In May, American and Nigerian forces collaborated to eliminate Abu Musab al-Minuki, a leader in ISIS and its Nigerian affiliate, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Killing al-Minuki is an important step in both Nigeria’s quest for stability and President Donald Trump’s efforts to expand coordination with the West African state and protect its persecuted Christians.
For America to succeed in its efforts, however, it should recognize that the primary source of instability in Nigeria doesn’t come from ISIS or ISWAP, but from Fulani militias.
The Fulani are a large, predominantly Muslim ethnic group composed mostly of herders who have historically clashed with sedentary, ethnically diverse Christian farmers over agricultural land and what the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom calls “ethnoreligious strife.”
Often without uniforms and driving motorcycles, these herdsmen-turned-terrorists have waged a vicious campaign in the Middle Belt, a multireligious fault line between Nigeria’s Muslim-majority north and Christian-majority south.
Since 2020, an estimated 4,407 Christians have been abducted, primarily by Fulani militants, over twice the number of Muslims abducted in that period. In March 2022, Fulani terrorists orchestrated mass killings and kidnappings across Kaduna, attacking 10 predominantly Christian communities, murdering an estimated 50 civilians and abducting twice as many, including a Catholic priest. In November 2025, Fulani Islamists stormed the Christ Apostolic Church in Kwara State, kidnapping 38 congregants while services were being livestreamed.
In 2023, Fulani militias coordinated a massive assault on approximately 30 Christian villages in Nigeria’s Plateau State days before Christmas. The day is now referred to as “Black Christmas” or the “Plateau State Massacre.” Heavily armed motorcycle gangs marauded from village to village, killing nearly 200 men, women, and children, burning churches and driving tens of thousands from their homes. All while shouting “Allahu Akbar, we will destroy all Christians,” according to eyewitnesses.
The Plateau State Massacre is tragically just one of many incidents of anti-Christian violence. In July 2025, Fulani terrorists stormed a church service in Nigeria’s northwestern Katsina State, where Pastor Emmanuel Na’allah stood at the altar. His sermon was interrupted by gunfire and shouts of “Allahu Akbar” as Na’allah and a congregant were shot to death. A Fulani raid in June 2025 on the overwhelmingly Christian Yelwata village left over 150 dead.
Historically, conflict between Fulani militants and Christian farmers has been ascribed to agricultural disputes. In some cases, this characterization is correct. Predominantly Muslim Fulani herdsmen clash over agricultural land use with predominantly Christian farmers and only a small percentage of Fulani attacks are purely religious in their motivations.
However, the tendency among Western analysts to overemphasize economic factors while ignoring the disproportionate targeting of Christians obscures the religious motivations at play.
Eyewitnesses say assailants regularly invoke jihadist slogans and spare non-Christians in their attacks. These kidnappings and massacres all happened in predominantly Christian villages, often in churches or around major Christian holidays. From the slogans and locations to the timing of attacks, the evidence points to brutality where religious persecution is the real story, not random banditry.
The Trump administration has taken significant steps to protect Nigerian Christians. On December 25, the president ordered airstrikes on a base belonging to Lakurawa, a network of violent extremist groups linked to ISIS, based in the northwest region of Nigeria. While American intelligence claimed success, Fulani militias, the primary perpetrators of this persecution, remain untouched.
Yet, airstrikes may not be the most effective way to target the Fulani militias. Unlike ISIS camps, which are fixed and generally isolated, Fulani fighters are dispersed and embedded among civilian populations. Any air campaign would therefore run the risk of a high civilian casualty rate while delivering minimal strategic return.
Other traditional soft power measures are also less effective on the Fulani. Visa bans, sanctions, or terrorist designations are unlikely to impact a largely agricultural people who aren’t major participants in the global economy. Instead, the United States should place responsibility and accountability where it belongs: on the Nigerian government.
The Nigerian government should be protecting its own citizens, but it is not. Despite escalating violence in the Middle Belt and explicit calls from the United Nations and NGOs to act, the Nigerian government has largely failed to prosecute assailants or respond to attacks. The United States can change that through both incentives and disincentives. Offering Nigerian security forces counterterrorism training, intelligence sharing, and advanced equipment can enhance Abuja’s ability to combat extremism on its own soil. Simultaneously, the United States should reduce the non-humanitarian portion of the $930 million it provides in aid to Nigeria should it continue to allow terrorists to run amok.
The Islamist character of some Fulani militants’ increasingly violent attacks on Christians is unmistakable. Protecting Nigerian Christians will require acknowledging the religious nature of their persecution, not hiding behind materialist explanations for violence.