Executive Summary:
- Russia’s September 18–20 State Duma elections have been described by some Russian commentators as a “special electoral operation,” echoing the Kremlin’s term for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The phrase references the elections’ tightly managed nature and their role in fabricating public support for Putin’s war.
- The Kremlin framing the elections as a referendum on its war while denying economic issues during the campaign may bring the regime’s legitimacy into question as the problems that many Russians face daily, such as high prices and gas shortages, come into conflict with government messaging.
- The increase in Russian hybrid warfare across Europe, from drone incursions to reckless maneuvers of combat ships, over recent months may make it necessary for Europe to take countermeasures.
Elections in Russia over the two and a half decades of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rule have never been free and fair. The scope of electoral manipulation has been steadily rising to the point that the recent system that selected members of the Russian State Duma from September 18 to 20 cannot meaningfully be described as an election. Some Russian political commentators have dubbed the rigidly managed voting a “special electoral operation,” borrowing the Kremlin’s terminology for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine to point out that Putin is using the process to falsify broad public support for his war (Radio Svoboda, September 14, 2022; The Moscow Times, September 18; Novaya Gazeta Evropa, September 21). At the start of campaigning in early summer, the Kremlin emphasized economic and social issues, but Putin has firmly set the focus on support for his war and “patriotic” unity since mid-August (Re: Russia, September 18). The government has not tried to boost optimism among the electorate by increasing pensions or social benefits, as was typically the case before many previous elections. Polls show that Russians expect more economic trouble in the future, even in semi-official polls (FOM.ru, September 15). In parallel, more Russians now disapprove of the State Duma than approve it (VTsIOM, September 18).
Counterfeiting public support has potential to backfire on Russia (The Insider, September 18). Dismissing economic concerns is especially dangerous. Putin’s assertions that the economy is doing just fine depart increasingly far from the contraction of incomes and purchasing power for millions of Russians (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 16; Kommersant, September 17). The Russian Central Bank has cautiously increased the estimate of inflation from 4–5 percent to 5–6 percent, but consumer prices, in particular for gas, to the extent that it is available, are climbing at a much faster rate (RBC, September 16). The Russian oil and gas industry, which used to be the main source of revenue for the Kremlin, is in a structural crisis. The shortage of investment in the industry is aggravated by the need to rebuild refineries repeatedly attacked by Ukrainian drones, which cannot be stopped by the cheap metal nets currently used for defense (The Bell, September 11; Meduza, September 18).
Putin was not able to amplify his jingoist message with declarations of a victorious advance as he shifted electoral rhetoric to sustaining the war effort. His recent claim on the capture of Ukraine’s Sviatohirsk monastery was followed by a chaotic retreat of Russian troops in the Lyman direction (Meduza, September 18). In a symbolic loss for Putin, Major-General Anton Grunis, who reported to Putin on the full control over Kostyantynivka—which is still contested by Ukrainian forces—and was rewarded with the Hero of Russia medal, was recently killed by a high-precision drone strike on his brigade’s command center (The Insider, September 16). Russian casualties often exceed 1,500 a day, half of which are fatalities. The system of commercial recruitment cannot deliver enough new bodies to compensate for these losses, and the rationale for a new limited mobilization, aiming perhaps at some 300,000–500,000 new soldiers, is growing (Re: Russia, September 10). Every denial by the Kremlin of any plans for such mobilization produces a new wave of rumors and fears, accelerating the outflow of people and money from Russia (Forbes.ru, September 18).
Equally unconvincing are the official denials of reports that the Kremlin is preparing to escalate its confrontation with Europe. These denials are often said alongside threats to annihilate hostile states in the matter of days (Lenta.ru, September 16; Vedomosti, September 18). In recent weeks, Putin has refrained from nuclear brinksmanship, but the expansion of Russian hybrid warfare and provocations, from drone incursions to reckless maneuvers of combat ships, likely make it necessary for Europe to take countermeasures (see EDM, September 15; Radio Svoboda, September 19). Investments in military-technical cooperation with Ukraine are one way that Europe is building up its own defense capabilities. Moscow views these ties as Ukraine’s incorporation into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) without formal procedures (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 17). Russia needs to break this trend, but its hybrid attacks are only giving NATO–Ukraine military-technical cooperation new impetus. Warnings about growing risks from Russia’s mainstream pundits provide evidence that the Kremlin is evermore worried about this collaboration (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, September 15).
The Kremlin is promoting the message that its European neighbors cannot count on U.S. protection. Every development that contradicts this assumption—from the plan to build a U.S. base in Poland to the agreement on Greenland’s security posture between the United States and Denmark—is downplayed (Izvestiya, September 17; Forbes.ru, September 19). Kremlin media dismissed the U.S. approval of a new package of military supplies to Kyiv, including air defense systems, as unable to mitigate the impact of winter on Ukraine’s economy (Izvestiya, September 19). The September 18 signing of the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act coincided precisely with Russia’s pseudo-elections and produced consternation in the Kremlin (Kommersant, September 17). The terse official response called it an “unfriendly act,” and other regime-aligned voices advocated for “military deterrence” and emphasized the People’s Republic of China’s irritation (RBC, September 17; Lenta.ru, September 19). Russia needs to demonstrate that it has a position of strength, but Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will have a weaker hand than ever before in upcoming talks on Ukraine with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly (Vedomosti, September 19).
Installing the new State Duma will not give Putin’s regime any new energy. Whether to enact a new partial mobilization remains a choice between two high-risk options. The Russian public’s tiredness of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine is increasing because of Ukrainian long-distance strikes, and this discontent has found no release in the war-drumming election campaign. International scorn of the quasi-democratic procedure, which was further delegitimized by voting staged on occupied Ukrainian territories, cuts Russia’s democratic credibility down to the level of North Korea, the only other state that is willing to send its soldiers to Russia’s “kill-zone” and defense plants.
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