Executive Summary:
- The timing and scale of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s upcoming May 19–20 Beijing visit underscores Russia’s weakened geopolitical standing, reinforcing perceptions that Moscow has become Beijing’s dependent junior partner rather than an equal strategic power.
- Russia’s stalled war effort against Ukraine, mounting battlefield losses, and worsening economic pressures have intensified concerns about the sustainability of Putin’s strategy.
- U.S. President Donald Trump’s May 13–15 visit to Beijing undermined Putin’s expectation of deepening U.S.–PRC tensions, leaving Russia isolated as its ambition to attain great-power status through its war against Ukraine continues to unravel.
The close sequence of two high-level visits to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—U.S. President Donald Trump’s May 13–15 visit and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s upcoming May 19–20 visit—gives insight into Russia’s diplomatic posture. The Kremlin did not announce the date of Putin’s long-awaited visit until after PRC sources leaked the information following Trump’s departure from Beijing (RBC, May 15). The impression that General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping has summoned Putin to Beijing is hard to dispel. Moscow’s commentators are eager to argue that Trump negotiated with the PRC from a position of seemingly diminished strength and achieved very little. In reality, Putin himself is about to travel to Beijing as a troubled vassal rather than a valued strategic partner (RIAC; Izvestiya, May 14).
Putin’s one-day working visit is set to be a much plainer affair than Trump’s summit. Xi will probably find an occasion to express his friendly feelings toward Putin (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 14). Russian media asserts that symbolism and substance are equally important in the PRC’s political culture (Kommersant, May 15). They highlighted, for example, that while showing Trump his exclusive rose garden, Xi mentioned that Putin was among the select others who had seen it (Vzglyad, May 16).
Russia’s WWII Victory Day parade on the Red Square is a central event in Putin’s symbolic assertion of Russia’s strength and military righteousness. This year’s May 9 show, reduced to the marching of several battalions, illuminated Russia’s diminished global status (Radio Svoboda; see EDM, May 11). This curtailed celebration was only made possible by Trump’s initiative for a three-day ceasefire, which overruled Putin’s proposal for a day-long pause and raised some hopes among the war-weary Russians for a longer truce (The Moscow Times, May 15). Massive subsequent Russian drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities, which Putin ordered to attempt to show that he still controls the strategic initiative in the deadlocked war, dashed this short-lived hope (The Insider, May 14). Ukraine has gained new advantages in the tactical “kill-zone” and in operational depth, as its middle-strike capabilities expand and degrade Russian logistics, particularly in the land “corridor” to Crimea (Re: Russia, May 14).
Putin must be worried about the possibility that Trump and Xi made decisions about his war against Ukraine during their meeting (Radio Svoboda; Kommersant; The Moscow Times; Carnegie Politika, May 15). Meanwhile, Russia’s top brass is reluctant to report the real scale of casualties to Putin. Xi’s expressed preference for careful management of all conflict sites bodes ill for Putin’s war, so jingoist pundits in Moscow are making noise against a Trump-style peace deal and for redoubling efforts to secure a convincing victory (RIAC, May 12; TopWar.ru, May 14).
Xi may have a better assessment of the effect of the war on Russia’s economy than Putin, who asserts that his firm instructions have ensured the return to the trajectory of growth (RBC, May 15). The depth of accumulated problems across many civilian sectors, and even in the military-industrial complex, is such that state budget revenues are shrinking rapidly. At the same time, war-related expenditures continue to grow (The Insider, May 15). The surge in profits from oil exports has lifted Putin’s spirits, but the volume of extra revenue is by no means sufficient to balance the budget (Re: Russia, May 13). Further cuts in this volume are made by high-precision Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries in Yaroslavl, Ryazan, and even in Moscow, which have forced Russian oil companies to reduce production (Finmarket.ru, May 12; EurAsia Daily, May 15).
High energy prices are a matter of mutual concern for the United States and the PRC. Trump and Xi found common ground on the need to open the Strait of Hormuz for free navigation, which is not necessarily in Russia’s interest (OilCapital.ru, May 15). Russian commentators are eager to point out that Trump’s visit to the PRC has yielded few tangible results, including on ending the conflict in the Gulf, which was paused by a very tentative ceasefire on April 8 (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, May 16). In contrast, Putin’s visit to the PRC is expected to finalize a joint deal to construct the Power of Siberia-2 natural gas pipeline, which was penciled in during his previous visit in September 2025 (MK.ru, May 16). The long-discussed pipeline may come into operation in the middle of the next decade, but the costs of this mega-project will add to Russia’s already strained finances (The Moscow Times, April 24).
Russia’s demotion from the ranks of great powers to a troublemaker in European security is a hard pill for Putin to swallow. The difference between his and Trump’s visits to Beijing proves this downsizing beyond a doubt. Putin’s grand vision behind his full-scale invasion of Ukraine was to reassert a claim to a pivotal global role. Russia’s apparent inability to capture even the remaining part of Donbas has destroyed that ambition. Ensuring his own grasp on power is a goal far more important to Putin than securing Russia’s long-term future.
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