Executive Summary:
- Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s appearance alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin in Ashgabat during the December International Year of Peace and Trust Forum fueled speculation about backchannel contacts, signaling a symbolic post-2008 thaw amid Moscow’s pressure and Tbilisi’s mixed messaging on dialogue and territorial integrity.
- Georgian Dream publicly defends Georgian sovereignty while making concessions aligned with Russian demands, advancing a neutrality narrative that weakens Euro-Atlantic integration, normalizes Moscow’s influence, and reframes North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and EU aspirations as unrealistic or destabilizing.
- Deepening economic, infrastructural, and informational ties with Russia—including energy dependence, trade routes, and media messaging—illustrate Georgia’s strategic drift toward Moscow, where “neutrality” increasingly functions as a vehicle for Russian leverage rather than genuine independence.
On December 11–12, 2025 Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Kobakhidze took part in the International Year of Peace and Trust Forum in Ashgabat, timed to coincide with the 30th anniversary of Turkmenistan’s neutrality (Times of Central Asia, December 11, 2025; Facebook/KobakhidzeOfficial, December 12, 2025). The forum was attended by the presidents of Russia, Central Asian countries, Türkiye, Armenia, Iraq, and Iran, as well as the prime ministers of Azerbaijan, Hungary, and Pakistan. In one of the official group photos, Kobakhidze and Russian President Vladimir Putin appeared almost side by side (Ekho Kavkaza, December 12, 2025). The Georgian opposition have speculated about possible secret talks between Kobakhidze and Putin (Facebook/interpressnews.ge, December 12, 2025). This suspicion was further strengthened by Vice Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Giorgi Volsky, who, on December 12, 2025, when commenting on Kobakhidze’s presence at the forum, told local media that Kobakhidze “is exactly where Georgia’s tomorrow is planned” (Netgazeti, December 12, 2025). This is the first time since the 2008 war that the leaders of Georgia and Russia have been present together at an international forum.
Official criticism of the Georgian authorities from Moscow preceded this forum. On December 3, 2025, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that there are no grounds for resuming political dialogue with Georgia. The statement specifically criticized Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party for refusing to recognize Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia) as independent states—a key demand from Moscow. Moscow is dissatisfied that Tbilisi links the restoration of diplomatic relations with Russia to the demand to renounce recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russian Foreign Ministry calls Georgia’s position detrimental to Georgia itself and unrealistic (Izvestiya, December 3, 2025). In response, Kobakhidze stated, “We have a principled position that the issue of the occupation of Georgian territories is a red line for us and is not subject to any compromise” (Interpressnews, December 3, 2025).
Georgian Dream has declared its commitment to Georgia’s territorial integrity while gradually complying with Moscow’s key demands. Among these demands is the existence of the Temporary Administration of South Ossetia. On May 8, 2007, before Russia’s military aggression against Georgia in 2008, a temporary administrative-territorial unit was established on the territory of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region, which had existed in the Soviet era, at the initiative of then-President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili. This intended to emphasize the region’s legal affiliation with Georgia. After Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states in 2008, Moscow expressed dissatisfaction with the continued existence of this administration. On December 17, 2025, the Georgian Parliament abolished the Temporary Administration of South Ossetia, which effectively coincided with one of Russia’s longstanding demands (Georgian Parliament, December 17, 2025).
Kobakhidze’s visit to Ashgabat was seemingly viewed positively in Moscow. Georgia’s participation in this forum was promptly followed by praise from Mikhail Kalugin, Director of the Fourth Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) at the Russian Foreign Ministry. He stated, “Tbilisi is demonstrating healthy pragmatism and a tendency toward a multi-vector foreign policy … Russia is seriously committed to normalizing relations with Georgia. The key point is that Georgia should not become a ‘bargaining chip’ in anti-Russian games” (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 16, 2025). In response to Moscow’s stated desire to normalize relations with Georgia, Chairman of the Georgian Parliament Shalva Papuashvili stated, “We also support normalization, but a precondition for this is the recognition of our territorial integrity” (Interpressnews, December 16, 2025).
Georgia’s participation in the 30th anniversary of Turkmenistan’s neutrality highlights its willingness to position itself as a neutral country. Since neutrality implies limited engagement with the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it also reinforces and formalizes Russia’s influence in Georgia. Georgian Dream appears willing to make concessions to Russia, such as potentially abandoning its path toward European integration. According to Georgia’s fifth president, Salome Zourabiсhvili, Georgian Dream is creating new political ramifications by openly supporting neutrality (X/@Zourabichvili_S, December 4, 2025). The United Neutral Georgia political movement, which had previously positioned itself as a civic initiative, formally established itself as a political party on December 1, 2025, with the intention of promoting the idea of declaring Georgia’s neutrality (Facebook/ertianineitralurisakartvelo, December 1, 2025).
The United Neutral Georgia political movement is not independent, as Georgian Dream supports it. The leaders of this organization have repeatedly authored initiatives that Georgian Dream later implemented as political decisions. To justify a possible declaration of Georgia as a neutral state, Georgian Dream has begun an information campaign to prepare the public. On December 17, 2025, Kobakhidze described Georgia and Ukraine as victims of the so-called NATO “open door” policy. According to him, it eventually became clear that no real NATO open door policy ever existed (Interpressnews, December 17, 2025). Kobakhidze is trying to convince the country’s population that no one ever intended to admit Georgia to NATO and that Georgia will never be admitted, making neutrality the most pragmatic option for the country.
Neutrality for Russia is a fiction. Saakashvili stated, besides declaring neutrality, Russia also demands that Georgia join the CIS and the Customs Union and establish a Russian counterterrorism center on Georgian territory, which essentially amounts to a Russian military base (Facebook/SaakashviliMikheil, December 20, 2025).
The Georgia government and its propaganda apparatus are gradually adapting the population to new realities. From now on, Georgia’s future is decided not in Brussels, as it was until recently, but in Ashgabat and other authoritarian cities of the post-Soviet space. Moreover, whereas previously Georgian media—including those controlled by the authorities—promoted various quotes from Western leaders regarding Georgia’s European integration, even the public broadcaster has now begun actively circulating quotes from Putin. These statements are being used to create a positive image, such as Putin’s claims that “Russia supports peace, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and respect for the rights of other countries and peoples” (1tv.ge, December 12, 2025).
Georgian Dream representatives are gradually acting as international advocates for Russia, indirectly defending its interests. For example, on December 18, 2025, Papuashvili criticized the European Union for intending to provide aid to Ukraine using Russia’s frozen assets (Netgazeti, December 18, 2025). Georgian Dream is making every effort to ensure that its voice is heard in Moscow. Papushavili has been actively posting statements on his Facebook account to support this position. He wrote, “Those who demand that Georgia impose sanctions on Russia are pushing us toward escalation with Russia. Those who push us toward escalation with Russia are putting the country at risk of a new war” (Facebook/shpapuashvili, December 18, 2025).
Russia is strengthening its trade and economic cooperation with Georgia, which, against the backdrop of international sanctions, is becoming increasingly important for Moscow. According to the National Statistics Office of Georgia, in the third quarter of 2025, the volume of direct investments from Russia in Georgia increased and amounted to $17.5 million, while the total direct investments from Russia in Georgia for the 2025 reached $56.8 million (Batumelebi.netgazeti, December 9, 2025). In 2025, 97 percent of the oil imported into Georgia came from Russia. This means that Georgia’s dependence on Russian fuel has already reached a dramatic level. According to the National Statistics Office of Georgia, 133.6 thousand tons of crude oil worth $60.4 million were imported from Russia (Facebook/radiotavisupleba, December 19, 2025). According to Russian media, 34,600 used passenger cars were imported from Georgia into Russia in 2025 alone (Radio Tavisupleba, December 17, 2025). This occurred despite Georgia’s 2023 ban on exporting and re-exporting passenger cars produced in EU countries to Russia and Belarus, imposed to avoid being accused of assisting Russia in circumventing international sanctions (see EDM, September 8, 2025; Radio Tavisupleba, September 26, 2025).
Russia is increasingly demanding additional concessions from Georgia. Discussions about constructing a new road connecting the two countries through Chechnya, one of Russia’s most dangerous regions, have occurred. This issue became especially relevant after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia needs to establish as many transport routes through Georgia as possible to combat international sanctions.
On December 14, 2025, the Head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, expressed dissatisfaction with the Georgian authorities, whom he accused of obstructing the construction of the new road, and revealed the existence of certain agreements with them. Kadyrov stated, “Georgia has turned out to be unfavorable for us, even though documents were signed and everything was done. Unfortunately, our neighbors still do not want there to be a road through Georgia” (Instagram/@Vainah_tv, December 14, 2025). Georgia has officially stated that it is not considering the construction of a new road through Chechnya (Formulanews, March 17, 2022). This also raises the question of which signed documents Kadyrov was referring to.
Georgia and Russia are currently connected by only one officially controlled border crossing—Dariali/Upper Lars. Harsh mountainous conditions and geological events, however, often complicate road operations and delay transportation. To simplify traffic and reduce transportation time along this route, Georgia’s Ministry of Infrastructure is already constructing a new 23-kilometer (14.3-mile) road and tunnel. On December 10, 2025, Georgia’s Deputy Minister of Infrastructure Mzia Giorgobiani stated that part of the road leading to the Russian border will open next year, while the project’s full completion is planned for 2028 (Georgia Online, December 10, 2025). Russian media have welcomed the news of the construction of the new road toward Russia and responded, “Russian travelers will have another way to reach Georgia—the new highway will connect the two countries by 2028” (Lenta.ru, December 8, 2025).
In December 2025, news emerged about an unexpected route that could connect Georgia and Russia through the occupied region of Abkhazia. In the Gali district of Abkhazia, the construction of a customs terminal, carried out with Russian assistance, is nearly complete and was conducted secretly (Ekho Kavkaza, December 9, 2025).
Abkhazian sources claim that Moscow intends to use this route for transit cargo shipments from Russia to countries such as the People’s Republic of China, India, Iran, and others. Reverse shipments could also take place through occupied Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. Without Tbilisi’s consent, Moscow would not have even begun construction of the customs terminal or invested financial resources in it. The political leadership of Georgia categorically denies any agreements with Moscow regarding the use of the occupied territory to open a new route between Georgia and Russia. Such cargo shipments would automatically be considered a violation of Georgian law on occupied territories and pose a potential threat to the country’s territorial integrity. Kobakhidze dismissed information about possible Tbilisi involvement in this project as false, calling it speculation, and confirmed that Georgia does not intend to allow any cargo to pass through the occupied territory (Facebook.com/KobakhidzeOfficial, December 10, 2025). According to Abkhazian sources, however, the new customs terminal “is intended to help Russia circumvent sanctions. Consequently, Georgia plays a key role in this scheme and is effectively a participant in the deal” (Jam-News, December 14, 2025).
Georgia’s turn toward neutrality and engagement with Russia marks a shift from its Euro-Atlantic path. Despite affirming territorial integrity, the government is increasingly yielding to Russian interests, highlighting how neutrality can serve external influence rather than true independence.
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