Executive Summary:
- On February 10, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov removed the country’s second most influential figure, Kamchybek Tashiev, from his position as chairman of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB), rupturing the “tandem” model that has governed the Kyrgyz Republic since Japarov and Tashiev came to power in 2020.
- Japarov simultaneously began purging Tashiev’s associates from security and government posts to dismantle his informal network, and instituted reforms to rein in the GKNB’s mandate and prevent any future security chief from amassing sufficient power to challenge the presidency directly.
- These moves signal Japarov’s intentions to build a personalist model of control ahead of next year’s presidential elections, allowing him to consolidate power on a larger scale than any of his predecessors.
On February 10, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov announced that, effective immediately, he was removing Kamchybek Tashiev from the position as chairman of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) (President of the Kyrgyz Republic, February 10). Since coming to power in October 2020, following the uprising against then-President Sooronbay Jeenbekov, Japarov and Tashiev have ruled as a tandem and consolidated power by silencing all opposition, weakening civil society, and coercing or co-opting the Kyrgyz Republic’s elite networks (see EDM, October 27, 2020, November 17, 2025; The Diplomat, May 1, 2024). Under Tashiev’s centralized control, the GKNB dramatically expanded its mandate, reaching all levels of Kyrgyz society and possibly becoming the country’s most influential institution (Kaktus.media, February 12). Tashiev took the lead on many issues nominally outside of the purview of a security chief, including those in the diplomatic, economic, educational, and political spheres, among others (K-News, May 17, 2024; Economist.kg, March 13, 2025; Kaktus.media, May 26, 2025; 24.kz, November 17, 2025). Many even began to question whether Japarov was still the head of the country, or if Tashiev had eclipsed him (Kloop, July 8, 2025). In this context, Japarov’s decision to remove Tashiev and begin dismantling the GKNB has sent shockwaves through the Kyrgyz political system.
Several factors likely led Japarov to act now. On February 9, the day before Tashiev’s removal, a document signed by 75 people—including public figures, scientists, and former deputies and prime ministers—was sent to Japarov, demanding early elections due to the constitutional changes in April 2021 (24.kg;Kaktus.media, February 9). [1] The signatories listed the administration’s key achievements and shortcomings over the past five years, arguing that “the newly elected president and his new team will have the opportunity to continue the successful work and solve existing serious problems.” Notably, the authors’ list of achievements almost exclusively highlighted measures taken by Tashiev (Kloop, February 11). Many have interpreted this letter as an attempt by Tashiev—or, at the very least, by his supporters—to secure the presidency for himself in the event of early elections. Japarov’s press secretary, Askat Alagosov, explained that people within Tashiev’s entourage “called for defecting to the general’s [Tashiev’s] side and signing certain documents, thereby posing a threat to stability in government structures,” in a direct reference to the letter sent to Japarov (Facebook/askat.alagozov, February 10;Open.kg, February 11).
Japarov is also likely acting now due to Tashiev’s health. After his ouster, rumors began circulating that Tashiev had left the country to seek medical treatment. It has since been confirmed that Tashiev traveled to Germany and, according to Mayor of Osh Zhenishbek Toktorbayev, went to Munich for an examination after one of the five stents in his heart shifted (Kaktus.media, February 10; 24.kg, February 11). Japarov presumably concluded that Tashiev’s absence presented the best opportunity to move against him, betting that Tashiev would not be able to rally associates and supporters to his side from abroad. This conclusion appears to be correct. No political figure in the Kyrgyz Republic has publicly defended Tashiev, allowing Japarov to swiftly take control without the obstruction of elite defections (Kloop; Telegram/@kaktus_mediakg; Telegram/@polit_lombard; Telegram/@kgbul, February 11).
Given these circumstances, Japarov has moved to not only target Tashiev himself but also to dismantle his networks within Kyrgyz governance structures. Simultaneously with Tashiev’s removal, Japarov ousted First Deputy Chairman of the GKNB Kurvanbek Avazov, Deputy Chairman of the GKNB and Director of the Cybersecurity Coordination Center Daniel Rysaliev, and Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for National Security and Director of the Anti-Terrorism Center Elizar Smanov (Dknews.kz, February 10). All are known to be close to Tashiev (RBC, February 10). In their place, Japarov has appointed Zhumgalbek Shabdanbekov as acting head of the GKNB, Rustam Mamasadykov as first deputy of the GKNB, Alisher Erbayev as director of the Anti-Terrorism Center, and Uranbek Shadybekov as head of the Cybersecurity Center. All are considered to be exclusively loyal to Japarov (Economist.kg, February 10; Feregana.agency; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 11). Purges within the GKNB and in other government structures continued in the following days. On February 14, Eldar Zhakypbekov was removed as head of the GKNB in Bishkek and arrested the following day (Kaktus.media, February 14; Vesti.kg, February 15). On February 16, Salmoor Dzhumabekov was removed as head of the GKNB of Osh and Osh oblast (24.kg, February 16). Later that day, Japarov dismissed Minister of Emergency Situations Boobek Azhikeyev, Minister of Natural Resources, Ecology, and Technical Supervision Meder Mashiev, and Minister of Transport and Communications Absattar Syrgabayev (President of the Kyrgyz Republic [1], [2], [3]; Vedomosti, February 16). The removal of Tashiev’s associates and anyone suspected of disloyalty from government positions signals Japarov’s intention to personalize Kyrgyz state institutions ahead of next year’s presidential elections.
Alongside personnel rotations, Japarov has taken measures to significantly reduce the GKNB’s power. On February 10, he established two new security services, the State Security Service and a Border Guard Service, which previously operated within the GKNB and will now function as an independent institution (President of the Kyrgyz Republic, February 10). Additionally, both institutions are directly subordinate to Japarov rather than to the GKNB (Telegram/@kaktus_mediakg; Telegram/@Vesti_Kyrgyzstan, February 10). The creation of separate, competing security institutions could be an act of counterbalancing. [2] The new security services intend to rein in the GKNB’s mandate and prevent any future security chief from amassing sufficient power to challenge Japarov directly. According to sources in Bishkek, the GKNB will undergo further, serious reforms and purges in the coming months as Japarov seeks to consolidate control over the country’s security structure (Kaktus.media, February 12).
Japarov and Tashiev had long competed for influence over members of the Jogorku Kenesh, the Kyrgyz Republic’s parliament (Carnegie Politika, November 25, 2025). The removal of Tashiev has given Japarov an opportunity to fully subjugate parliament and rid the institution of any leftover influence from Tashiev’s network. Speaker of the Jogorku Kenesh Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu—a southerner and known ally of Tashiev—officially resigned on February 12 amid rumors that Japarov sought his ouster (Vechernii Bishkek, February 12; 24.kg, February 13). Marlen Mamataliev—a northerner and strong supporter of Japarov—was swiftly elected unopposed in Turgunbek uulu’s place (24.kg, February 12; Check-point.kz, February 16). In a February 13 interview with the state media company Kabar, Japarov stated that “everything began in the parliament,” asserting that members of the parliament, deputies, and activists aimed to divide the country into two sides, the “president’s” and the “general’s.” Japarov claims he was therefore forced to act quickly to prevent a coup and maintain unity (Kabar, February 13).
The Kyrgyz Republic’s neighbors appear to have taken an interest in recent developments. A flurry of public diplomatic activity suggests a desire to quell potential political turmoil. On February 10, the day of Tashiev’s ouster, Japarov held a call with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev (24.kg, February 10). On February 13, Japarov welcomed Tajik Prime Minister Kohir Rasulzoda and Kazakh Minister of Foreign Affairs Ermek Kosherbaev to Bishkek (Kabar, February 13[1],[2]). The newly elected speaker of the Jogorku Kenesh, Mamataliev, also spoke by phone with the chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federal Assembly, Vyacheslav Volodin, on February 13. During the call, Volodin invited Mamatliev to visit Russia, which Mamatliev accepted (24.kg, February 13). On February 17, Japarov held a call with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in which Tokayev expressed his support for Japarov’s decisions aimed at “preserving the unity of society and strengthening Kyrgyz statehood.” Japarov, in turn, expressed support for Tokayev’s constitutional reform in Kazakhstan (Vlast.kz, February 17).
While both Japarov and Tashiev have made their nationalist views known, Tashiev’s particularly hard-line position has often impeded Japarov’s efforts to develop closer ties with the Kyrgyz Republic’s neighbors (Carnegie Politika, February 12). For example, in 2021, Tashiev almost ruptured the long-awaited border deal with Uzbekistan (Kloop, April 19, 2021). In 2023, he directly threatened the Tajik government over its territorial claims (24.kg, September 15, 2023). Tashiev’s negative views of the Russian language, efforts to develop a foreign policy less reliant on Russia, and rebukes of Russia’s treatment of migrants also angered many in Moscow (Gazeta.ru, December 31, 2025; Telegram/@Nezygar, February 11). Russian media and social media outlets close to the Kremlin and other siloviki-linked networks have notably celebrated Tashiev’s ouster as the removal of the “main Russophobe,” reflecting Moscow’s past frustrations with him (Lenta.ru, February 10; Nezavisimaya gazeta; Telegram/@Nezygar, February 11; Vedomosti; Telegram/@Rybar, February 12).
Japarov’s successive and decisive measures indicate that he had long planned for the eventual necessity of Tashiev’s removal. In his first statement after his removal, Tashiev expressed that Japarov’s actions were “completely unexpected” for him, but that “we must comply with the president’s decision” (Kloop, February 11). Japarov appears to support a quiet return home for Tashiev, one that will allow him to remain free but, in return, away from politics. On February 13, Tashiev returned to Bishkek before meeting with Japarov on February 15 (Kaktus.media, February 16). Commenting on the meeting, Japarov stated that Tashiev “will not return to a government position” and should instead “rest and take care of his health” (Kabar, February 16). By removing the country’s second-most-powerful figure, Japarov has consolidated power more than any of his predecessors and now seeks to build a personalist system reminiscent of those in many of the Kyrgyz Republic’s neighbors. The stability of this system may depend on Tashiev. The next presidential elections are scheduled for January 2027, and with Tashiev sidelined, Japarov will undoubtedly cruise to a decisive victory. If Tashiev decides to run and rally others to his side, however, Kyrgyz politics are likely to return to instability and unpredictability.
Notes:
[1] This refers to the Kyrgyz Republic’s new constitution, ratified in April 2021. Japarov was elected in January 2021 under the previous constitution, which allowed presidents to serve a single 6-year term. He quickly introduced a constitutional referendum, and the April 2021 constitution now allows for presidents to serve two 5-year terms. The letter argues that Japarov should call elections this year rather than next, because five years have passed since the new constitution was ratified. Japarov maintains that his presidency complies with the previous constitution, rather than the current one. Japarov’s interpretation allows him to complete his six-year term and then serve two additional five-year terms under the current constitution. On February 17, the Kyrgyz Republic’s constitutional court unsurprisingly ruled in favor of Japarov, officially declaring January 24, 2027, as the date of the next presidential elections (24.kg, February 17).
[2] For more on how leaders “counterbalance” against potential rivals by creating competing institutions, see De Bruin, Erica. How to Prevent Coups d’État: Counterbalancing and Regime Survival. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctvv413v6.
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