Executive Summary:
- The Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) elected Metropolitan Shio (Mujiri) as Patriarch amid allegations of Georgian Dream interference, opaque procedures, and Russian influence. This intensified domestic polarization and raised concerns about the Patriarchate’s institutional independence and political neutrality.
- Shio III’s Russian theological background, longstanding ties to pro-Kremlin businessman Levan Vasadze, and rapid congratulations from Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill fueled suspicions that Moscow seeks to preserve influence over GOC affairs.
- The contentious election process exposed divisions within the GOC, with critics alleging manipulated candidate selection, government pressure on bishops, and insufficient transparency, leaving the new Patriarch facing challenges to establish legitimacy and public trust.
On May 11, at an expanded council of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC), the Holy Synod elected the 142nd Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia (Georgian Patriarchate, May 11). As expected, Georgian Dream-supported 57-year-old Russian-educated Metropolitan Shio (Mujiri) became the spiritual leader of the country. Late-Georgian Patriarch Ilia II had appointed Shio III as locum tenens of the Patriarchal throne in 2017. Of the 39 members of the Holy Synod, 22 hierarchs voted in favor of his candidacy. According to the rules, the expanded council held at the Cathedral of the Holy Trinity in the center of Tbilisi included, in addition to the senior hierarchs with voting rights, around 1,200 delegates—both clergy and lay participants—who attended as guests without voting rights (Georgian Patriarchate, May 11). He is the first Catholicos-Patriarch to be elected to this position after the collapse of the Soviet Union, under an independent Georgia. His critics, however, immediately compared the election to the Soviet tradition of appointing leaders from among the Communist Party nomenklatura (Kviris Palitra, May 11).
Local media noted that well-known propagandists close to the ruling elite and Georgian Dream-affiliated business figures were among the council’s guests (TV Pirveli, May 11). Some opposition-leaning clergy claimed that entrepreneurs linked to Georgian Dream allegedly exerted pressure on bishops in favor of Shio III (YouTube/@tvpirveli1, May 5).
Materials supporting Shio III were actively disseminated in the public information space. Several pro-government media outlets promoted his image as the most likely and “natural” successor to Ilia II. Numerous social media accounts published coordinated posts, video clips, and other content in support of the locum tenens. Georgian Dream has officially denied any involvement in church affairs, including the election of the new patriarch. Representatives of the Georgian security services have expressed a similar position. Mamuka Mdinaradze, the newly appointed state minister for coordination with law enforcement bodies and former head of the State Security Service of Georgia, stated on April 23 that security service personnel had been given clear instructions not to interfere in the Patriarchal election process (Imedi News, April 23).
Amid suspicions of Russian interference in the election, Russian businessmen of Georgian origin were also present at the council. The new Patriarch is often linked in local media to Georgian businessman Levan Vasadze, known for his pro-Russian and ultra-conservative views (YouTube/@Tv.kavkasia, April 29). Shio III and Vasadze have been friends since childhood, and Vasadze himself attended the council where his longtime friend was elected Patriarch (Facebook/tvpirveli.ge, May 11). In 2025, the United Kingdom described Vasadze as a “Georgian politician and media mogul” and sanctioned him amid concerns about growing Russian influence in Georgia. He has close ties with segments of Russia’s political elite and maintains contact with leading Kremlin ideologist Alexander Dugin. The sanctions targeted “Georgia’s hidden supporters of Russia,” and Levan was sanctioned for “using his platforms to pump out pro-Russian disinformation” (U.K. Government, September 19, 2025).
Until recently, Vasadze pursued political ambitions in Georgia. He has cooperated with Georgian Dream and, in 2021, established a right-wing, conservative civic movement called “Unity, Essence, Hope.” Later that same year, he registered a political party named “Nation.” His activity, which has noticeably decreased in recent years, previously included participation in street demonstrations and public confrontations with liberal civil activists in the name of defending traditional, Christian, and national values (see EDM, August 17, 2021).
News of Kremlin-affiliated businessmen attending the church council shook Georgian social media. Leader of the Labor Party of Georgia, Shalva Natelashvili, stood out among Georgian political figures as one of the few who publicly listed and assessed the businessmen present. He said, “I can never come to terms with the fact that at the election of the Patriarch of Georgia there is an entire security service of Putin’s main occupier … Russia’s FSB and Foreign Intelligence Service” (Facebook/Mtavarinow, May 11).
Accusations of close ties with Russia against Shio III emerged immediately after his appointment as locum tenens of the Patriarch in 2017. His theological education is primarily connected with Russia, where he studied at the Moscow Theological Academy and Saint Tikhon’s Orthodox University. From 2001 to 2003, he served as the rector of St. George’s Church of the Georgian community in Moscow (Georgian Patriarchate, accessed May 12). Both during that period and in the years that followed, the so-called “Georgian community in Moscow” was traditionally used by Russia as an instrument for projecting its soft power into Georgia.
In 2017, when a local journalist asked whether he had ties to the Russian authorities and clergy, Shio III responded that it was “gossip and slander” (Netgazeti, November 23, 2017). Allegations regarding his alleged connections to Russia continued to circulate up until he was elected Patriarch. Archbishop Zenon (Iarajuli) of Dmanisi and Agara-Tashiri, in an interview with the opposition TV channel TV Pirveli, made one of the most controversial statements before his election. He stated, “Bishop Shio is dangerous for the Georgian Church as a Patriarch,” and described him as a candidate “favored by Russia,” claiming that Georgian Dream actively supported him. According to the archbishop, government representatives “summoned bishops one by one” to secure support for Shi III (YouTube/@tvpirveli1, May 5). Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze criticized such statements, describing them as a “black campaign” and a manifestation of an inappropriate attitude (Interpressnews, May 7).
There is no clear evidence to support claims that Shio III has pro-Russian views. A childhood friend of the new Patriarch, writer Irakli Kakabadze, speaking on local television in response to criticism of the new Patriarch, claimed that Shio III “’has always been a supporter of a pro-European orientation” (Facebook/tvpirveli.ge, May 12). Moscow, however, appears to be quite satisfied with this candidate. It likely expects that the Moscow Patriarchate will not face any unexpected developments in its relations with the GOC, such as the possible recognition of autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. One of the first foreign religious leaders to congratulate Shio III on his election was Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), who sent a congratulatory letter just hours after his election on May 11. In his letter, Patriarch Kirill refers to the “deep spiritual closeness of our peoples who share the same faith” and writes, “The Georgian and Russian churches are connected by a common history and firmly preserve the faith.” Patriarch Kirill also expressed hope that Shio III will continue the tradition of “fraternal relations” (RIA Novosti, May 11).
In the letter, while congratulating the newly elected Georgian Patriarch—as was also the case with the previous Georgian Patriarch—he did not use his full title. Ilia II deliberately added “Bichvinta and Tskhum-Abkhazia” to his title in 2010 to emphasize that this territory, occupied by Russia, is considered part of Georgia (Civil Georgia, January 7, 2011). When Shio III was announced as the winner, his full title was proclaimed as The Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, Archbishop of Mtskheta-Tbilisi, and Metropolitan of Bichvinta and Tskhum-Abkhazia. Over the years, the GOC administration has never formally expressed protest to the ROC over such disregard for the full title. Shio III now has an opportunity to demonstrate that he is willing to defend, at least in dealings with Moscow, the use of his full ecclesiastical title.
Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has repeatedly accused Georgian opposition parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and media outlets of being involved—allegedly under the influence of external forces, particularly from Europe—in a large-scale campaign against the GOC. According to him, the authorities were forced to carry out a “counter-campaign,” as a result of which the stated objective was achieved. He did not specify, however, what exactly was meant by this “counter-campaign” (Georgian Public Broadcaster, April 29).
The new Patriarch will now also have to demonstrate that he is ready to take a principled, independent stance on the country’s internal political situation, dispelling accusations from parts of the local clergy and society regarding his ties to the ruling elite. According to Georgian theologian Gocha Mirtskhulava, “Metropolitan Shio has turned the Patriarchate into a party branch of Georgian Dream” (Facebook/tvpirveli.ge, May 10). Likewise, according to another theologian, Mirian Gamrekelashvili, “What Metropolitan Shio is planning is blind submission to the government” (YouTube/@tvpirveli1, May 10). Former Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili called on him to pardon all prisoners of conscience as his first step as the new Patriarch (Facebook/tvpirveli.ge, May 11).
The new Patriarch will have to make considerable efforts to earn authority not only among the population but also within the GOC itself. This is all the more so given that the events surrounding his election have already cast a shadow over him, as scandals and high-profile statements from various clergymen marked the entire pre-election period. Divisions within the GOC will not disappear even after the election of a new Patriarch.
Scandals in both the ecclesiastical and public spheres marked the entire electoral process. The election itself took place amid controversial procedures, raising doubts about its transparency and fairness (Radio Tavisupleba, May 6). According to the statute, on April 28, the Holy Synod of the GOC selected three candidates for the patriarchal throne. At the shortlist stage, however, critics argue that procedural mechanisms were used to exclude potentially strong and authoritative contenders capable of mounting real competition to Shio III.
Two well-known metropolises in particular were not admitted to the process—Daniel and Isaiah. Metropolitan Daniel was excluded on a formal basis. According to the statute, a candidate must not be older than 70, and he will turn 71 at the end of May (Radio Tavisupleba, May 6). In the case of Metropolitan Isaiah, the reason for exclusion was the requirement of higher theological education. The Patriarchate stated that he failed to provide a relevant diploma or any confirming document, and he was therefore also removed from the list of candidates (Radio Tavisupleba, April 28).
On April 28, the Holy Synod approved three candidates for the patriarchal throne: Shio III, Metropolitan Iov (Akiashvili), and Metropolitan Grigol (Berbichashvili) (YouTube/@TVersulovneba, April 28). Due to limited support within the Synod, Metropolitans Iov and Grigol were not considered real competitors to Shio III, further reinforcing doubts about the process’s competitiveness and openness.
Shortly before the election, Iov publicly stated that his documents—both secular and theological diplomas—had been stolen from the Patriarchate. According to him, this may have been done to prevent his participation in the election of the GOC’s head (Interpressnews, May 6). These claims further intensified tensions surrounding the electoral process and raised additional questions about its transparency. The diplomas’ disappearance was later confirmed. On May 5, the GOC established a special commission that, after reviewing archival materials and testimonies, officially recognized that Iov had possessed higher theological education (Facebook/sazupatriarchate, May 5). This allowed him to retain his candidacy and participate in the patriarchal election.
In Georgia, a prevailing view is emerging that the new head of the GOC will face significant difficulties in becoming not only a unifying spiritual authority for the nation, but also a figure capable of commanding full trust within the clergy itself. These challenges are closely tied to persistent suspicions about his potential proximity to both Russian political and ecclesiastical circles and to Georgian Dream, whose representatives were among the first to publicly congratulate him on his election. His ability to demonstrate institutional independence will be decisive for the credibility of the Patriarchate and for maintaining cohesion within the GOC amid deepening internal and societal divisions.
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