Executive Summary:
- The conflict in and around Iran has disrupted emerging Eurasian transport networks, undermining reliance on Iranian corridors. Rapid infrastructure growth and rising transit volumes through Iran are jeopardized by U.S.–Israeli air strikes and regional instability.
- Iran had become a critical hub in the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative and the Russia-led International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC).
- Attacks on key Iranian ports such as Chabahar and Bandar Abbas have stalled connectivity projects, forcing regional states to reconsider alternatives, such as the Middle Corridor that bypasses Iran.
The effect of the conflict in Iran has widened beyond the combatants to Central Asia and the South Caucasus. For years, these countries have been pursuing overland transport links with Iran. Iran has been intensifying its transport diplomacy with Central Asia for more than a decade to mitigate international sanctions and strengthen cooperation, given the growing importance of east–west and north–south transit corridors, both of which pass through Iran.
Iran has been promoting east–west transport routes that connect the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to southeastern Europe. Goods start in the PRC and traverse various routes across Central Asia, Iran, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye before reaching Europe overland or via the Black Sea. In February 2016, the inaugural freight train from the PRC arrived in Tehran, completing a 6,462-mile journey from Zhejiang via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in 14 days (Iran.ru, February 15, 2016). This route aligns with the PRC’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, of which Iran is a member (see China Brief, September 26, 2019, March 16, 2020; Belt and Road Portal, accessed March 31). Central Asia and the South Caucasus remained economically and logistically bound to Russia for decades after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union. Railways, pipelines, and ports built during the Soviet era kept their economies dependent upon Moscow. While allowing some access to global markets, Russia retained regional influence over transportation and trade, which it periodically used to enforce its political influence. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and increasingly harsh Western sanctions undermined this arrangement.
Participation in east–west transit routes, including via OBOR, has enabled Central Asia and the South Caucasus to secure significant economic and infrastructure upgrades, given their proximity to the world’s second-largest economy. Interest in improved infrastructure extends to Tajikistan, the easternmost of the former Soviet Central Asian countries, which seeks better access to global markets and is therefore interested in Iran’s Bandar Abbas port on the Persian Gulf and Chabahar port on the Arabian Sea.
In the first months of 2025, container traffic on the PRC–Iran railway route grew by 2.6 times (RailFreight.com, May 12, 2025). In May 2025, a meeting was held in Tehran among senior railway officials from Iran, the PRC, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Türkiye to discuss the development of a transcontinental rail network (The Astana Times, May 13, 2025). Thirteen days later, the first freight train from Xi’an, PRC, reached Iran’s Aprin Dry Port—an inland terminal linked by rail and road to sea ports—after crossing Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, marking the official launch of a direct rail link between the PRC and Iran. This new logistical artery significantly reduced transit times from 30–40 days by sea to roughly 15 days by land, lowering transportation costs (Special Eurasia, June 9, 2025).
Since its 1979 revolution, Iran’s economic strategy has focused on securing the survival of its political system by lessening its economic and diplomatic isolation and positioning itself within the rise of Eurasia and an emerging multipolar order. Iran was accordingly a pioneer of the “New Silk Road” concept long before the PRC’s 2013 OBOR proposal (De Cordier, “The economic cooperation organization: Towards a new silk road on the ruins of the cold war?,” 1996). Iran views OBOR as the embodiment of the “New Silk Road” discourse that Tehran helped pioneer.
In 2025, Iran’s Ministry of Roads and Urban Development announced plans to build nine transit rail corridors totaling 10.5 thousand miles at a cost estimated at more than $10 billion (Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst, January 27). Upon completion of construction, Iran’s railway network is expected to transport up to 60 million tons of cargo per year. Some of these projects, including the 124-mile Marand–Cheshmeh–Soraya railway, are intended to create the shortest trade route between east and west. The PRC is currently building a railway terminal in Serakhsa on the border of Turkmenistan and Iran to speed up container traffic on the PRC–Central Asia–Iran–Türkiye–EU route via the Persian Gulf (Voenno-Politicheskaia Analitkia, March 1). In August 2025, the Iranian authorities reported that the project was more than half completed.
Iran is also emerging as a major player in the Russia-led International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a transit project which initially connected India, Iran, and Russia, later joined by Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Central Asian countries. Iran Railways opened the 23-mile (37-kilometer) extension of the Qazvin–Rasht line to Iran’s Caspian port of Bandar-e Anzali in June 2024, completing the last INSTC section. Running through the northern Iranian province of Gilan, the Rasht-Caspian Railway Project completes an all-rail link across Iran from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Abbas (Railway Gazette International, June 25, 2024). The INSTC is now modestly operational—Russian Railways sent a full container train along the INSTC route from Chelyabinsk, in Russia’s Ural Federal District, to Mundra Port, in Gujarat, India, which arrived on November 3, 2025. The train of 62 twenty-foot containers full of oats followed the INSTC eastern rail route to Bandar Abbas, then was shipped to Mundra. The transit time from Chelyabinsk to India is just 30 days, five days faster than on previous routes (Povorot Rossii v Aziyu, November 3, 2025).
Other aspects of PRC involvement in Iranian connectivity development are through the construction of new railway lines from Tehran to Hamadan and Sanandaj, as well as from Kermanshah to Khosravi. Ports, airports, and navigation systems are also under development (Chatham House, March 10). Additionally, the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway is due to become operational in 2030, which will create a faster route from the PRC to Europe through Uzbekistan, which is already connected to Turkmenistan and Iran (see EDM, May 7, July 17, 2024, April 8, December 4, 2025, January 27).Central Asian states are seeking to use Iranian transit to gain land access to Türkiye and Europe and reach the Indian Ocean through Iran’s southern ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas—both of which are now under attack by U.S.–Israeli forces. (The Times of India, February 28; Gcaptain.com, March 1; BBC, March 4; The Hindu, March 17; Iran International, March 19). Iran has adopted a strategy of attrition amid this conflict. The economic prognostications are grim—the World Trade Organization (WTO) is warning that global trade growth will slow sharply in 2026 and could weaken further if elevated energy prices tied to the Middle East conflict persist. In statistics released on March 19, the WTO said world merchandise trade growth is expected to fall to 1.9 percent in 2026, down from 4.6 percent in 2025 (World Trade Organization, March 19). A war-torn Iran is unlikely to serve as a major regional transit hub anytime soon. Post-Soviet states’ options remain stark—continue using Russian transport options, await Afghanistan’s glacial railway construction, or increasingly focus on the Middle Corridor, which bypasses Iran. For the foreseeable future, their best interim option appears to be the Middle Corridor.
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