In the days before the United States and Iran agreed to a nemorandum of understanding that has now disintegrated, the UAE joined Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Gulf states in appealing to Donald Trump to end the war. But Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) monarchs are unlikely to forget that the UAE was the only regional state that had earlier encouraged Israel and the US to pursue attacks on Iran and even actively participated in them while others were struggling to end the conflict.

As the GCC rulers had long predicted, their territories were the main targets of Iranian attacks. In coming years, joint action and cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE will continue when circumstances demand it, but their rivalry is now a fundamental feature of regional politics and will worsen, regardless of a meaningless exchange of friendly messages between two officials on July 21.

Decades of pretense that the GCC states are a cohesive group of like-minded autocracies are misleading. Going back to the nineteenth century, rival families ruling little more than villages were riven by intrafamily disputes, with their leaders killing each other to control the then-scarce resources of the region. This sequence was interrupted when Great Britain fossilized the relationships between them as imperial overlord.

Saudi Arabia was, of course, the exception, but it is barely a century since the Al Saud finally took over Hejaz and established the country along its current borders. Had it not been for British domination of the coastal statelets, there is little doubt that, with the exception of Oman and Yemen, the entire peninsula would now be part of Saudi Arabia.

Relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been tense more often than not. The long-lasting conflict over the Buraimi Oasis was only solved in 1974 when the kingdom recognized the UAE diplomatically. Particularly since the beginning of the twenty-first century, under the leadership of Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), the country has used its massive hydrocarbon export income to increase its power and challenge Saudi dominance of the GCC states and beyond.

As early as 2009, the Emirati leadership considered Saudi Arabia a serious security threat, as revealed in a US Wikileaks cable from that year:

While the UAE pays lip service to the idea of GCC unity, the reality is that Abu Dhabi is deeply skeptical of multilateral approaches particularly on military matter [sic]. And while publicly expressing close ties with Riyadh, the UAE privately regards the Kingdom as its second greatest security threat after Iran (Israel is not on the list).

After King Salman’s advent to the Saudi throne in 2015, his son Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) soon ascended to very senior positions. To become crown prince, he needed support from Washington, which favored the then-incumbent, his cousin Mohammed bin Naif, who had been a close collaborator of US intelligence agencies for decades. The UAE’s influential ambassador Yousef al Otaiba made the change possible by persuading the US authorities to support MBS. For a couple of years, observers generally described the relationship between MBZ and MBS as one of mentor and mentee.

The high point of their cooperation, which was also to be the root of their future divergence, was the blockade of Qatar between 2017 and 2021. Initiated by the Emiratis, it was at first supported by MBS. However, the Saudi-initiated reconciliation with Qatar was imposed on a reluctant UAE by 2021.

By now, the relationship had already significantly deteriorated as a result of this and other issues. Yemen was the first space where their rivalry was visible as early as the summer of 2017, when UAE officials did not hesitate, in private at least, to insult the Saudi leadership.

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE aspire to middle-ranking world power status with international influence. To achieve its targets, Saudi Arabia must develop many sectors in which the UAE is decades ahead, including tourism, entertainment, sports, hospitality, and luxury infrastructure.

The development strategies of the two states are similar if not identical, based on the export of hydrocarbons, a close alliance with the United States and other Global North states, and neoliberal economic policies. Both are designing their economies for a post-oil future on the basis of advanced technologies, tourism, and grandiose projects. Politically, they are both absolute monarchies unwilling to accept any form of challenge, or even any hint of alternative political views, repressing the mildest forms of dissent.

In the long run, the size and financial clout of the Saudi regime are advantages it possesses. The population balance favors the kingdom, three times that of the UAE. Moreover, if we only include nationals of the two countries, disregarding migrant workers, the UAE has barely 10 percent of Saudi Arabia’s population.

The UAE has a much higher per capita income for its nationals and is way ahead of the kingdom in its development model: for example, the Saudis only introduced tourism visas in 2019. The UAE’s strategic geographic position, about halfway between East Asia and Europe, is a major asset for trade and manufacturing.

Disagreements and forms of competition are growing. Taking early advantage of the GCC Free Trade Agreement, the UAE established numerous productive and other enterprises in a series of “free zones,” mostly in Dubai. In July 2021, the Saudi regime ended free trade for outputs from free zones and imposed import tariffs on these products, targeting the UAE, which is most affected.

The same year, it decreed that all major international companies operating in the kingdom must have their HQ there. This prompted more than 660 companies to move to Riyadh, although its living conditions are not yet quite as relaxed as those in Dubai. Various incentives have been provided to support this move.

Although the UAE has a long head start, the Saudis are catching up, largely thanks to two factors: improved standards of entertainment and comfort in the kingdom, alongside the size and scope of potential profits for the companies concerned, which far outstrip anything the UAE can offer. This month, the Financial Times reported systematic delays in financial transfers between the two countries.

Another difference is the UAE’s focus on military interventionism. Since 1990, its forces have been involved in US-led operations in Afghanistan, Somalia, Kosovo, Libya, and Iraq and received the moniker of “little Sparta” from senior US military staff. By contrast, the Saudi military are widely reputed to be little more than a “parade” army. This has been one reason that few Saudi ground troops have been active in the fighting in Yemen, though the UAE suffered significant losses there.

Saudi and Emirati policies toward Russia and China are similar, ignoring the US-led sanctions and embargoes in favor of deepening economic relations. The Saudis pioneered a prisoner exchange between Ukraine and Russia in 2022. They also hosted an international Ukraine conference in August 2023 as well as meetings involving Ukraine, Russia, and the United States in March 2025. However, the UAE has mediated more prisoner exchanges, and the US-sponsored Ukraine-Russia negotiations in late 2025 took place in Abu Dhabi, suggesting that on this front, it is unclear who has Washington’s favor.

In Yemen, the two states were pursuing incompatible policies as early as 2017, and the gap steadily widened until the open breach six months ago. The UAE supports Southern separatists, while the Saudis are in favor of retaining a unified state. A major point of divergence emerged in Sudan when war broke out in 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Hemedti (officially Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo), which have been responsible for horrific massacres.

Saudi Arabia supports the “official” armed forces, while the Emiratis continue actively arming and financing the RSF despite worldwide outrage at their atrocities in Darfur. In 2025, the UAE supported the formation of a RSF parallel government, while the Saudis established a coordinating council with the Burhan government. Following the eruption of the rivalry in Yemen in December 2025, disagreements on Sudan flared up publicly once again.

Tensions are also noticeable around the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia has facilities in Djibouti, whose government expelled the UAE in 2017. The Emiratis then set up a new base in Berbera in the unrecognized state of Somaliland, with additional facilities in Eritrea. Following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, the UAE is now building military facilities inland to facilitate Israeli and US activities in the area.

Meanwhile, the Saudis are deepening their relations with Somalia. They have kept the UAE out of the Red Sea Council, a regional body created in 2020, although it must be said that this remains little more than a paper organization at time of writing.

Differences over oil exports and production first became prominent in 2021, when the Saudis compromised with the Emirati position. However, the UAE went on to leave OPEC on May 1 this year, a move that will deeply affect finances in Saudi Arabia. When the long-term impact of constraints on the Strait of Hormuz are solved, oil prices will drop thanks to a glut and the increase in renewable alternatives.

This context explains why rivalry, even explicit hostility, dominates the relationship between the Saudi Kingdom and the UAE, with their two leaders hardly on speaking terms. As early as late 2022, MBS was said to have told reporters that the UAE “stabbed us in the back,” for which he threatened to retaliate.

Although it is highly unlikely that this situation will lead to lasting armed confrontation between the two states, there is little doubt that the rivalry will intensify and manifest in other situations. There is now a deep split between the UAE and Israel on the one hand and a larger number of states that include Saudi Arabia, other GCC members, and Egypt, alongside Turkey and Pakistan. This is likely to be a feature of regional politics for years to come.

Yemen may remain the most visible litmus test of their relationship, though the Red Sea and surrounding states are also likely to become prominent. As the RSF prepares more atrocities in Sudan, now in Kordofan, the UAE shows no sign of reducing its support. Conflict continues in Yemen, with the Emirati leadership undermining efforts to solve the crisis. The main victims of this rivalry are the people of these countries.