Executive Summary:
- The just-completed and much-covered “elections” to the Russian State Duma have unsurprisingly produced an even more tightly controlled Russian parliament that will do whatever Russian President Vladimir Putin wants and that he will use to claim legitimacy for his rule.
- Two other less-attended “Russian” elections held at the same time may prove more fateful—the choice of a Russian citizen as president of South Ossetia and the selection via the Internet of an opposition parliament in the Udmurt Republic.
- The first sets the stage for the Russian annexation of that Georgian territory and the second challenges both the Kremlin by creating a legitimate alternative to Moscow’s rule there and opposition groups that do not organize similar bodies in similar wars.
The outcome of Russia’s latest Duma “election” has been as expected. The Kremlin banned opposition figures from taking part, whose presence might have cost the ruling United Russia Party its constitutional majority. As a result, the Kremlin has gotten almost precisely what it sought. The elections resulted in an even more tightly controlled Russian parliament that will rubber-stamp whatever Russian President Vladimir Putin asks for. He will use these results to claim the legitimacy of his regime and overwhelming Russian popular support for his war against Ukraine (e.g., CNN, September 21). Because the Duma vote involved all of Russia and because the Kremlin trumpeted its supposed importance, the just-completed Russian vote unsurprisingly attracted enormous attention both in Russia and abroad. Two other “Russian” elections held at the same time, though they drew far less attention, appear set to prove more fateful. First, a Kremlin-backed Russian citizen was elected as president of South Ossetia, the Georgian breakaway territory Moscow helped wrest from Tbilisi in 2008 (OC Media, September 9; Vot Tak, September 19; Kavkazskiy Uzel, September 20; RITM Eurasia, September 21). Second, an opposition assembly in the Udmurt Republic in Russia’s Middle Volga region was selected via a secure internet channel (Region.Expert, September 18; Udmurtia, accessed September 22). The first sets the stage for Russia’s annexation of South Ossetia, and the second challenges the Kremlin by laying the groundwork for a legitimate alternative to Moscow’s rule there, as well as for opponents of Putin’s rule in emigration who do not move to organize similar bodies in similar ways.
After Putin invaded Georgia in 2008, South Ossetia along with Abkhazia became partially recognized states, controlled, especially in the case of South Ossetia, by Moscow, and have diplomatic relations with only a handful of countries. Many expected Moscow would annex South Ossetia and join it to Russia’s North Ossetian republic just north of the border. That has not happened for at least three reasons. First, international opposition to border changes, including in the South Caucasus, continues (EXO FM, August 7). Second, Moscow wants to deepen its rapprochement with Georgia, a goal that could be compromised if it absorbed one or both breakaway republics (Svobodnaya Pressa, August 8). Third, the Russian government is getting almost everything it wants without the downsides of annexation and the other financial costs of doing so, including having a military base there (Window on Eurasia, June 12, 2024).
In recent months, significant changes appear to have set the stage for eventual annexation (see EDM, June 26). First, the international community, while still officially opposed to annexations, has shown through its response to Moscow’s moves against Ukraine and Donbas that it is not prepared to take action when and if they happen. Second, Georgia, while still opposed to annexation, has fewer choices than it did and might not end its cooperation with Moscow even if Russia annexed South Ossetia. Third, the Russian military base in South Ossetia has become vastly more important for Moscow given that Russia may soon lose its base in Armenia or be forced to reduce its size and capabilities to remain (see EDM, September 8; Window on Eurasia, September 19).
Since his actions began last spring, Putin has been seen as willing to move toward annexation. He signed a far more comprehensive cooperation agreement with Tskhinvali, giving Russia even more control over that republic. He sacked the governor and endorsed Marat Kambolov as his successor, an Ossetian from the north whose entire career has been in the Russian Federation. This is a step the Kremlin had never taken before, and it has now been formalized by the snap election in that republic on September 18 (OC Media, September 9; Vot Tak, September 19). While some observers expect that these moves reflect a desire by Putin only to clean up the increasingly troubled situation in the South Ossetian government, most view them as another step toward annexation. They argue, however, that the move may not be imminent, since Kambolov will have to gain control of the government there (OC Media, September 9).
Moscow and Kambolov may move more quickly toward annexation, especially if Moscow loses its base in Armenia. If so, that by itself would make the vote in South Ossetia more significant than the orchestrated elections in the Russian Federation.
If what is taking place in South Ossetia reflects Kremlin calculations and interests, another electoral development far removed from the North Caucasus does not. That is Udmurtia, a Middle Volga republic with a long history of resisting Moscow from the Russian Civil War to this day (Window on Eurasia, September 14, 2019, August 13, 2023, February 22, 2022). Its tradition in that regard is typically ignored because the republic is small, with only 1.5 million residents, two-thirds of whom are ethnically Russian and only one-fifth are ethnically Udmurt. These Finno-Ugric people are traditionally animist but are now counted by many as Russian Orthodox.
In recent years, Moscow has responded by repressing the Udmurt minority, arresting protesters and driving even more into emigration, where the Udmurts are increasingly active (Window on Eurasia, March 1). Instead of retreating into a narrow nationalism, however, that emigration has retained its internationalist positions. Last year, it reissued its 1990 declaration of sovereignty for all the peoples of the republic (Window on Eurasia, September 21, 2025). Last month, it planned to create an independent national assembly through an election on September 20 (Udmurtia, accessed September 22). That election, organized under the leadership of journalist Andrey Grigoryev, naturally had to be held online using a new internet technology that allows voters to remain anonymous (Region.Expert, September 18; OpaVote, accessed September 22).
Details about the election beyond a report that 10 members were elected to the assembly have not been announced (Facebook/Sergey Antonov, September 21). Still, the very fact that such an election was held to fill such a body represents a serious challenge to Moscow, as well as to émigré groups of ethnic Russians, individual national groups, or a combination of both. For Moscow, the challenge comes from individuals willing to stand as candidates and from the readiness of people both in the republic and in the emigration to vote in an election the Russian government opposes, all the more because it encourages Russians and non-Russians to work together against Moscow. For émigré groups, in turn, the challenge of what the Udmurts have done is almost equally great. Their action calls into question both the claims of groups without such a demonstration of backing to speak for their regions and republics and the unwillingness of many to reach across ethnic lines to seek greater freedom, autonomy, and even independence for their regions. As a result, this “Russian” election may also have a greater impact than the much-ballyhooed one for the new Duma.
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