Executive Summary:
- The death of Georgian Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II—whose funeral drew massive crowds of mourners to the streets of Tbilisi—has triggered a succession contest in which factions inside and outside the country are competing to install a favorable candidate.
- Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service issued an unusually direct statement on March 31, accusing Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of attempting to destabilize the Georgian Orthodox Church, signaling the Kremlin’s intent to influence the succession process.
- The outcome of the patriarchal election has become a focal point of domestic and international competition, with its outcome likely to influence Georgia’s political trajectory.
On March 31, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) issued a statement titled “Bartholomew Has Lost His Way in His Arrogance” addressed to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople. The statement accused him of attempting to destabilize the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) (SVR, March 31). This unusually direct intervention comes shortly after the death of Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II, who was buried on March 22 (1tv.ge, March 22). Ilia II had led the GOC since Soviet times. He was elected its primate in 1977 and, over nearly half a century, gained enormous authority and influence in the country. Despite the patriarch himself supporting Georgia’s aspiration toward integration into Western structures such as the European Union, there have always been strong pro-Russian and anti-Western sentiments within the GOC (Civil Georgia, April 25, 2014). His passing marked the end of an era, as for many years he remained one of the most trusted figures in Georgia, surpassing all political leaders in public confidence (see EDM, April 15, 2013, July 16, 2019, March 13, 2024). Russia appears to be signaling its intent to maintain influence over the GOC, which plays a key role in Georgian society and politics.
The head of the press service of the Georgian Patriarchate, Andria Jagmaidze, called any interference in the patriarchal elections “unthinkable and completely impossible” (Interpressnews, March 31). On April 3, however, Georgian Speaker of Parliament Shalva Papuashvili confirmed external interference in the patriarchal elections, blaming local media outlets funded from abroad, stating that these media are carrying out a campaign against certain candidates (Facebook/shpapuashvili, April 3).
About 83–87 percent of Georgia’s population identifies as Orthodox Christians, and the GOC enjoys enormous public support (Caucasus Barometer, June 2020). According to some estimates, more than one million people took to the streets of the capital on March 22 to express their condolences during Ilia II’s funeral, which is nearly a third of the country’s 3.7 million person population (1tv.ge, March 22). The turnout underscores the GOC’s influence and reach in modern Georgia.
This makes it an object of interest to the region’s main geopolitical players. Even though the GOC is one of the oldest in the world and is autocephalous—an independent church not subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)—Moscow’s influence has historically remained noticeable (see EDM, January 11, 2013). Russia, for its part, skilfully uses religious commonality with Georgia to preserve its influence within the GOC and thereby strengthen its influence in Georgia itself.
As local media note, the funeral of Ilia II was largely turned into a politicized, almost partisan event. Organizers barred even former presidents of the country, as well as leaders of opposition parties, from attending. On the day of the funeral, access to the church where the burial ritual took place was granted mainly to public figures loyal to Georgian Dream (Radio Tavisupleba, March 23). Propagandistic sources linked to the ruling party, moreover, attempted to portray the funeral as a demonstration of its strength, and the massive crowds who came to bid farewell to the patriarch as Georgian Dream supporters. In particular, one propagandist wrote that “the funeral of Ilia II was a plebiscite, and the minority—the losers—should analyze that this was the people’s response to European bureaucracy” (Facebook/TVGeorgiantimes1, March 26).
The Patriarchate supported Georgian Dream’s rise to power in 2012 and became its ally thereafter (PONARS Eurasia, October 10, 2021). In return, the church received substantial funding from the state budget and various privileges. During Georgian Dream’s rule, there have been several instances when the positions of the church and the party sharply diverged. For example, in 2018, when the government attempted to legalize cannabis cultivation, the church strongly opposed it, forcing the government to back down (Imedi News, November 2, 2018). Tensions also emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic when restrictions on public gatherings prompted resistance from the church (see EDM, April 21, 2020). Another conflict arose when the idea of granting Orthodoxy the status of a state religion was discussed. The Patriarchate considered such an initiative a threat to the GOC’s interests (see EDM, September 5, 2024).
In 2021, a scandal erupted involving the publication of surveillance materials by Georgian security services targeting high-ranking clergy. This dealt a serious blow to GOC’s authority, as details of the private lives of certain members of the clergy became public (JAM News, September 15, 2021). From these materials, the public also learned about the government’s alleged attempts to remove Ilia II from office in 2017, when his health had deteriorated. The authenticity of these claims, however, could not be definitively verified. Shio Mujiri was subsequently appointed as acting patriarch in 2017 (see EDM, July 16, 2019).
From that time, due to the patriarch’s declining health, Shio Mujiri effectively led the church. After Ilia II’s death, Shio Mujiri is considered one of the top candidates for the position of the new Patriarch of the GOC, who must be elected no later than two months after the death of the previous leader. According to the GOC’s rules, the new patriarch is elected by the Holy Synod of Georgia, a deliberative body representing the highest structures of the church that includes 39 senior hierarchs, including bishops and metropolises of the GOC.
The issue of electing a new Patriarch of the GOC has become a subject of political speculation and intrigue not only within the country but also on the international stage. Shio Mujiri’s appointment as locum tenens, or temporary head, of the Patriarch of Georgia in 2017 is often linked in local media to the involvement of one of the formerly most influential metropolitans of the ROC—Hilarion (Alfeyev), who visited Georgia that year and met with Ilia II on the eve of Shio’s appointment (Civil Georgia, June 23, 2018). Alfeyev served as chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations, was a permanent member of the Holy Synod, and a close associate of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus’. After Alfeyev was removed from these posts in 2022, he was reassigned to Hungary. In 2024, however, he was removed due to a sex scandal (Meduza, June 7, 2022; Lenta.ru, December 27, 2024). He nevertheless attended Ilia II’s funeral on March 22, underscoring Moscow’s interest in the selection of a new Georgian patriarch (Tabula, March 22).
Shio Mujiri—who had never previously spoken out against Russia—addressed these perceptions for the first time after Ilia II’s death. During a religious service on March 25, he referenced Russian Emperor Alexander I’s 1811 abolition of the GOC’s autocephaly (YouTube/@rustavi2official, March 25). By invoking this historical episode, Shio Mujiri sought to distance himself from allegations of pro-Russian sympathies.
Control over the church is a matter of retaining power for Georgian Dream. For Russia, it is a matter of geopolitical interests. At this stage, pro-government media supporting Georgian Dream have already launched a campaign in favor of Shio Mujiri, while simultaneously spreading negative information about his rivals. One pro-government commentator publicly stated on a television program that “anyone who does not withdraw their candidacy in favor of Shio is a traitor,” thereby demonstrating Georgian Dream’s support (Facebook/tabula.ge, March 24). Georgian Dream could still pivot to an alternate or reserve candidate if necessary.
Georgian media have circulated several names as potential candidates for Patriarch of the GOC (Facebook/msofliosaeklesiosiakleni, March 24). According to church rules, there must be three candidates, one of whom will certainly be the locum tenens, Shio Mujiri. Among others, the candidacy of Isaia (Chanturia) is being considered. He is regarded by local theologians as a promising contender and is known for his anti-Russian views.
This situation also highlights a possible miscalculation by the SVR, which has criticized the Ecumenical Patriarch, accusing him of attempting to expand his influence over the GOC. In its statements, the SVR identified two Georgian clergymen as candidates allegedly supported by the Ecumenical Patriarchate (SVR, March 31). The names Russian intelligence cited, however, do not include the candidate widely regarded in Georgia as the true rival to the locum tenens. The SVR claims that the Ecumenical Patriarch seeks to extend his influence over the GOC by exploiting the transitional period in its leadership. According to Russian intelligence, Constantinople is purportedly lobbying for specific candidates for the patriarchal throne, including Metropolitan Abraham (Garmelia) of Western Europe and Metropolitan Grigori (Berbichashvili) of Poti and Khobi (SVR, March 31). Under GOC rules, however, a candidate for the patriarchal throne must be between 40 and 70 years old. Metropolitan Abraham is already 77, therefore ineligible to officially participate in the election (Georgian Patriarchate, accessed 2026). Claims that he has the Ecumenical Patriarch’s support contradict the GOC’s existing rules.
The SVR’s statement addressing the Ecumenical Patriarch’s alleged interference further confirms the Kremlin’s active involvement and direct interest in maintaining and strengthening its influence over the GOC—as well as promoting its favored candidate for the position of Patriarch of Georgia—(Facebook/MIDRussia, March 31). Some GOC clergy have not ruled out Russian interference in the process of electing a new patriarch. For example, Metropolitan Nikoloz (Pachuashvili) of Akhalkalaki, Kumurdo, and Kars, even before the SVR statement, acknowledged the possibility of such interference. According to him, interest in these elections comes from both foreign states and other Orthodox churches (TV Pirveli, March 31).
To underscore its desire to preserve influence in the GOC, Moscow sent former Russian Minister of Culture and Special Presidential Envoy for International Cultural Cooperation Mikhail Shvydkoy to Ilia II’s funeral (Radio Tavisupleba, March 22). The church delegation from the Moscow Patriarchate included 80 people, led by the Patriarchal Exarch of All Belarus, Metropolitan Veniamin (Tupeko) of Minsk and Zaslavl (Radio Tavisupleba, March 22). The Moscow Patriarchate essentially sent a representative of the Belarusian Church, which is legally subordinate to it.
The situation surrounding the election of the new Catholicos-Patriarch of the GOC reflects a deep intersection of religious and geopolitical dynamics in the region. Both Georgian Dream and Moscow seek to maintain influence over the GOC, recognizing that control over its key decisions provides significant political leverage in Georgia. The SVR’s statement against the alleged interference of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I highlights longstanding tensions between the ROC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, particularly following the recognition of the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (see EDM, September 9, 2018). Patriarch Bartholomew’s presence in Tbilisi at Ilia II’s funeral on March 22 alarmed Moscow, which fears renewed ties between Tbilisi and Constantinople. The outcome of this election will determine not only Georgia’s religious stability but also the balance of influence between the West and Russia in the region and the GOC’s future geopolitical direction.
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