Executive Summary:

  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on May 29 warned that there would soon be a new Russian large-scale missile/drone strike on Kyiv amid Russia’s intensified nuclear brinkmanship.
  • Moscow’s recent nuclear brinkmanship includes missile tests, military exercises, and another Oreshnik strike near Kyiv. Rather than intimidating European countries, these actions appear to be accelerating regional cooperation on air defense, counter-drone capabilities, and broader nuclear deterrence initiatives.
  • Each day of heavy-casualty and zero-yield attacks on Ukraine degrades Russia’s military capabilities and brings a new package of aid and investment in European defense structures. Each attempt at nuclear blackmail exposes the disarray in Russian elites and society.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned on May 29 that there would be a new Russian large-scale missile/drone strike on Kyiv. This strike is not just probable, but certain to come (Meduza, May 29). It will inflict damage to some apartment blocks and the city infrastructure, of about the same scale as the previous one on May 24, and the one before it on May 14 (Novaya gazeta Europe, May 25). The pattern of Russia’s attacks is well established, with only slight variations in the types of missiles and duration of the waves of incoming drones. This time, however, the Russian leadership is trying to make a threat of particular gravity and has suggested the evacuation of foreign diplomats (Vedomosti, May 29). U.S. and European embassies refused to evacuate, showing their perceptions of the limits of Russia’s capabilities (Forbes.ru, May 28). Moscow has thrown every destructive projectile it can build at the Ukrainian capital. While Russia can count on Ukraine’s depletion of surface-to-air missile stocks, particularly the MIM-104 Patriot, it cannot expect a decline in Ukrainian resilience (Rossiiskaya gazeta, May 29). 

The volume of Russian missile/drone strikes increased only slightly in May compared with April or March. The intensity of Russia’s nuclear brinksmanship, however, has registered an extraordinary surge (Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 19; see EDM, May 26). It started with the test launch of the new heavy intercontinental missile Sarmat, followed by exercises of strategic and non-strategic forces—including on the territory of Belarus—and culminated with a strike on Bila Tserkva—around 80 kilometers (50 miles) to the south of Kyiv—by the intermediate range Oreshnik missile (Current time, May 26).

The spread of these demonstrations of nuclear might was expected to impress various audiences.  Even domestic warmongers, however, were left disheartened (TopWar.ru, May 22). Following Moscow’s nuclear posturing, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called U.S. State Secretary Marco Rubio to draw his attention to the forthcoming strikes on Kyiv (Lenta.ru, May 25; Kommersant, May 26).

In Europe, Russian brinksmanship was closely monitored. The French initiative to expand nuclear deterrence gained new supporters, including Norway, to the scorn of Moscow pundits (Vzglyad, May 29). Greater concerns, however, are focused on the threat from Russian drones, and the hit on an apartment block in Galati, Romania on May 29 illuminated this problem (Rossiiskaya gazeta, May 29). That incident did not constitute a deliberate attack, but each wave of Russian drones targeting Odesa involves high risk of incursions into Romania’s airspace, and the scope of similar security challenges in the Baltic region is even greater (Current time, May 28). Russian electronic and kinetic countermeasures against the Ukrainian drone attacks on the Primorsk and Ust-Luga oil terminals inevitably divert them toward Estonia, Finland, and further westward, so these states are urgently expanding cooperation with Ukraine in anti-drone defenses (The Moscow Times, May 30). Moscow accuses the Baltic states of opening “corridors” for drone attacks and even providing infrastructure for launching them (TopWar.ru; The Moscow Times, May 26).  

Russia cannot respond in kind to these exercises because its ground forces are concentrated on the Ukrainian front, where the course of hostilities has taken a turn in Ukraine’s favor. The mainstream media in Moscow is instructed to ignore these developments (Izvestiya, May 29). The severe effect of Ukrainian middle-strikes on logistics of Russian groupings and supplies to Crimea is impossible to deny, as the shoulders of the key Mariupol–Simferopol road are crowded by burned trucks (Radio Svoboda, May 26; Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 28). Russian command may presently have a better picture of the situation in the battle zones because, during spring, the number of reconnaissance satellites was significantly increased by several launches, including the more modern Angara-1.2 rocket on April 23 (Naked-Science.ru, April 23). The top brass, nevertheless, keeps reporting to the commander-in-chief only what he wants to hear, so Putin continues to assert steady advances of Russian troops (Kommersant, May 30). The failing strategy of slow conquest of the Donbas is therefore maintained, while the negative balance of losses and reinforcements continues to accumulate (Re: Russia, May 25).

The costs of this unworkable strategy are mounting, and discontent in society is deepening accordingly. Among elites, ritual demonstrations of loyalty serve as a thin camouflage for worries about the depth and duration of the economic recession (The Moscow Times, May 27; Levada.ru, May 28). Russian President Vladimir Putin is simultaneously dismissive of changes in public mood and nervous about them, so he persists in the discourse of achieving a clear victory while promising to conclude the war in the near future (Vedomosti, May 29). His propaganda machine trumpets conflicting messages, and selective repression is only spreading angst among top bureaucrats and wealthy entrepreneurs (The Moscow Times, May 30). The lull in peace talks has become an awkward issue, and Putin remains hesitant to signal readiness for meaningful compromises necessary to restart the conversation with Washington (Izvestiya, May 30). He would not want to negotiate with the firmly pro-Ukrainian Europe, but still entertains the proposition that a combination of threats and false promises would erode this solidarity (RIAC, May 21; Novaya gazeta Europe, May 28).

Putin still fancies peace talks from a position of strength and seemingly cannot comprehend the rapid decline into weakness. Each day of heavy-casualty and zero-yield attacks degrades Russia’s military capabilities. Each round of massive strikes on Ukraine brings a new package of aid and investment in European defense structures. Each attempt at nuclear blackmail exposes the disarray in Russian elites and society. Disoriented and fragmented as the society is, and apprehensive and egoistic as the elites are, they have one want in common—bringing the self-destructing war to an end. Standing in the way of this longing is a dangerous stance for Putin, but he has exhausted his arsenal of military means and diplomatic intrigues, while crossing the nuclear threshold is a step too risky for the aging autocrat obsessed with personal safety.

The post Russia Hits Strategic Ceiling With Attacks, Strikes, and Bluffs appeared first on Jamestown.

Leave A Comment