Executive Summary:
- The Russian-language information space has widely discussed the possibility of a second mobilization wave in autumn over recent weeks. This assessment is supported by Russia’s front line personnel shortages and new measures meant to improve military recruitment.
- Growing evidence indicates that the first mobilization decree from September 2022—which has not been legally ended—is continuing in practice, and that legislative changes designed to simplify mobilization are already being applied.
- Authorities are increasingly pressuring conscripts and civilians into signing military contracts through coercion, blurring the lines between conscription, contract-soldier recruitment, and wartime mobilization.
The possibility of a new mobilization wave has been widely discussed in the Russian-language information space over recent weeks. Mobilization refers to the wartime call-up of military reservists under a presidential decree. It is distinct from Russia’s biannual conscription, under which individuals generally cannot be deployed directly into combat unless they sign a professional contract, though there are many reports of conscripts being forced to the front. Independent Russian outlets Verstka and Important Stories, citing eight sources working with the Russian Presidential Administration and the security services, reported the Kremlin could announce new mobilization as early as October, after the State Duma elections. One source who oversees recruitment for one of Russia’s state corporations stated that preparatory measures “for something that will never be called mobilization” have been underway “for several months.” The Kremlin is also discussing the possibility of sending rear-area reservists to the front (Important Stories, June 24). This information has been corroborated by Meduza, citing its own sources (Meduza, June 26).
According to Ukrainian military estimates, Russian battlefield casualties have exceeded new recruitment since December 2025, creating a need for more troops. Pro-Kremlin outlets largely continue to deny any preparation for mobilization. They do, however, acknowledge that Moscow has taken steps to optimize conscription and recruitment of contract soldiers, including the development of the Unified Military Registration Register and the introduction of electronic summonses (Politika Segodnia, July 4).
Regime-aligned commentators insist that these measures have nothing to do with mobilization. In practice, the distinction between conscription for compulsory service and deployment to the war against Ukraine is frequently erased. Officially, the Kremlin frames conscription as domestic, non-combat service, wherein around a third of eligible men 18–30 are called up for mandatory one-year terms for training and basic military duties, with a legal bar on deploying conscripts to a war zone. There is extensive evidence, however, that conscripts are systematically coerced into signing contracts (Radio Svoboda, February 24). Commanders most often achieve this through threats, coercion, direct physical torture, beatings, or deception (Vot Tak, January 22). Cases in which commanders themselves sign contracts on behalf of conscripts by forging their signatures are also not uncommon (Radio Svoboda, February 10). Earlier this year, human-rights activists obtained a document confirming that conscripts are being recruited for the war on the direct orders of the Russian Ministry of Defense (Telegram/@netprizyvu, February 4).
In late June, the ultra-right Tsargrad outlet reported that training sessions for officials responsible for mobilization issues are being held. In Volgograd and Volzhsky, four training sites were used for such events. Representatives from Astrakhan oblast, Rostov oblast, the Republic of Kalmykia, the Republic of Crimea, Sevastopol, and Russian-occupied Luhansk also took part. Local governments insisted that the gatherings were merely a platform for inter-regional exchange of experience and not a signal for the start of mobilization. The authors of the article, however, noted in response that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s September 2022 decree announcing partial mobilization remains formally in force (Тsargrad, June 20). Though the mass call-up has ended in practice, the decree technically remains valid, retaining Moscow’s authority to mobilize reservists without first issuing a new mobilization decree.
Reports of raids, during which conscripts and men not subject to the draft have been detained and pressured into signing military contracts, continue to grow. In early summer, reports emerged of raids in Penza oblast during which men were detained on the street, forced into cars and minibuses, and taken to military recruitment offices where they were beaten and compelled to sign contracts (Deutsche Welle Russian Service, June 19). At the end of June, similar raids were reported in Primorsky and Khabarovsk krais. In Penza oblast, reports of people being abducted from the streets, workplaces, and even their own homes occur daily. Successfully intervening to free those detained is extremely rare. This practice has also reportedly spread to the Far East (Radio Svoboda, June 26).
Some analysts believe that forced mobilization could further degrade the quality of Russian forces. The Russian army is already facing serious problems in training personnel and drone operators, and large-scale mobilization could exacerbate these difficulties and negatively affect combat effectiveness. Ukrainian drone strikes, which actively hinder Russia’s ability to transfer personnel to the front, maintain supply lines, and hold positions, could further undermine the effectiveness of a new mobilization wave (Ukrinform, May 28).
Accurate information about the economic and military situation may not be reaching Putin. Members of Kremlin-backed think tanks paint a very different picture. Andrei Bezrukov—a Russian intelligence operative whose extended time undercover in North America inspired the U.S. television show “The Americans” and is now a professor and a member of Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defense Policy—insists that the West is unprepared for a serious war with Russia and remains defenseless against a potential Russian missile strike. Bezrukov has argued for strikes against targets inside Europe itself, including on factories and gas distribution stations (YouTube/@ne_delyagin1, July 4).
Debates about whether Russia will launch a new wave of mobilization in autumn are somewhat misplaced. The forced mobilization of people to the front has not stopped in practice since the first wave in September 2022 and has significantly intensified in recent months. Russia is substantially improving the technical infrastructure for mobilization. The important question is by how much, and how formally, mobilization will increase this autumn.
The post First Mobilization Wave Ongoing as Second Wave Discussion Intensifies appeared first on Jamestown.