Executive Summary:
- Türkiye is escalating its direct military role in Somalia by deploying F-16 jets and troops to reinforce its largest overseas military base and combat Al-Shabab.
- Ankara is positioning itself as a flexible security alternative to Western and regional powers for African governments seeking to fill expanding security and diplomatic gaps.
- By managing critical infrastructure such as the Mogadishu seaport, Türkiye is expanding its economic footprint and securing influence over vital maritime trade corridors against regional rivals.
On January 30, Türkiye deployed F-16 fighter jets to Somalia. Ankara aimed to protect its growing strategic assets in the country while supporting Mogadishu’s ongoing military campaign against the Al-Shabab militant group (Türkiye Today, January 30). The deployment of advanced aircraft marks a notable escalation in Ankara’s security engagement in Somalia and underscores the importance Türkiye increasingly places on the Horn of Africa within its broader regional security strategy. The move signals a shift in Türkiye’s posture—from one centered on military training, capacity-building and advisory support to a more direct operational role (Zona Militar, February 6). The deployment also comes at a moment of widening geopolitical uncertainty across the Middle East. As tensions surrounding the Iran conflict increasingly spill into the Gulf, drawing in regional powers such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates—both of which maintain extensive political and economic interests across Africa—Ankara may see an opportunity to deepen its influence on the continent, particularly in the Horn of Africa and along the key Red Sea corridor.
In recent years, many African governments have sought to reduce their dependence on traditional Western partners such as France, the United Kingdom and the United States. In turn, a growing number have looked to emerging external actors, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, Türkiye and the Gulf states to fill expanding economic, security and diplomatic gaps. Within this increasingly competitive landscape, Türkiye has sought to distinguish itself from both the PRC and Russia by positioning itself as a more flexible and operationally reliable security partner, particularly for states confronting insurgencies, Islamist militant groups and separatist movements (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 8, 2025). These security challenges are especially acute in regions Ankara has prioritized for engagement, including in the North and the Horn of Africa.
Türkiye occupies a distinct position in Africa’s evolving security landscape. Türkiye’s Africa policy has increasingly centered on a combination of security cooperation, economic engagement and diplomatic outreach, with Ankara positioning itself as a leading voice of the Global South and an alternative partner to both Western and non-Western powers. As a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member, furthermore, it offers military capabilities and training standards associated with the Western alliance while simultaneously demonstrating a willingness to export military equipment with fewer political conditions attached.
One of Türkiye’s primary concerns is strengthening its presence along critical maritime trade routes. Türikiye has focused on expanding its influence over key ports in the Horn of Africa and along the Red Sea, including Somalia’s Mogadishu Port, Sudan’s Suakin Port and several Libyan ports (Horn Review, November 9, 2025; Critical Threats, April 16). Türkiye has also aligned itself with Morocco’s Atlantic Initiative, which aims to provide Sahelian states greater access to the Atlantic Ocean. Together, these efforts reflect Ankara’s broader objective of promoting its logistical reach and power projection capabilities from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic coast of Africa (Observer Researcher Foundation, March 1, 2025). Beyond maritime infrastructure, Türkiye has continued to expand its economic footprint across the continent, particularly in Kenya, Tanzania, and Senegal, through a combination of maritime cooperation and infrastructure investment.
In January 2022, for example, Türkiye provided Kenya with tugboats equipped with firefighting capabilities. These tugboats are intended to expand salvage and harbor operations at Mombasa, the largest port in East Africa (Daily Sabah, January 13, 2022). That same month, the Turkish contractor Yapi Merkezi signed a $1.9-billion contract to construct 368 km (about 229 miles) of electrified standard-gauge railway (SGR) in Tanzania (enr.com, January 7, 2022). In March 2026, the Tanzanian government invited Turkish investors to invest in strategic sectors, including infrastructure, energy, and agriculture, as part of efforts to accelerate economic development and strengthen diplomatic cooperation between the two countries (dailynews.co.tz, March 31). In 2025, during Prime Minister of Senegal Ousmane Sonko’s visit to Turkiye, Turkish Minister of Trade Omer Bolat emphasized that Turkish contractors have completed 39 projects in Senegal worth a total of $2.2 billion, and that the two countries were moving to an annual bilateral trade volume of $1 billion (Türkiye Today, August 10, 2025). Türkiye’s security ties with Somalia offer a potential model for future engagements with these countries.
In 2017, Türkiye opened its largest overseas military base, TURKSOM, in Mogadishu (Al Jazeera, October 1, 2017). Located along the Indian Ocean corridor, the base was established to deepen military and security cooperation with Somalia as Mogadishu continues its long-running campaign against the al-Shabab militant group. TURKSOM has since become a key hub for training and equipping Somali forces, with the capacity to train more than 10,000 soldiers and to provide logistical and operational support (Turkish Minute, August 6, 2025). Türkiye has continued to deepen its security role in Somalia in recent years. In February 2024, Ankara and Mogadishu signed a framework agreement granting Turkish naval forces a 10-year mandate to patrol Somali waters and protect offshore resources, further expanding Türkiye’s military presence along the Horn of Africa and the western Indian Ocean (The Soufan Center, February 29, 2024).
Türkiye has also significantly expanded its military assistance to Mogadishu as Somalia continues its campaign against Al-Shabab. Ankara has supplied Somalia with Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci drones, as well as T129 Atak attack helicopters, enhancing the Somali military’s aerial capabilities (Horn Review, March 23, 2025; Africa Defense Forum, February 4). In parallel, Turkish forces have trained several thousand Somali soldiers—comprising roughly one-third of Somalia’s military personnel—underscoring the scale of Ankara’s security footprint and influence in the country (Middle East Eye, January 29). Türkiye has also reportedly sought to establish an aerospace facility along Somalia’s Indian Ocean coast that would serve as both a satellite launch site and a potential long-range ballistic missile testing center (Somalia Today, July 6). In an apparent effort to secure the site, Türkiye has deployed M48 and M60 Patton main battle tanks to Mogadishu (Garowe Online, February 14). Türkiye has also steadily increased its troop presence in Mogadishu amid setbacks in the Somali government’s campaign against Al-Shabab. Following parliamentary approval in July 2024 authorizing the deployment of up to 2,500 personnel, Turkish forces arrived in Somalia equipped with substantial military hardware as part of a two-year mission (Africa News, August 13, 2024). The deployment underscored Ankara’s commitment to reinforcing Somalia’s security apparatus while deepening implementation of the two countries’ 2024 defense agreement (Military Africa, April 23, 2025).
Access to and influence over key maritime infrastructure has become another area of interest for Ankara. In Somalia, Türkiye has taken a leading role in developing and managing both the Mogadishu airport and seaport—with the latter emerging as one of the region’s most important commercial hubs and the fourth highest-performing port in Africa (Daily Somalia, May 3). Control and management of these assets provide Türkiye with greater leverage along critical maritime corridors, including the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as over major Africa–Middle East trade and supply routes central to the global economy (The Africa Report, October 16, 2025). In doing so, Ankara is positioning itself in strategic spaces traditionally dominated by regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates.
Somalia has emerged as the centerpiece of Ankara’s Africa strategy, with the TURKSOM military base serving as a critical hub for Turkish power projection, defense cooperation and regional influence. Through its growing military and economic investments, Ankara is positioning itself to become a long-term strategic actor in Africa’s evolving security landscape.
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