Executive Summary:

  • Iran transformed the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei into a state-sponsored campaign of ideological mobilization by invoking the Twelver Shi’a doctrine of Ya Latharat al-Hussein.
  • Iran uses this doctrine to frame revenge against the United States and Israel—including calls to assassinate U.S. President Donald Trump—as a religious obligation rather than merely a political objective.
  • While the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) employed Khamenei’s martyrdom to reinforce cohesion, Central Asian supporters of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and al-Qaeda overwhelmingly celebrated his death, exposing the enduring sectarian divide between Iran’s revolutionary Shi’a ideology and Sunni Salafi-jihadism.
  • The contrasting responses demonstrate that Iran’s proxy network, ISKP, and al-Qaeda-aligned Central Asian jihadists remain ideologically distinct threat ecosystems, despite their shared hostility toward the United States and Israel.

The death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the joint U.S.–Israeli military operation on February 28 triggered an unprecedented campaign of state-sponsored mourning across Iran and the broader Shi’a world (IRNA, March 1; Mehr News, July 15). Beneath a sea of red flags symbolizing the religious duty to avenge the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, senior Iranian officials, clerics, and millions of mourners invoked the battle cry Ya Latharat al-Hussein (“O Avengers of Hussein”), recasting Khamenei’s death through the lens of Twelver Shi’a martyrdom theology (Eurasia Diary, July 6). This symbolism is rooted in the Ashura commemorations, during which Shi’a Muslims worldwide commemorate Imam Hussein—the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, who was killed at the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE—through public mourning ceremonies and processions that symbolize the enduring obligation to seek justice for his death. By framing retaliation as a religious imperative rather than merely a political response, Tehran sought to strengthen ideological cohesion within its proxy networks and mobilize supporters for a prolonged confrontation with the United States and Israel. 

Yet Tehran’s carefully constructed narrative found little resonance among Sunni Salafi-jihadist movements. Rather than mourning Khamenei or expressing solidarity with Iran, Uzbek- and Tajik-language supporters of Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups celebrated his death, ridiculed Shi’a mourning rituals, and denounced the Ya Latharat al-Hussein doctrine as further evidence of theological deviation and heresy.  

Their reactions highlight the enduring ideological and sectarian divide between Iran’s revolutionary Shi’a project and Salafi-jihadism, especially among Central Asians. More importantly, they demonstrate that even amid a common confrontation with the United States and Israel, deeply entrenched doctrinal hostility outweighs any tactical convergence. This renders the maxim that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” largely inapplicable.

ISKP Supporters Celebrate Khamenei’s Death

On July 12, the Uzbek-language pro-ISKP Telegram channel Tavhid Makoni celebrated the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, underscoring the group’s uncompromising sectarian hostility toward Iran’s Shi’a leadership. [1] The channel—which regularly assails secular Central Asian governments as well as Uzbek and Tajik al-Qaeda-aligned clerics and militants in Syria—denounced Khamenei as a rafidha (“rejecter,” which is a derogatory Salafi-jihadist term for Shi’a Muslims) and declared that he had been consigned to hell. It further condemned the reported delay in Khamenei’s burial, accused Iranian authorities of displaying his body for public veneration, and mocked the millions of Shi’a mourners who participated in the funeral ceremonies. According to the channel, praying over Khamenei and venerating his remains constituted shirk (“polytheism,” or associating partners with God), which reinforced ISKP’s long-standing portrayal of Twelver Shi’ism as a heretical deviation from Islam rather than a legitimate Islamic tradition. 

Similar themes appeared on July 7 in the Tajik-language pro-ISKP Telegram channel Ansor Tojiki. The channel exploited Tajik President Emomali Rahmon’s attendance at Khamenei’s funeral in Tehran on July 3 to reinforce its anti-state and anti-Shi’a narrative (IRNA, July 3). Publishing Rahmon’s photograph alongside its commentary, the channel asserted that murtads (apostates), whether ruling Shi’a Iran or Sunni Central Asia, are indistinguishable, and accused both the Tajikistani and Iranian regimes of “betrayal of Islam, tyranny, and treachery.” The channel further denounced Rahmon as a taghut (an illegitimate ruler who governs in defiance of God’s sovereignty) and called for him to share Khamenei’s fate. [2] This messaging reflects ISKP’s ideological framework, which places Iran’s Shi’a theocracy and the secular governments of Central Asia within the same category of apostate regimes, thereby declaring both as equally valid targets of jihad.

The reactions of Uzbek and Tajik pro-ISKP supporters closely mirrored the entrenched anti-Shi’a sectarian narrative promoted by Islamic State (IS)’s Arabic-language propaganda apparatus. Their messaging was not an isolated regional response but a direct reflection of IS’s broader ideological framework, which portrays Shi’a Muslims as apostates and Iran as a principal enemy of Sunni Islam. This alignment became evident immediately after Khamenei’s death. On February 28, following the joint U.S.–Israeli strikes against Iran, prominent IS supporter Abu ‘Abdallah al-Halabi (also known as Muhammad Jabhah), a former media official of the IS-linked Liwa’ al-Aqsa, declared that Khorasan (Afghanistan and Pakistan) would emerge as the IS’s new global center and predicted that future conflicts would become ”openly religious” following the collapse of the “murtadd Shi’a Iranian state” (MEMRI, March 1). His remarks illustrate how IS sought to frame Khamenei’s death not merely as a military setback for Iran but as the beginning of a broader sectarian realignment that would strengthen the movement’s global jihadist narrative.

From Online Celebration to ISKP Attacks in Iran

IS supporters quickly amplified the same sectarian narrative across other online platforms. On March 1, an English-language IS supporter celebrated the death of what he called the “Taghut of Iran” at the hands of “the Jews,” thanking Allah for Khamenei’s killing and urging ISKP to exploit the resulting instability by entering Iran and “killing everyone.” Echoing the IS’s long-standing doctrine of takfir, he asserted that all Rafidahs are unbelievers and therefore legitimate targets of violence (MEMRI, March 1).

Uzbek and Tajik ISKP militants have long maintained deep hostility toward Iran’s Shi’a Muslims, whom they routinely denounce with the sectarian slur Rafidha and accuse of apostasy. This ideological hostility has repeatedly translated into operational violence, with Tajik ISKP members conducting three high-profile attacks inside Iran that extended the group’s operational reach beyond its traditional strongholds in Afghanistan and South Asia. For example:

  • In January 2024, Tajik ISKP operative Abdollah Tajiki carried out a suicide bombing during a memorial ceremony in Kerman for Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, killing at least 95 people and injuring 284 others (Khabar, January 11, 2024). 
  • In August 2023, Tajik ISKP militant Rahmatollah Nowruzov attacked the Shah Cheragh mausoleum in Shiraz, killing two people and wounding seven (Kayhan, September 10, 2023). 
  • In October 2022, Tajik ISKP militant Sobhan Kamrouni conducted an armed assault against the same shrine, one of Iran’s most important Shi’a religious sites, killing at least 15 people and injuring more than 30 others (AP News, November 7, 2022).

In each case, ISKP deliberately selected targets of profound religious significance to Shi’a Muslims. Although ISKP supporters ridicule Iran’s Ya Latharat al-Hussein doctrine of sacred vengeance, their hostility toward Iran exists alongside an equally entrenched opposition to the United States and the broader Western order, which they define through the Salafi-jihadist concept of kufr (disbelief). The convergence of anti-Shi’a sectarianism and anti-Western extremism demonstrates that ISKP’s confrontation with Iran is driven by ideological rivalry rather than strategic alignment with Washington, despite conspiracy theories from Iran and Russia to the contrary.

Al-Qaeda-Aligned Jihadists Celebrate Khamenei’s Death as Divine Judgment

Like ISKP supporters, Central Asian Salafi-jihadist groups aligned with al-Qaeda and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) also celebrated Khamenei’s death. They, however, framed their reaction through a more politically calibrated sectarian narrative. Rather than focusing exclusively on the theological condemnation of Shi’a Islam, these actors portrayed the Iranian leader’s death as divine punishment for Tehran’s involvement in conflicts across the region and as part of a broader struggle among rival non-Muslim and sectarian forces. On March 1, for example, the Uzbek-language Telegram channel Guraba Medya, affiliated with the Uzbek al-Qaeda-linked group Katibat al-Guraba, published an excerpt from the eighth-century Islamic scholar Abd al-Rahman al-Awza’i’s Kitab al-Siyar, which stated, “If Allah kills one of two unbelievers fighting each other, it is good; if He kills both warring unbelievers, it is even better.” [3] By invoking this interpretation, Katibat al-Guraba framed Khamenei’s death as a manifestation of divine judgment while expressing hope that Israeli and U.S. leaders involved in the conflict would meet the same fate.

Similarly, Abu Umor Taliban, deputy emir of the Uzbek al-Qaeda-aligned Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB), welcomed Khamenei’s death in a Facebook post published on March 8. He mocked Iranians as Shi’a Rafidhas responsible for the deaths of Sunni Muslims in Syria, arguing that Khamenei had ultimately suffered the same fate he had inflicted on others and would now face divine judgment. Thanking Allah for allowing “Zionist terrorists” to kill Iran’s leaders, he concluded by expressing hope that both sides would continue destroying one another [4].

Another al-Qaeda-aligned Uzbek-language commentator, Al-Shami, called upon Allah to “strike the oppressors with the oppressors and make the outcome beneficial for the Muslims” on June 18. [5] His remarks reflect the Salafi-jihadist view that both Shi’a Iran and Israel are enemies of Sunni Islam, making mutual attrition between them desirable. 

Conclusion

Iran’s invocation of the Ya Latharat al-Hussein doctrine following Ali Khamenei’s death illustrates how Twelver Shi’a martyrdom theology can be instrumentalized in the service of state policy to legitimize retaliation, reinforce proxy cohesion, and mobilize supporters against the United States and Israel. At the same time, the overwhelmingly hostile reactions of Central Asian ISKP and al-Qaeda-aligned jihadists demonstrate that Tehran’s confrontation with Washington has done nothing to diminish the deep ideological hostility of Sunni Salafi-jihadist movements toward either Iran or the West. Instead, these actors continue to pursue independent agendas rooted in sectarian rivalry and global jihad.

Notes:

[1] Telegram source withheld due to the dissemination of terrorist propaganda. Uzbek-language Telegram channel, published July 12, 2026.

[2] Telegram source withheld due to the dissemination of terrorist propaganda. Tajik-language Telegram channel, published July 7, 2026.

[3] Telegram source withheld due to the dissemination of terrorist propaganda. Uzbek-language Telegram channel, published March 1, 2026.

[4] Facebook source withheld due to the dissemination of terrorist propaganda. Uzbek-language Facebook post, published March 8, 2026.

[5] Telegram source withheld due to the dissemination of terrorist propaganda. Uzbek-language Telegram channel, published June 18, 2026.

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