Executive Summary:
- In February, India introduced its first comprehensive counter-terrorism policy doctrine, the National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, titled ‘PRAHAAR.’ The doctrine marks the culmination of a decade-long shift from reactive counterterrorism to preventive disruption.
- The strategy addresses new technological challenges, including encrypted communications, drone logistics, cryptocurrency funding, and the potential misuse of digital or biological materials.
- Despite addressing key elements of counterterrorism, PRAHAAR is not yet a fully comprehensive, “future-ready” strategy, as it offers limited guidance on algorithmic radicalization and generative artificial intelligence (AI)-produced terrorist content.
On February 23, India unveiled its first National Counter-Terrorism Policy and Strategy, titled ‘PRAHAAR’ (Policy for Response Against Hostile Activities and Radicalism). The doctrine identifies seven clearly defined pillars:
- Preventing terrorist attacks;
- ensuring a swift and proportionate response;
- aggregating domestic capabilities;
- upholding the rule of law and human rights-based processes;
- mitigating conditions that enable terrorism, including radicalization;
- shaping international counterterrorism efforts; and
- promoting recovery and resilience through a whole-of-society approach.
The strategy also takes a “zero-tolerance” stance toward all forms of terrorism (Ministry of Home Affairs of India, February 23). Until the introduction of PRAHAAR, India has relied on a combination of legal instruments to counter terrorism, including the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) of 1967 and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita of 2023; intelligence-sharing mechanisms involving central agencies such as the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) and the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID); and specialized military and police units such as the National Security Guard (NSG). India, however, lacked a comprehensive counter-terrorism doctrine to address the range of hostile actors operating within and beyond its borders. Major attacks—including the 1993 Mumbai bombings in the aftermath of the Babri Masjid controversy, the 2001 Delhi Parliament attack, and the 2008 “26/11” Mumbai attacks—prompted incremental and often ad hoc changes to counterterrorism laws, institutions, and operations. The 2025 attacks in Pahalgam and at the Red Fort appear to have added urgency to the government’s effort to develop an overarching doctrine that closes persistent gaps through coordinated political, legal, technological, and operational measures (see Terrorism Monitor, January 15).
The eight-page policy document outlines India’s evolving threat landscape. Although cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan and Bangladesh remains a central concern, the document also identifies emerging threats such as encrypted terrorist communications, drones, cryptocurrency, organized crime-terrorism linkages, cyber operations, and the potential misuse of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive, and digital (CBRNED) materials. Earlier documents almost exclusively emphasized cross-border infiltration, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and Kashmir- and Pakistan-focused militant groups. The new policy therefore reflects the changing operational realities confronting Indian security agencies.
Has ‘PRAHAAR’ Already Been Activated?
Evidence from recent months suggests that India’s counter-terrorism posture has gradually shifted toward disrupting entire terrorist ecosystems, including overground worker (OGW) networks, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmir Life, April 23; New Indian Express, July 8). Recent investigations into a pan-India online radicalization network originating in Andhra Pradesh illustrate this transition. The Andhra Pradesh Police initially uncovered the case in March and later handed it over to the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which exposed a digitally connected network spanning Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Delhi, Bihar, Rajasthan, and West Bengal. Authorities identified approximately 13 suspected extremists linked to Al-Hakim Shukoor, a foreign handler affiliated with Islamic State (IS). The network reportedly used digital platforms, including BENEX.com and Instagram, for recruitment and indoctrination (New India Express, June 28).
A similar pattern emerged in Gujarat in July, when the Anti-Terrorism Squad arrested eight alleged Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) operatives. Investigators found that the group had translated jihadist literature—particularly Masood Azhar’s Dars-e-Jihad—into Gujarati and gathered hundreds of extremist publications, speeches, encrypted digital files, and messages expressing allegiance to JeM’s leadership (The Print, July 4). The case demonstrated that regional-language propaganda, secure digital storage, and ideological messaging have become central to terrorist recruitment inside India.
Recent counterterrorism operations in eastern India provide another example of this preventive orientation. The NIA and Assam Police intensified investigations into networks linked to al-Qaeda-affiliated Bangladeshi organizations, such as Ansarul Bangla Team (ABT), Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), and its offshoot Imam Mahmuder Kafila (IMK). Indian security agencies are increasingly targeting recruitment cells, indoctrination programs, financial facilitation, cross-border movement, and the dissemination of extremist literature from Bangladesh into northeastern India, particularly Assam, West Bengal, and Tripura (Scroll, December 31, 2025; Times of India, January 3). These operations suggest that anti-India terrorist networks increasingly depend on local support, digital technology, and ideological mobilization rather than extensive physical infrastructure. This approach broadly aligns with PRAHAAR’s objective of countering radicalization and disrupting online propaganda before terrorist networks become fully operational (Ministry of Home Affairs of India, February 23).
A Conceptual Evolution
The PRAHAAR doctrine reflects an important conceptual evolution in India’s use of legal instruments. A greater emphasis on individual terrorist designations will allow authorities to freeze assets, restrict transactions, limit international mobility, and facilitate international cooperation against specific terrorist leaders and facilitators. In July, the Ministry of Home Affairs designated an additional 23 individuals as terrorists under Section 35 of the UAPA, bringing the total number of individually designated terrorists to 57. Most of the newly designated individuals were reportedly based in Pakistan or Pakistan-administered Kashmir (PAK). They were linked to established organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and JeM, while several had alleged ties to IS- and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, including Islamic State Al-Hind (Press Information Bureau, July 4).
Technology has become central to India’s evolving counterterrorism model. Recent investigations increasingly involve encrypted messaging platforms, cryptocurrency transactions, dark-web marketplaces, and drone-based logistics. In late May, Gujarat’s Cyber Centre of Excellence dismantled an international cryptocurrency syndicate allegedly involved in laundering funds through Monero, USDT, and hawala channels, tracing financial links to extremist entities in the Middle East (Times of India, May 25). The increase in drone interceptions along India’s sensitive western border—particularly in the Punjab and Jammu sectors—illustrates how terrorist and criminal logistics have adapted to unmanned systems for transporting narcotics, weapons, and explosives across the frontier (Times of India, July 24, 2025; Press Information Bureau, July 17).
The new counter-terrorism strategy also places emphasis on international diplomatic engagement following terrorist attacks. This was evident after the April 2025 Pahalgam attack and India’s subsequent military response, Operation Sindoor. India launched an extensive diplomatic campaign, sending all-party delegations to 32 countries to highlight Pakistan’s alleged support for cross-border terrorism (Press Information Bureau, May 18, 2025). The campaign received expressions of support from the United States, Australia, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and several European countries. This growing integration of diplomacy with domestic law enforcement and intelligence operations closely mirrors PRAHAAR’s emphasis on shaping international counterterrorism efforts.
Conclusion
Despite addressing important elements of counterterrorism, PRAHAAR does not yet constitute a fully comprehensive, “future-ready” strategy. The strategy offers limited guidance on emerging challenges such as algorithmic radicalization, autonomous drones, and generative artificial intelligence (AI)-produced terrorist content. The NIA and other Indian agencies face increasingly sophisticated propaganda distributed through encrypted platforms and multilingual media, but the doctrine does not explain in sufficient detail how authorities should address these next-generation threats or the broader role of social-media ecosystems.
PRAHAAR also offers little guidance on calibrated military deterrence. This is despite India’s September 2016 surgical strikes targeting terror camps across the Line of Control in PAK, the February 2019 Balakot airstrikes, and Operation Sindoor in May 2025. While emphasizing a proportionate response, the doctrine does not clearly explain how military, diplomatic, intelligence, and covert tools should be integrated against state-sponsored terrorism.
PRAHAAR should nonetheless be understood as the culmination of a decade-long shift from reactive counterterrorism toward preventive disruption supported by technology-enabled intelligence. For now, PRAHAAR provides an important baseline against which India’s future counterterrorism performance can be assessed, codifying an approach that has already begun to reshape how the country anticipates, disrupts, and responds to terrorism at home and beyond its borders.
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