The Nobel Prize in Economics isn’t mentioned in Alfred Nobel’s will. Rather, the gong was established in 1968 by Sweden’s central bank, which still funds it today. As Avner Offer and Gabriel Söderberg show in their book The Nobel Factor, this is no mere historical curiosity, for the prize’s origins can be understood against the backdrop of a conflict between Swedish social democracy and the champions of the market. Recognizing economists with the prestigious Nobel Prize was supposed to grant their theories the authority of the natural sciences such as physics and chemistry. Yet these imperfect theories do more than just describe the world: they help guide economic policy decisions that affect the lives of millions of people.

The 2026 prize awarded to Robert Hall and Michael Woodford drew this issue into especially sharp focus. According to the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, the two economists provided the “microeconomic foundations of macroeconomic stabilization,” developing tools capable of smoothing out the peaks and troughs of the economy. The official statement even claims that their research has made the management of major crises far more effective. The problem is that the models in question, grounded in the contributions of Hall and Woodford, have not helped stabilize economies, as the 2008 crisis clearly demonstrated. Such models have, however, convinced many economists that they could do so. Internal consistency was passed off as a real understanding of the dynamics of capitalist economies; theoretical elegance was equated with empirical validity; and apparent stability was misread as an absence of crises.

Decisively, this illusion of control was not confined to academic inquiry but guided the economic policies of governments and central banks. This fueled an excessive confidence in monetary policy’s ability to stabilize both inflation and the real economy while ignoring those financial risks that would overwhelm the global economy with the subprime mortgage crisis.

An Economy Tailored to the Model

In the 1970s, stagflation challenged the statistical relationships through which a certain vintage of “Keynesian” macroeconomics interpreted production, unemployment, and inflation. A “New Classical Macroeconomics” offered a radical response: to study the dynamics of capitalist economies by starting with the consumption, savings, and labor choices of a single hyperrational individual capable of predicting the future based on all available information. Replacing the interactions of millions of people and firms with a single imaginary individual was a convenient shortcut to avoid seriously addressing the problems of general-equilibrium models. But this meant sweeping aside the very problems that economic science has to understand and explain: involuntary unemployment, distributional conflicts, inequality, systemic risk, and crises.

This was the context in which Hall published his famous 1978 paper on consumption. If a representative household rationally chooses how much to consume in each period based on the income it expects to earn over its entire lifetime, changes in consumption head on a “random walk,” because they depend solely on new information, which is by definition unpredictable. This theoretical result implies that consumption depends solely on the income expected to be earned over a lifetime, but this contrasts with the behavior of millions of households whose consumption depends on their monthly income.

In fact, as early as 1989, empirical evidence showed that the predictions from Hall’s model were incorrect, since a considerable portion of consumers made spending decisions based on current, rather than permanent, income. Subsequent research has confirmed the importance of liquidity constraints that limit consumption and differences in wealth among households.

And this is no minor detail: for a low-income or indebted household, a government transfer can immediately increase consumption, just as a reduction in interest rates can. Income distribution and the composition of fiscal policies thus turn out to be decisive. But in Hall’s model, as in all models built around a mythical representative consumer, these differences are absent by design.

Hall is also famous for having developed, together with Dale W. Jorgenson, the neoclassical theory of investment, in which a representative firm decides how much to invest based on the cost of capital. In this case, too, numerous empirical studies have contradicted his and Jorgenson’s neat theoretical findings: for firms’ investment choices depend primarily on expectations of future demand and the availability of financing sources such as bank credit.

While Hall provided the theories for modeling the dynamics of aggregate consumption and investment, i.e., two fundamental components of GDP, Woodford played a prominent role in the “New Neoclassical Synthesis,” which sought to explain the dynamics of a capitalist economy. In his 2003 magnum opus Interest and Prices, Woodford developed a macroeconomic model called Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) based on the rational choices of a representative consumer and firm that maximize utility and profits, respectively, with perfect knowledge of the economic model in which they operate.

The main difference between this DSGE model and those used by New Classical Macroeconomics is the existence of “market imperfections,” meaning monopolistic competition, and especially that firms do not change prices continuously. The presence of sticky prices thus allows the central bank to stabilize consumption, output, and employment by announcing its future policy decisions and changes in the interest rate. Thanks to this stickiness, monetary policy can influence GDP dynamics, even though the theoretical framework remains that of New Classical Macroeconomics.

This compromise has often been referred to as “New Keynesianism,” and yet it has little to do with John Maynard Keynes’s work. Economic fluctuations, in fact, stem from shocks external to the model that temporarily push the economy away from market equilibrium, and only price rigidities allow monetary policy to correct these deviations. In contrast, for Keynes, economic cycles are an intrinsic feature of how capitalist systems function even in the presence of flexible prices. In this context, monetary policies, and especially fiscal policies, play a fundamental role in mitigating the lasting effects of financial crises and recessions.

From the Great Moderation to the Great Recession

The advent of the New Neoclassical Synthesis fueled growing confidence in macroeconomic models, seemingly confirmed by the so-called Great Moderation: a long period beginning in the mid-1980s, when many advanced economies saw a major reduction in the volatility of GDP and inflation. Many economists regarded this outcome as a “divine coincidence,” due in large part to improved monetary policy that slavishly followed the “scientific” principles provided by DSGE models.

In this climate of optimism, reminiscent of Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis, Nobel laureate Robert Lucas solemnly declared, like some modern-day Pangloss, that economists had solved the problem of depressions. And in August 2008, Olivier Blanchard described the state of macroeconomics as “good.”

Unfortunately, the outcome of this story is well known: in the fall of 2008, the subprime mortgage crisis plunged the global economy into the most severe recession since the Great Depression of 1929. Beneath the apparent stability indicated by DSGE models, inequality, household debt, and the fragility of banks and financial intermediaries were on the rise, while the financial sector was being deregulated, and new derivative products were being invented. Price stability masked the growing instability of the financial system. This all happened amid the utter silence of the dominant macroeconomic theory, which paid no attention to the behavior of banks and large investors. It did not acknowledge the possibility of a financial crisis, even as a theoretical prospect.

As noted by Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, the failure to account for finance rendered the dominant models useless not only for predicting a crisis but also for explaining why it had emerged. Worse, DSGE models proved useless in formulating the economic policy interventions needed to avert a new depression, such as bank bailouts, expansionary fiscal policies, unconventional monetary policies, macroprudential regulations of the financial system, and extraordinary measures to prevent the collapse of financial markets.

In essence, the contributions of Hall and Woodford and the New Neoclassical Synthesis more generally provided no theoretical foundation for macroeconomic stabilization. Instead they helped blind many economists and policymakers to the signs of the perfect storm that was about to hit the global economy. And when the crisis erupted, they proved inadequate for devising the economic policies needed to save global economies.

An Extremely Fine-Grained, Imaginary World

The main strength of DSGE models, which have become the dominant language of modern macroeconomics and influential tools within central banks, is their formal rigor. But mathematical consistency is no guarantee of realism. A model can rigorously describe what would happen in an imaginary world if the underlying assumptions were true, yet be totally unreliable when those assumptions are tested against reality.

MIT economist Ricardo Caballero explained this clearly in the wake of the 2008 crisis. He showed how mainstream macroeconomics had become captivated by the models’ own internal logic, confusing the precision achieved in the virtual world they constructed with knowledge of the real world. This fed the risky assumption that existing policies would guarantee price and economic stability even as the conditions for the subprime mortgage crisis were being created. If the financial system is treated as marginal, and failures are either absent or greatly simplified, the model can provide extremely detailed answers to the wrong questions. As early as 2002, research at the Bank for International Settlements had shown that financial imbalances can grow even with low inflation, while economists Òscar Jordà, Alan Taylor, and Moritz Schularick found that rapid credit growth could signal systemic risks prior to a crisis. Still, this type of analysis remained on the margins of the dominant paradigm. To quote former Bank of England economist Charles Goodheart, the standard DSGE model excludes everything relevant to the stability of the financial system and “has been completely useless as a guide to the recent financial crisis.”

Unfortunately, this trend has become more entrenched in mainstream macroeconomics ever since the theories developed in the 1970s by Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent. The focus is, in fact, on mathematical elegance at the expense of critical analysis of the assumptions and the realism of the model. But the implications for economic policy depend on the assumptions, not on mathematical proofs derived from imaginary economies. Otherwise, we risk entrusting our understanding of macroeconomic dynamics and economic policy to “post-real” models, as Paul Romer wryly put it in 2016.

After 2008, DSGE models incorporated imperfections in the credit market and homeopathic doses of heterogeneity among consumers. And Woodford himself addressed the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability. These are developments worth acknowledging. But adding a new host of frictions is not enough to explain how economic imbalances can lead to financial crises and deep recessions.

The Cost of Orthodoxy and the Need for Pluralism

There is also a less visible cost than the one directly involving economic crisis: namely, the stifling of pluralism in research. The theoretical-political construct developed around Hall’s and Woodford’s framework has become so dominant and self-referential that it has dismissed nearly all opposing arguments. Keynesian approaches as well as those of other economic schools, which focused on deep uncertainty, effective demand, income distribution, institutions, and financial instability, have often been deemed less scientific and marginalized. This not because they are contradicted by the data, but because they fall outside the language of the dominant paradigm, which lends a veneer of formal rigor.

Krugman highlighted this paradox in 2016, asking what accurate predictions justified the hegemony of DSGE models. He noted how this methodology had sidelined less sophisticated analyses that were, however, more useful for understanding crises. This is not an objection to technical rigor but to the transformation of a particular technique into a dogmatic criterion for belonging to the discipline, where the dominant theory becomes almost a creed or, worse, a sect. And when the method matters more than the phenomena to be explained and the results obtained, the supposed rigor becomes a weapon to silence alternative theories. This occurs through control of scientific journals, where the guardians of orthodoxy publish only articles aligned with the relevant theoretical paradigm. In this way, as James Heckman and Sidharth Moktan argue, the careers of young economists are shaped, careerism is encouraged, and creativity is stifled. And all of this, according to George Akerlof, has discouraged research on financial crises, which were considered a secondary issue within the dominant paradigm — at least until the crisis struck.

The 2026 Nobel Prize in Economics pays homage to a seductive idea. It suggests that, given an elegant theoretical model, the fluctuations of capitalist economies can be easily smoothed out through economic policies designed according to “scientific” principles. The problem is that reality cannot be bent to fit the model if the model represents a leap beyond economics, as asserted by Robert Solow. Different theoretical approaches are needed, therefore, like those that view economies as complex evolving systems. We can only hope that the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Hall and Woodford will spark a debate leading to greater pluralism in the field of economics, rewarding the ability to explain the real world rather than the formalism of imaginary worlds. Unfortunately, this too may be a little overoptimistic.

This article originally appeared in Jacobin, a democratic socialist magazine publishing long-form essays and analysis on politics, economics, and culture. Subscribe to the print edition for $20 a year.

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