Executive Summary:
- The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) recent restructuring of its space sector illustrates the implementation of its “new-style whole-of-nation system” for innovation, again using the space program as a leading test bed for new approaches to manage high-risk, high-reward investments.
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has announced further integration of its crewed and robotic lunar exploration programs, and set up separate offices to support and regulate the commercial space sector and the deep space exploration and science program. Together, these new offices align the PRC’s space governance with broader CCP priorities to strengthen Party leadership while expanding the role of basic research and market-driven innovation.
- These changes are intended to improve coordination ahead of the PRC’s first attempt at a crewed lunar landing before 2030, while positioning the space sector to be a “pillar” of national economic development. Although the restructuring may improve efficiency, it also creates potential risks in organizational complexity for the PRC. For the United States, it provides some information transparency but also increased competition for leadership.
On April 9, when providing an update on the arrival of its next lunar exploration probe to the Wenchang Launch Center, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) China Manned Space Engineering (CMSE; 中国载人航天工程) office stated that it would deepen the integration of the crewed and robotic lunar missions “in order to leverage the strength of the new-style whole-of-nation system” (为充分发挥新型举国体制优势) (CCTV, April 10). Some western researchers had been anticipating this move. Domestic media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), however, were surprised with CMSE’s casual announcement that it seemed to be absorbing the robotic lunar program, formerly managed by the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA; 国家航天局) (CASI, July 25, 2022; Guancha, April 17). [1]
CMSE provided more detail in a May 23 press conference. In response to Chinese media requests for information, a spokesperson for the office explained that it was integrating existing crewed lunar landing and uncrewed lunar exploration initiatives across three dimensions: missions, resources, and teams. He said that this integrated effort would be designated as the “Lunar Exploration Program” (月球探测工程) (CMSE, May 23). Given that related organizations within the space sector already cooperate, deeper integration in this case most likely refers to joint planning on schedules and resources beyond mission critical systems, such as support systems, similar to NASA’s regrouping for the Artemis Program (NASA, November 15, 2021).
Deeper coordination is logical. The two remaining China Lunar Exploration Program missions are increasingly related to preparations for the PRC’s first attempt at a crewed lunar landing before 2030. The first, Chang’e 7, will launch before the end of 2026, while Chang’e 8 is set to launch before 2029 (CNSA, April 24, 2025; Xinhua, July 13). It is too early, however, to determine if the PRC will set up a new organization under CMSE to coordinate or simply continue the historical leading small group structure (CASI, July 25, 2022). [2]
New Whole-of-Nation System Starts With Space Sector Reorganization
The “new-style whole-of-nation system” is a Party doctrine formalized in 2022 initiating a national mobilization and an institutional framework for long-term competitiveness (CCP Members Net, September 8, 2022; Guangming Daily, September 30, 2022; China Brief, June 16, 2025). Party documents describe it as an initiative led by scientific research and market forces, and flowing multi-directionally among academic, civilian, and military players (Naughton et al., July 2023; People’s Daily, August 23, 2024). [3] To lead implementation of the new innovation system, the CCP also established a new Central Science and Technology Commission (中央科技委员会) (21st Century Business Herald, April 8, 2023). The space sector has been central to this system from its first references in central-level planning documents in advance of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). In 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping credited it for the Chang’e 4 and Chang’e 5 lunar missions, which included the PRC’s first soft landing on the far side of the moon (Beijing Daily, July 15, 2019).
The only similarity between the new and old whole-of-nation innovation efforts is the role of the space sector, which will again be the test bed for developing new mechanisms that reliably manage high-risk, high-reward investments and timelines. A Chinese media commentator argued that nationwide mobilization and investment into science and technology is “the only way” (唯一选项) for the PRC’s crewed lunar program to succeed. As evidence, he cited the U.S. decision in the 1960s to merge the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force rocket programs and establish NASA (Guancha, April 17). The new system is otherwise unlike past efforts, like the “Two Bombs, One Satellite” (两弹一星) program that successfully achieved a limited number of high-priority objectives using technology absorption and reverse engineering. It instead will command resources across the PRC’s now vast economy to go beyond parity in existing technologies and attempt to get ahead in a larger category of emerging sectors (People’s Daily, August 23, 2024). It will emphasize original innovation over incremental innovation, and “curve overtaking” (弯道超车)—blending the best innovation practices with “Chinese characteristics” (Xinhua, June 9, 2014; CCP Members Net, September 8, 2022; China Economic Weekly, April 3, 2023).
Space integration efforts to date have included not just merging the crewed and robotic lunar programs, but also several additional sectoral and organizational changes. After the fourth plenary session of the CCP Central Committee in November 2025, the PRC designated the aerospace sector a “pillar industry” (支柱产业), a historical term for sectors that support national development, usually large upstream or infrastructure-linked industries (People’s Daily, October 23, 2025; CCTV, April 11). This is a significant designation. While space has long been a national strategic priority, it will now underpin the national economy and, like the transportation and petrochemical sectors, will get preferential treatment for longer planning horizons (RAND, June 11). [4]
CMSE has also opened the astronaut program to civilian applicants and designated the Chinese Space Station (CSS) a “national space lab” (国家太空实验室) to enable broader usage and experimentation in space (YouTube/中国新闻社, March 10, 2021; CASI, August 2023; CMSE, January 8). [5] As of Shenzhou-13, which launched in late 2021, six non-PLA astronauts have entered the CSS (CMSE, October 29, 2024; Author research, 2026). A former PLA lab under the CSS also has been redesignated a non-PLA state national lab (CASI, October 2025). [6]
Efforts to support space science are also expanding. In line with the CCP’s formalization of the new system in 2022, Anhui Province, CNSA, and the University of Science and Technology of China accepted China Lunar Exploration Program Chief Designer Wu Weiren’s (吴伟仁) proposal for a Deep Space Exploration Lab (DSEL). This lab will support space science programs like the Tiandu test satellites in lunar orbit and the Tianwen exploration missions, which are currently distinct from the Chang’e program (State Council Information Office [SCIO], February 27, 2022; STDaily, May 28, 2025). The Tianwen program includes Mars exploration, as well as the ongoing Tianwen-2 asteroid sample return mission that is set to return in 2027 (State Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, September 23, 2025).
As a new space organization, DSEL builds on momentum from the Tianwen-1 Mars orbiter and lander that launched at the end of the 13th five-year plan period in 2020. The lab will jointly implement many of the new initiatives outlined in the first “National Mid- and Long-term Plan for Space Science in China (2024–2050)” (国家空间科学中长期发展规划 (2024—2050年)) (CNSA, October 15, 2024; China Brief, November 5, 2024). It will also lead the PRC’s first planned planetary defense mission, announced in the country’s last space white paper (SCIO, January 28, 2022; China Science Daily, September 5, 2025). Wu Weiren and other DSEL leadership have echoed the CCP’s language for a whole-of-nation system. For instance, speeches at the inaugural Deep Space Economy and Industry Development Conference in 2025 referenced collaboration mechanisms like “government leadership + market participation” (政府牵引+市场参与) and “national team + private sector” (国家队+民营) models (China Space News, November 11, 2025).
The PRC has made other sectoral and regulatory adjustments to support the other leading force in the whole-of-nation system: the market. Since State Council guidance opened several strategic sectors to private investment for the first time in 2014, to include space launch and remote sensing, the country’s commercial space sector has steadily grown (SCIO, November 16, 2014). The trend is likely to persist. In 2023, the government designated the commercial space sector a “strategic and emerging industry” (战略性新兴产业)—distinct from a “pillar” industry—which has unlocked state preferential policies and provincial investment (National Development and Reform Commission, December 22, 2023). Chinese regulators define “commercial space projects” (商业航天项目) as those “not included in national or military research plans and not using central government funds” (未列入国家和军队科研计划，未使用中央财政资金) (CNSA, July 16, 2025). To streamline regulation, in late 2025, CNSA announced it had established a Commercial Space Department (国家航天局商业航天司) (Xinhua, November 29, 2025). CNSA’s new director, Shan Zhongde (单忠德), has also echoed the importance of the Party’s new-style whole-of-nation system in recent roundtables with the commercial space sector (People’s Finance News, April 27; Eastmoney, April May 5).
The PRC’s adjusted space program reflects lessons it has learned from the historical and current U.S. space program. For instance, it seems to be following the U.S. model for a first crewed lunar landing with a “whole-of-nation” strategy initially reliant on military astronauts. The first U.S. civilian astronaut to participate in a crewed lunar mission was Harrison “Jack” Schmitt during the last Apollo 17 mission in 1972. Unlike the United States during the space race, however, the PRC is attempting a lunar landing while at the same time growing a strong Earth orbit astronaut program. CMSE plans to host its first international astronaut at the CSS later this year (CMSE, May 23). Its announcement that it is more deeply integrating the crewed and robotic lunar exploration programs may help it focus on lunar orbit, but may indicate possible capacity and safety shortfalls at the CSS. An alternative possibility is that the now six civilian astronauts can take a larger role in CSS management and deepen international science collaboration.
There are opportunities and risks for the United States from this reorganization. One positive is that it brings more clarity to when and where to get relevant information. With CMSE in charge of lunar coordination, it will have a larger speaking role at televised State Council briefings, not only niche CMSE Shenzhou briefings. The PRC’s increasing differentiation of and support for its exploration, science, and commercial space programs, however, may also expand future space competition beyond strategic national programs to commercial and human capital competitiveness.
Coordination, Commercialization, and Securitization Could Signal Further Changes
The PRC’s last significant bureaucratic change to its space program was the creation of CNSA in 1993. At least three signals will likely indicate its next significant space governance reorganization. The first is closer DSEL coordination with CMSE. The PRC plans a crewed Mars mission for the late 2040s (CASI, May 2025). [7] DSEL’s robotic Mars missions will probably need to more deeply align with planning for CMSE’s crewed Mars mission well in advance. Relatedly, to coordinate the ground segment and support DSEL planetary defense mission planning, the CNSA established a new Asteroid Monitoring and Early Warning Research Center (国家航天局小行星监测预警研究中心) in June 2026 (CNSA, July 2). Asteroid early warning is necessary for crews on the Moon and Mars, and the United States in the past considered a crewed asteroid mission (NASA JPL, April 10, 2013).
The second is further commercialization of the CSS. If CNSA’s Commercial Space Department takes on a larger role in facilitating more non-state-owned enterprise commercial participation, that could indicate that the PRC can more quickly commercialize the CSS as an orbital national lab and further compete with the International Space Station’s incremental commercialization plans (U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 17).
The third is subsuming CMSE under the PLA Aerospace Force (ASF). The Central Military Commission (CMC) formalized the ASF in April 2024 as just one of many changes in how the country administers its national space program (China Brief, April 26, 2024, July 11, 2025). Chinese astronauts wear CMC patches, not ASF patches, and a shift would be significant for astronauts in Earth and lunar orbit (Author research, 2026). While the ASF may claim a need for enhanced monitoring in lunar orbit for national security space situational awareness (SSA), this is consistent with global practice (CIA, October 6, 1967, October 7, 2019; Cong Dianwei et al., October 17, 2025). [8] The establishment of a new Lunar Exploration Program probably includes the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s Queqiao lunar communication relay
team, but also potentially the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ distant retrograde orbit (DRO) satellite team. The DRO satellites have a role in lunar navigation, space science, and probably cislunar space SSA (Chinese Academy of Sciences, April 16, 2025). If the DRO satellite team stops being transparent in their scientific progress, this could indicate a larger ASF role.
Conclusion
The CCP’s “new-style whole-of-nation” innovation system extends beyond the national space program, and its success across the various sectors will likely be mixed. The recent establishment of new space program management offices, however, illustrates that this system is more than a slogan, and that the Party is being more proactive. The creation of program offices to provide dedicated support and regulation for the commercial space sector and deep space exploration and science efforts will most likely propel rather than burden those burgeoning sectors. This added clarity and professionalization will also support PRC efforts to build international partnerships. For example, Chang’e 7 will launch with international payloads from Egypt, Bahrain, Italy, Russia, Switzerland, Thailand, and the Hawaii-based International Lunar Observatory Association (Xinhua, April 24, 2024).
The growth of the PRC’s space program has largely maintained a successful track record, with no human casualties and increasingly sophisticated technologies. Its decision to merge the crewed and robotic lunar space programs is probably intended to enable focus and better coordination, but it could also potentially result in an overburdened CMSE and safety culture shortfalls in CSS management.
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency.
Notes
[1] Kristin Burke, Understanding China’s Space Leading Small Groups—The Best Way to Determine the PLA’s Influence (United States Air Force China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), July 2022), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/CASI%20Articles/2022-07-25%20China’s%20Space%20Leading%20Small%20Groups.pdf.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Barry Naughton, Tai Ming Cheung, Siwen Xiao, Yaosheng Xu, and Yujing Yang, “Reorganization of China’s Science and Technology System,” (U.S. Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, July 2023), https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Naughton-et-al-Working-Paper-Reorg-v1-8.22.23.pdf.
[4] Gerard Dipippo, Jonathon Sine, and Benjamin Lenain, “China’s Techno-Industrial Strategy in the Xi Era: Producing under pressure”, (The RAND Corporation, June 12026), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA4000/RRA4012-1/RAND_RRA4012-1.pdf.
[5] Kristin Burke, “Trends That Impact Perceptions of the Chinese Space Program,” (United States Air Force China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), August 2023), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Space/2023-08-28%20Trends%20That%20Impact%20Perceptions%20of%20the%20Chinese%20Space%20Program.pdf.
[6] Matthew Bruzzese, “China’s Defense S&T Key Lab System 2025 Update,” (United States Air Force China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), October 2025), p. 234-238, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/4255775/chinas-defense-st-key-lab-system-2025-update/.
[7] Kristin Burke, “The Real Space Race: China Will Send a Crew to Orbit Mars by 2050,” (United States Air Force China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), May 2025), https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Space/2025-05-05%20The%20Real%20Space%20Race%20China%20Will%20Send%20a%20Crew%20to%20Orbit%20Mars%20by%202050.pdf?ver=5pT8gZsloeqXRiv3F43GnA%3d%3d.
[8] C. Dianwei, W. Yitian, T. Fei and Z. Jiayi, “Review of Classification and Application on Deep Space Surveying and Mapping,” 2025 IEEE 11th International Conference on Control Science and Systems Engineering (ICCSSE), Beijing, China, 2025, pp. 42–48, doi: 10.1109/ICCSSE67426.2025.11552521.
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