-era ethnic work has been in progress for a number of years already, commentary around the national-level law discusses the various problems and obstacles that these efforts have encountered to date, which the new law is expected to resolve.
The law’s most important feature is the regulatory force that it brings. One article describes this upgrade variously as moving “from policy guidance to legal norms” (从政策性引导向法律性规范), as transforming the work of ethnic unity and progress “from a ‘soft task’ to a ‘hard constraint’” (从“软任务”转化为“硬约束”), and in the context of Yunnan’s demonstration zone as moving “from ‘advocacy requirements’ to ‘mandatory obligations,’ and from ‘work deployments’ to ‘statutory responsibilities’” (从“倡导性要求”转化为“强制性义务”，从“工作部署”转化为“法定职责”). In other words, the new law means that officials are now compelled much more forcefully to follow the Party’s ideological line on ethnic work, with harsh punishments for those who fail to do so. This will resolve the issue of the “policy-led model” (政策引领模式), which some saw as too flexible and with insufficient capacity for enforcement (Today’s Nationalities Magazine, May 13).
Given the already oppressive policy environment that most ethnic minorities have had to deal with, from the outside the need for more stringent obligations can seem unclear. Top Party authorities, however, take a different view, and are convinced that there is much more work to be done. In a recent article titled “When it comes to ethnic unity, why do we need a ‘promotion law’ today?” (民族团结，为何今天需要一部“促进法”), the National Ethnic Affairs Commission (NEAC) explains that the country is still far from “forging a common national consciousness”—something that the new law takes as its “central theme” (主线). [2] In practice, this entails following Xi Jinping’s “Four Points On Relationships” (“四对关系”), which include forcing all minorities to always “put common Chinese interests first” (始终把中华民族利益放在首位) and to see that “Chinese culture is the main stem, and minority cultures are the branches and leaves” (中华文化是主干，各民族文化是枝叶) (NEAC, April 29).
In order to fully subjugate diverse cultures under a homogenized and majoritarian whole, a raft of new regulations are likely to appear over the coming year. In Yunnan, for example, its 2018 regulations are set to be revised, new targeted regulations will be drawn up that focus on key areas such as ethnic integration and rule of law at the border, and administrative law enforcement will be strengthened to “address behaviors that hinder ethnic unity” (治理妨碍民族团结的行为) (Today’s Nationalities Magazine, May 13). Perhaps most concerning will be a deepening of the construction of “embedded communities” (互嵌式社区) across the country rather than only in specific locales. This involves what one article calls “demolishing walls and merging courtyards” (拆墙并院), with the aim of forcibly assimilating minority ethnic groups with the Han majority in new residential facilities (Ningxia Daily, March 30).
Attempts to control religious behavior will also ramp up. The most recent white paper on Xinjiang foreshadowed this, describing the “Sinicization of religion” (宗教中国化) as including “promoting the national flag, the Constitution and laws, socialist core values, and fine traditional Chinese culture in religious venues” (开展国旗、宪法和法律法规、社会主义核心价值观、中华优秀传统文化进宗教活动场所活动) (Xinhua, September 20, 2025). Some preparatory activities to these ends have already begun following the passing of the ethnic unity law, with the United Front Work Department (UFWD) acting as a key player. In Tibet, a local UFWD division held a symposium with Muslim community leaders, telling them to “earnestly study and implement” (认真学习贯彻) the ethnic unity law, and to provide interpretations of classical doctrines that “conform to the requirements of social development and progress and to excellent traditional Chinese culture” (符合社会发展进步要求、符合中华优秀传统文化) (Sixth UFWD Division of the District Party Committee in Tibet, March 26). The local UFWD in Hanbin, Heilongjiang Province, meanwhile, hosted a special training session for the district’s Muslim community at which they declared a need to “firmly establish the concept that national law is superior to religious regulations” (牢固树立国法大于教规的观念) and integrate the ethnic unity law’s requirements into “practical measures for daily religious sermons, management of religious venues, and social services (日常讲经、宗教活动场所管理及社会服务的务实举措) (Hanbin UFWD, April 28).
International Condemnation Exposes Weak Discourse Power
Chinese authorities are acutely aware of the unpopularity—and potential illegality—of the new law. A commentary coauthored by the central UFWD and the NEAC warned of the need to “address shortcomings in … international communication capabilities” (国际传播能力 … 存在的短板提出创新举措) and to “strengthen propagandizing and explaining” (加强宣传阐释). It suggests achieving this by “fully leveraging the role of relevant research institutions and think tanks” (要充分发挥有关科研机构和智库作用) to help “maintain … theoretical discourse power” (牢牢把握 …理论话语权) and by “firmly opposing all acts of slander, smear campaigns, suppression, and subversion carried out under the pretext of ethnicity, religion, human rights, or other such grounds” (坚决反对一切以民族、宗教、人权等借口实施污蔑抹黑、遏制打压、渗透破坏等行为) (People’s Daily, April 27). These suggestions have been echoed elsewhere. A post from one university notes that organizing international conferences, participating in discussions on international human rights mechanisms, and holding thematic side events allow them to “proactively tell the true stories of the protection of the rights of ethnic minorities and the progress of ethnic unity in China, enhancing the international communication power of China’s narrative” (主动讲述中国少数民族权利保障和民族团结进步的真实故事，增强中国叙事的国际传播力) (WeChat/China Minorities Education, May 11).
It is still early, and the law is still young, but it may take some time before the international community accepts the Party’s new law, let alone sees it as a “a new benchmark for peaceful coexistence among humankind in a diverse world” (为人类在多元化世界中的和平共处确立了新的文明标杆) (NEAC, April 29). A letter from the United Nations, co-signed by no fewer than eight special rapporteurs for human rights, expresses serious concerns about the law. It notes that the law not only likely contradicts the PRC’s own constitution, but that it violates at least 12 international human rights laws that the PRC has ratified, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (UN OHCHR, April 16). The European Parliament has similarly condemned the law, called for sanctions, and urged its repeal (European Parliament, April 30). These responses are to be expected, but the law also lacks support from the PRC’s closest international partners. This author was unable to find a single foreign governmental official or media outlet that has come out and praised the law since its passage over two months ago—an inauspicious sign as Beijing seeks to persuade other countries of its moral bona fides amid growing global disorder.
Conclusion
The Ethnic Unity and Progress Promotion Law is set to come into effect in July. Its legal force will lend top-level sanction to the acceleration of human rights abuses in the PRC, with potential criminal penalties for those who resist. It will likely precipitate a wave of local regulations—both new and revised—that put budgetary and enforcement power behind efforts to “forge a common Chinese consciousness.” This goal, articulated at the highest level by Xi Jinping as central to achieving the Party’s number one priority of national rejuvenation, will have wide-reaching within the PRC. Overseas, the Party has signaled its intent to implement the law’s extraterritorial provisions, which suggests that transnational repression campaigns will continue to receive strong support.
Notes
[1] The NPC Observer has a useful side-by-side comparison of the old law and the new revisions and additions (NPC Observer, September 2025).[2] This was also the central theme of a white paper on Xinjiang that the State Council released in September (Xinhua, September 20, 2025; China Brief, October 5).
[2] This was also the central theme of a white paper on Xinjiang that the State Council released in September (Xinhua, September 20, 2025; China Brief, October 5).
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