Executive Summary:
- The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is rapidly expanding as an alternative to Russia’s Northern Corridor amid rising cargo volumes and coordinated international investment in infrastructure and digitalization.
- Countries in Central Asia and the South Caucasus are advancing connectivity through major infrastructure projects such as the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway and the Port of Alat amid increased involvement from Europe and the People’s Republic of China.
- The TITR has transitioned from an aspiration to an operational reality, but without addressing unresolved issues in its development, it will struggle to maintain structural stability amid increased transport volumes.
On April 24, a meeting for the Board and General Assembly of the international association Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) was held in Astana, Kazakhstan. Representatives from Kazakhstan, the People’s Republic of China, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye, along with others from European countries, approved a work plan for 2026 focusing the digitalization of transport processes on the TITR, widely known as the Middle Corridor, to improve the route’s transit time and transparency (Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, April 24; The Times of Central Asia, April 27). This is one of the developments in international cooperation with the corridor.
For nearly three decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus and Central Asia remained interconnected with Moscow through an intricate network of Soviet-era infrastructure. The Northern Corridor, comprising Russia’s rail and pipeline system, transcended its role as a mere commercial route. It served as a strategic instrument of influence, enabling Moscow to control the transit of goods between Asia and Europe while limiting the economic independence of neighboring states without resorting to direct coercion.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has significantly altered logistical calculations in Eurasia. As Western sanctions rendered the Northern route less viable for global logistics companies, the TITR was elevated from a secondary alternative to a core strategic infrastructure. During the first eleven months of 2024, cargo volumes totaled 4.1 million tons, representing a 63 percent increase compared to the corresponding period in 2023, with container traffic multiplying 2.6 times to 50,500 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU), as Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Transport reported (The Astana Times, December 18, 2024). Between 2019 and 2024, total route traffic expanded sixfold (see EDM, February 11). This persistent and substantial growth underscores a structural realignment rather than a cyclical diversion.
Azerbaijan plays a large role in this corridor’s development. For years, Baku’s strategic posture rested on energy diplomacy, leveraging oil and gas reserves to sustain independence from both Moscow and Tehran. Azerbaijan has shifted toward connectivity diplomacy, positioning itself as the indispensable transit node of a trans-Eurasian corridor. Baku has made significant investments in the Port of Alat, which is currently undergoing expansion to achieve a long-term capacity of 25 million tons of cargo and 500,000 TEUs annually (see EDM, April 23, December 4, 2025). The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway, commissioned in 2017 and upgraded in 2024 to an annual capacity of 5 million tons following the reconstruction of its 184-kilometer (114-mile) Georgian section, eliminates the necessity for transit through Russian territory or the Eurasian Economic Union’s customs procedures (Coordinating Council on Transit Freight of Azerbaijan, accessed April 28). For Central Asian countries, particularly Kazakhstan, the BTK provides a reliable bypass of the Russian-controlled Northern route. In August 2025, China Railway Container Transport Corporation joined the Middle Corridor Multimodal Ltd joint venture, affirming Beijing’s formal institutional commitment to the corridor’s long-term sustainability (see EDM, October 28, 2024, September 10, 2025).
The most significant structural bottleneck within the corridor is the Caspian Sea. Current constraints primarily stem from a shortage of rolling stock and operational inefficiencies at railway-port transition points, rather than from deficiencies in rail or port infrastructure. Vessel availability, specifically the shortage of roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) and container ships operating in a landlocked sea, is the predominant operational constraint for the corridor in its Caspian Sea node (World Bank, November 27, 2023; see EDM, April 23, June 9, 2025). This issue cannot be remedied solely through rail investment, nor can port expansion alone address the gap while Caspian fleet procurement remains at the feasibility study stage.
Armenia’s potential role within the Middle Corridor represents the most politically sensitive aspect of this realignment. Landlocked and with its borders with Türkiye and Azerbaijan sealed since the early 1990s, Yerevan has traditionally been the most isolated economy in the region. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Crossroads of Peace initiative symbolizes a strategic effort to transform geographic vulnerability into economic leverage by restoring those borders under Armenian sovereign authority (see EDM, April 15, 2024, October 15, 2025). The primary obstacle, however, is not infrastructural. Under the ceasefire agreement signed by Yerevan and Baku in November 2020, Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards were assigned to oversee the transportation corridor between Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave, which passes through Armenian territory. Yerevan has systematically taken steps to reduce reliance on Russian border guards. On July 31, 2024, FSB border guards formally concluded their 32-year presence at Yerevan’s Zvartnots International Airport, with full border jurisdiction transferred to the Armenian National Security Service (see EDM, August 15, 2024). On December 30, 2024, FSB guards left the Agarak checkpoint on the Armenia–Iran border (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 31, 2024; see EDM, January 16, 2025).
For the Middle Corridor to serve as a dependable, high-speed alternative to Russian rail networks, shippers and insurers require predictable, sovereign customs regimes at each node. The presence of FSB personnel within Armenian territory introduces a potential single point of interdiction that no major logistics operator can incorporate into long-term contractual planning.
The Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement, which remains unsigned, has yet to finalize the details of the Trump Route International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), also referred to in Azerbaijan as the Zangezur Corridor. This unresolved issue constitutes the most significant variable affecting the route’s long-term reliability (see EDM, March 14, August 15, 2024). An unresolved border dispute that threatens corridor reliability serves as a less costly, more deniable instrument of influence than maintaining a direct physical presence.
Georgia is arguably the Middle Corridor’s most structurally vulnerable node. All shipments moving from Baku to European markets via rail must traverse Georgian territory. The Port of Poti handles approximately 80 percent of Georgia’s container traffic but faces draft restrictions that limit the use of larger bulk carriers (see EDM, June 21, 2024). The project was revitalized through a new tender process. In May 2024, the Georgian government allocated a 49 percent stake in the construction of the Anaklia deep-sea port to a Chinese–Singaporean consortium led by China Communication Construction Company (see EDM, June 6, 2024). As of late 2025, no final construction contract had been executed, and Georgia reduced Anaklia’s 2026 budget allocation from $56 million to $18 million (Caucasus Watch, December 5, 2025).
Both the European Union and the United States, as active investors in corridor connectivity, have articulated concerns regarding the potential for Chinese operational access to cargo data at Anaklia. The enactment of Georgia’s “Transparency of Foreign Influence” law in 2024, combined with the suspension of European Union accession negotiations, has intensified this tension (see EDM, April 24, 2024, June 2, October 15, December 6, 2025, February10,11, April 22; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 20, 2025).
The European Union has responded to the TITR’s developments with unprecedented financial commitment. At the Global Gateway Investors Forum in Brussels in January 2024, the European Commission announced a collective commitment of 10 billion euros ($11.7 billion) toward sustainable transport connectivity for Central Asia and the Caucasus, subsequently augmented by an additional 12 billion euros ($14 million) at the inaugural EU–Central Asia Summit in Samarkand, Uzbekistan in April 2025 (European Commission, January 28, 2024, April 3, 2025; see EDM, January 21). In October 2024, the European Union and Turkmenistan jointly launched the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor Coordination Platform in Ashgabat, establishing a permanent multilateral framework for infrastructure investment coordination (see EDM, October 28, 2024, January 28, 2025). The scale of this commitment reflects Brussels’ recognition that corridor reliability is not a commercial matter but a strategic one.
Russia’s primary countermeasure to the development of the Middle Corridor has been to accelerate the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), connecting Russian ports to India via Iran. The INSTC has genuine commercial justification for bilateral India–Russia trade, but it operates on a north–south axis and does not restore Moscow’s leverage over the east–west flow (see EDM, June 7, 2023, March 6, 2024, January 15, March 13, 2025, January 13, March18,31).
The Middle Corridor has transitioned from an aspiration to an operational reality. Without addressing unresolved issues in its development, the corridor will continue to experience increased volume while retaining structural fragility. It functions under normal circumstances but cannot support the reliability required to ultimately replace the Northern Corridor in shipper and insurer risk assessments. For Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan, the difference between a high-volume corridor that is politically contingent and one that is genuinely sovereign lies in the distinction between remaining subjects of regional geopolitics and assuming active roles in shaping it.
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