Executive Summary:
- Support for annexing Taiwan is gaining prominence in the Party’s united front work, according to analysis of speeches, events, and commentary surrounding the celebrations of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
- At recent events in the United Kingdom and France, the Party’s chosen representatives of overseas Chinese communities made pledges to support unification and affirmed loyalty to the Party above and beyond their home governments.
- The PRC sought to use the recent summit meeting between General Secretary Xi Jinping and U.S. president Donald Trump to press for concessions on the U.S. understanding of both World War II history and PRC claims over Taiwan.
The anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is an opportunity for the Party faithful to renew their vows of allegiance. It also serves as a reminder of what that allegiance entails. For overseas Chinese, the demands from the center are rising. Recent statements made by the leadership in Beijing, its emissaries around the world, and commentators in official publications all make clear that the Party is doubling down on its overseas united front work in order to enlist support for both its economic and political objectives, including support for the annexation of Taiwan.
One of the more articulate expositions of how the Party thinks about how to leverage overseas Chinese comes in an article for the September issue of the magazine China’s United Front (中国统一战线), which is published by the United Front Work Department (Zhang Xiaoxin, September 2026). [1] In the new era, the author writes, overseas Chinese have been given an “unprecedented historical mission” (前所未有的历史使命) and are an “indispensable and important component serving national strategies” (服务国家战略不可或缺的重要组成部分). A separate piece, penned by an academic based in Suzhou, talks of “handling the relationship between enemies and friends” (处理好敌我友的关系) and calls for “striving to fulfill the original aspiration of the republic by building and improving both the domestic united front and the international united front” (通过构建和完善国内统一战线与国际统一战线来践行共和国的初心). Using the same phrase, he described these two united fronts as “indispensable” (不可或缺) for national rejuvenation (Aisixiang, September 25).
Pressure Builds to Support Unification
As General Secretary Xi Jinping has frequently made clear, the annexation of Taiwan is a necessary condition for the achievement of national rejuvenation. In his speech to celebrate the 77th anniversary of the PRC’s founding, he told those listening to “resolutely crack downon ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces … [and] advance the great cause of national unification (习近平指出，我们要 … 深化两岸交流合作，坚决打击“台独”分裂势力 … 推进祖国统一大业) (People’s Daily, October 1). [2] Politburo member Wang Huning (王沪宁), who hosted a separate national day celebration for the Party’s main united front organizations, echoed these remarks. He also said that he would thoroughly implement the Party’s “overall strategy for resolving the Taiwan issue in the new era” (新时代党解决台湾问题的总体方略) and its “policies on overseas Chinese affairs … [to] promote national unification” (将全面贯彻党的侨务政策 … 促进祖国统一). These include consolidating and developing “the broadest patriotic united front” (最广泛的爱国统一战线) (People’s Daily, September 29). [3] The same day, United Front Work Department director Li Ganjie (李干杰) also told the leadership of the China Overseas Friendship Association to vigorously safeguard and promote national unification (People’s Daily, September 29).
These remarks are standard formulations, especially at this time of year; but early evidence suggests that, following two important united front-related conferences over the summer, the Party is making discourse on unification even more central to its external messaging. According to some coverage of one of those meetings, the National Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs, a key outcome was the declaration of “three new requirements for the times” (三项时代新要求), also referred to as a clarification of the “three benefits” principle, one of which is for overseas Chinese to play a greater role promoting unification (Americas Chinese TV, September 21; Zhang Xiaoxin, September 2026).
Senior officials have also cranked up pressure during diplomatic outreach to Taiwan’s key partners. In a meeting with the chairman of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade, for example—a local organization in Japan that engages with united front and other PRC political warfare organizations—Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) took issue with the Tokyo’s stance on Taiwan. He warned that if the country continued down the path of rebuilding its military, it “will hardly have a future at all” (也难以有未来) (China Brief, June 26, 2019; People’s Daily, September 29).
The PRC also tried to co-opt the United States to its revisionist view of history during the recent summit between Xi and President Donald Trump. In an interview following the meeting, PRC ambassador to the United States Xie Feng (谢锋) implied that Trump agreed to respect Beijing’s claims over Taiwan. First, Xie noted that Trump and Xi “agreed to jointly safeguard the victorious outcomes of the [second world] war.” In recent months, Beijing has pushed a narrative that the “enemy state clauses” of the United Nations Charter permits it to engage in military action should Japan move toward rebuilding its armed forces (Global Times, September 29). Although a 1995 UN General Assembly resolution recognized that those clauses had become obsolete, they are yet to be removed from the charter. In this way, Ambassador Xie suggested that Xi had successfully extracted assurances from Trump that the United States opposes Japan’s rearmament. He also implied that Trump is amenable to Beijing’s view on Taiwan, stating that the two leaders agreed that the “constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability” now entails “respecting each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” which, for the PRC, means respecting its claims over Taiwan (Newsweek, October 1). This interpretation is a plausible reading of the summit’s outcomes, though it does go beyond the official outcomes published by the two sides (The White House, September 25; Xinhua, September 26).
PRC diplomats have also presided over events to elicit support from overseas Chinese communities for these same objectives. In France, for instance, Ambassador Deng Li (邓励) said that overseas Chinese in France will “always firmly support the path of national development and consciously safeguard the core interests of the country (将始终坚定拥护国家发展道路，自觉维护国家核心利益). Those present committed to “upholding their patriotic aspirations … and joining hands with their motherland to embark on a new journey of national rejuvenation” (继续坚守家国初心 … 与祖（籍）国同心同向、携手同行，共赴民族复兴新征程) (Europe Times, September 27).
A similar event was held in the United Kingdom and attended by Ambassador Zheng Zeguang (郑泽光). One of the hosts, Wu Lili (吴莉莉), delivered a speech declaring that “all overseas Chinese in the United Kingdom have always upheld the original aspiration of ‘living in Britain but with hearts connected to China’” (全体旅英侨胞始终秉持‘身在英伦，心系华夏’). The event’s other organizers, Lin Qing (林清), Zhong Xiaoping (钟晓频), and Lin Xinxian (林新献), went further, affirming that all overseas Chinese “will always remain loyal to the Party” (全体侨胞将始终侨心向党). What this loyalty means in practice, as Ambassador Zheng noted in his remarks, is that overseas Chinese cultivate a deep sense of patriotism and, among other things, become “promoters of the great cause of China’s unification” (努力做 … 中国统一大业的促进者) (Europe Times, September 23).
These statements effectively constitute loyalty oaths to the Party. They are a compact to put the Party’s interests first, over and above those of their home governments. Though rarely reported on, such statements are likely to become increasingly standard. As the article in China’s United Front observes, “in the long run, the importance of overseas Chinese affairs related to Taiwan within the overall framework of overseas Chinese affairs work will undoubtedly become increasingly prominent” (长远来看，侨务对台工作在侨务工作总体布局中的重要性必将愈发凸显). This is because the Party sees overseas Chinese as “a vital force in opposing separatism and promoting unification, ultimately contributing to the complete unification of the motherland” (海外侨胞是反“独”促统、实现祖国完全统一的重要依靠) (Zhang Xiaoxin, September 2026).
Conclusion
The Party sees annexing Taiwan as the core of its core interests, and Xi Jinping has signaled that he intends to make meaningful progress toward achieving that end while he remains in power. The work of overseas Chinese is a crucial part of its all-domain efforts in pursuit of this goal. At present, too little is known about the pledges and agreements made by overseas individuals and organizations with ties to the Party, and how they are working to provide practical support for an agenda that contravenes the interests—and sometimes the policies—of their home governments. As all signals point to the Party ramping up this work in the months and years ahead, this lack of knowledge will only become more of an issue.
Notes
[1] Zhang Xiaoxin [张小欣], “The rich connotations of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important expositions on overseas Chinese affairs” [习近平总书记关于侨务工作的重要论述的丰富内涵], China’s United Front [中国统一战线] (2026)7, https://archive.ph/ewxXQ
[2] Xi used the verb “crack down on” (打击) rather than the less strident “oppose” (反对). Senior officials use both fairly interchangeably, and it is unclear what specific meaning, if any, the choice of one over the other has in this case. [3] The event included approximately 750 representatives from Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and overseas, and was hosted jointly by the General Office of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the United Front Work Department (UFWD), the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO), the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office (HKMAO), the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), and the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC).
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