Executive Summary:
- In May, the Russian authorities placed Dmitry Semizorov, deputy general director of Uralvagonzavod, Russia’s largest tank manufacturer, and Alexander Gavrilov, general director of the Krasnoyarsk-based Krasmash plant, the sole producer of the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, in pre-trial detention
- Criminal prosecutions of senior executives in the defense-industrial complex (DIC) have intensified in recent months, including cases tied to corruption schemes dating back more than a decade, reflecting a shift in priorities under a wartime economy.
- The arrests of executives at key companies create operational risks for military production, but authorities appear to have deemed this damage acceptable compared to the losses caused by corruption.
- The current wave of arrests does not yet constitute a systemic anti-corruption campaign. Arrests remain selective in nature, serving both as a tool for exerting pressure on defense-industry management and as a means of shifting responsibility for failed programs onto specific individuals.
Russia is continuing to systematically arrest senior managers at some of its largest defense-industrial enterprises in cases that might never have progressed beyond internal departmental investigations just a few years ago. In May, the Russian authorities placed Dmitry Semizorov, deputy general director of Uralvagonzavod, Russia’s largest tank manufacturer, and Alexander Gavrilov, general director of the Krasnoyarsk-based Krasmash plant, the sole producer of the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), in pre-trial detention (Meduza, May 4, 27). The defendants in both cases spent many years working within the defense-industrial sector, and the corruption schemes in question were likely known to investigators long before the arrests took place. In Semizorov’s case, the criminal charges relate to events that occurred a decade ago, suggesting that the case is part of the realignment of priorities in a wartime economy rather than a simple anti-corruption effort.
On May 27, Russian media reported the arrest of Semizorov, the deputy head of Uralvagonzavod, Russia’s largest tank manufacturer. The corporation is part of Rostec, the Kremlin’s massive state-owned defense conglomerate, and has traditionally been regarded as one of the pillars of the Russian defense-industrial complex. The plant is currently responsible for producing and modernizing T-90M Proryv tanks, upgrading T-72B3M tanks, and repairing and refurbishing older armored vehicles. Uralvagonzavod is adapting armored platforms to the realities of modern warfare, including the installation of protection against unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks and precision-guided munitions. Uralvagonzavod plays a critical role in Russia’s war against Ukraine, supplying the Russian Ground Forces and compensating for enormous losses of Russian armored vehicles. Despite sanctions, mass layoffs, and other financial difficulties, Uralvagonzavod continues to deliver batches of tanks. These tanks are often sent to reserve units, used to replenish formations, or deployed directly to the front (Vot Tak, October 10, 2025; EADaily, May 12). Any disruption to the enterprise could have direct operational consequences for the Russian military.
Moscow’s Basmanny District Court arrested Semizorov on charges of embezzling 50–54 million rubles ($671,141–$724,832) during the execution of a state defense contract. Investigators are not accusing him of wrongdoing at his current position. Instead, the alleged embezzlement dates back ten years to when he headed the Central Research Institute for Precision Machine Building (TsNIITochMash) in the Moscow region. According to the Investigative Committee, the institute signed a contract in 2016 for climate-control equipment worth 132 million rubles ($1.77 million), while the actual market value of the equipment was approximately 78 million rubles ($1.05 million). The difference—roughly 54 million rubles ($724,832)—was allegedly cashed out and misappropriated. The scheme, inflating contract prices and siphoning off funds through affiliated entities, is standard in the Russian state procurement system.
It is unusual that the criminal case was opened as early as fall 2025, but Semizorov’s arrest occurred in May of this year. Semizorov denies wrongdoing. His lawyers cite the age of the allegations, his health condition, and his professional achievements in his defense. The court nevertheless imposed the harshest pre-trial measure, emphasizing that the alleged actions posed a threat to the country’s defense capability (Telegram/@kontext_channel, May 28).
This argument by investigators reflects a shift where conduct that previously might have been classified as a crime with limited consequences is now being interpreted as direct damage to national defense capabilities. The fact that the alleged scheme dates back ten years indicates that security services have effectively been given carte blanche to reopen cases regardless of their age. From the standpoint of a wartime economy, the decision may also appear irrational. Removing a senior manager from a key enterprise during a period of peak military production risks disrupting its operations, but the authorities appear to have concluded that this risk is acceptable.
On May 4, reports emerged that a court had ordered Krasmash General Director Alexander Gavrilov held in pre-trial detention (Vedomosti, May 4). Krasmash is a Roscosmos-owned enterprise and the only facility in Russia producing the RS-28 Sarmat ICBM. For years, Russian officials have presented the Sarmat as one of the principal instruments of strategic deterrence, capable of penetrating any missile-defense system. Gavrilov had led the enterprise since 2018, essentially throughout the period of active development and testing of the Sarmat missile. During those years, tens of billions of rubles (hundreds of millions in U.S. dollars) were allocated to the program. Sarmat’s results, however, have been disappointing. Despite statements by Roscosmos head Yuri Borisov in 2023 that the system had entered combat duty, publicly available information points to only one partially successful launch in 2022, along with at least two failed launches accompanied by serious accidents, including the explosion of a missile inside a silo launcher at the Plesetsk test range (RBC, September 1, 2023; UNIAN, November 28, 2025).
On May 12, Russian news reported another Sarmat test launch (BBC News Russian, May 12). On the same day, Russian President Vladimir Putin again said that the Sarmat would enter operational service, indirectly acknowledging that the system had still not been deployed in a standard operational configuration. The new target date for deployment was moved to the end of this year (TASS, May 12).
Gavrilov’s arrest occurred in the week before this development. Formally, the charges concern a 3- million-ruble ($40,268) bribe, an insignificant sum compared to the scale of defense programs worth billions of rubles. According to Krasnoyarsk City Council Deputy Ivan Petrov, investigators continued working on the factory grounds after Gavrilov’s arrest and could uncover additional corruption schemes at Krasmash in the future (NovayaGazeta, May 4).
This case strikes at the reputation of Russia’s entire strategic nuclear triad. The Kremlin intended the Sarmat to replace the aging Voevoda ICBMs and ensure the ability to overcome a potential adversary’s missile defenses. If corruption has permeated the production of this key strategic missile, the entire technological chain comes into question. The consequences of Gavrilov’s arrest may prove more impactful than those of the Semizorov case. The Sarmat is a missile system that requires exceptional manufacturing precision. Gavrilov, a manager who had worked at the enterprise since 2005, takes with him not only informal ties with subcontractors but also an understanding of the true state of production, including, potentially, knowledge of the extent to which corruption has penetrated the enterprise.
Neither case is an isolated incident. On June 9, reports indicated that the Moscow Military Court would hear a case involving two Rosgvardiya generals accused of crimes allegedly committed more than a decade ago, including receiving large bribes in connection with state contracts (Telegram/@ejdailyru, June 9).
The rationale behind these developments is clear. Russia’s transition to a wartime economy has resulted in unprecedented budgetary spending on the defense sector. Under such conditions, losses to corruption cease to be an abstract problem; they are converted into unrepaired equipment and non-functional missile systems, lowering the state’s tolerance for corruption. For many years, schemes involving inflated defense-contract prices existed in a kind of gray zone. The Kremlin and security services largely turned a blind eye if production targets were formally met. This informal arrangement has now broken down because shortages of resources at the front quickly acquire political significance.
At the same time, the current process creates structural problems that Moscow has yet to resolve. First, the arrest of executives and senior managers at defense enterprises during wartime creates operational disruptions. Gavrilov, for example, joined Krasmash in 2005 and accumulated more than two decades of knowledge on technological processes, informal relationships with subcontractors, and vulnerabilities within production. Any successor will require significant time to fully understand these processes. During that period, the Sarmat risks remaining more of an expensive declaration than a genuine instrument of strategic deterrence. Second, replacing top management merely creates a temporary sense of legitimacy without addressing the underlying structural causes. The issue is not individual personalities but rather a system of incentives under which inflating state-contract prices had, for decades, become standard practice throughout the sector.
The current wave of arrests is unlikely to be the last. Further retrospective criminal investigations into contracts from the second half of the 2010s—a period when rearmament programs received substantial funding while oversight remained largely formal—should be expected. Targeted anti-corruption purges within the defense-industrial complex signal “serious intent” to a domestic audience, create a mechanism for exerting pressure on defense-industry management, and allow part of the responsibility for failed programs, such as the Sarmat, to be shifted from systemic shortcomings onto specific individuals. There are currently no grounds, however, to conclude that Russia has embarked on a comprehensive anti-corruption campaign. Rather, what is taking place appears to be a series of selective but increasingly severe measures focused on the most critical sectors of the defense-industrial complex. War is forcing the system to address long-standing vulnerabilities that were previously tolerated. How effectively this will translate into improved military effectiveness remains to be seen.
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