Executive Summary:
- A new white paper on global governance presents Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy initiative as a bid to reform international governance in its favor. Both the white paper itself and surrounding commentary show that Beijing’s dismissals of claims it seeks to reshape the international system are a red herring.
- The document shows how Beijing sees a route to displacing the United States and the West in the international system runs through global south countries, which it claims to lead, and in particular through harnessing the support of the BRICS countries and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
- Almost half of the document is spent enumerating Beijing’s impressive achievements expanding its global influence over the last decade. Foreign Minister Wang Yi signaled its importance as the PRC seeks to shape the governance of emerging domains such as artificial intelligence, cyberspace, outer space, and other planetary frontier regions.
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is building a new world order. That is the primary takeaway from a new white paper released by the State Council on June 6 (SCIO, June 6). Across nearly 20,000 characters, the document, titled “More Just and Equitable Global Governance: China’s Principles, Proposals and Actions” (构建更加公正合理的全球治理体系：中国的理念、倡议与行动) presents Beijing’s diagnosis of current problems in the international system, repeatedly criticizes the United States and developed countries, sets out its vision for global governance, and attempts to justify why the international community should support its vision at this particular point in time.
The focus of the white paper is Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s “Global Governance Initiative” (GGI; 全球治理倡议). Party insiders describe the GGI as providing “overall top-level design” (统筹顶层设计) for global governance reform, sitting above Beijing’s three other global initiatives and the One Belt One Road initiative (CCTV, June 23). A recent People’s Daily article describes it as a “shining banner guiding the progress of the times” (引领时代前进的光辉旗帜) that Xi has put forward while “standing at the strategic height of the future and destiny of mankind” (站在人类前途命运的战略高度) (People’s Daily, June 19). Commentary surrounding the GGI and the white paper indicate that Beijing is increasingly focused not just on building a narrative around its global leadership but on following through with tangible actions.
Beijing Does, in Fact, Want a New World Order
The white paper itself is careful to emphasize that Beijing does not want to fully overturn the international order. Central to this is a constant reiteration of the foundational importance of the United Nations (UN) as the “core” (核心) of the international system. This is coupled with repeated reassurances. It states twice that there is no need to “set up a new kitchen” (另起炉灶; i.e. start all over), and says that the current system “does not need to be dismantled and rebuilt in full” (不必推倒重来).
This is echoed in some of the surrounding commentary. A scholar at the Central Party School, Wu Zhicheng (吴志成), used similar language in an interview with CCTV. He said that Beijing’s proposal is “neither a complete overthrow of the existing international order nor a move to create a new system outside the current international framework” (中国提出的解决之道并不是对现有国际秩序的推倒重来，也不是在现行国际体系之外另起炉灶) (CCTV, June 23). Two scholars from Fudan University’s School of International Relations and Public Affairs similarly argue that the PRC “does not intend to subvert or replace the existing international order nor to forcibly implement a reform plan that prioritizes one country’s dominance” (不是要颠覆或者替代现有的国际秩序，更不是要强行推行一家独大的改革方案) (Zhang and Shi, June 2026). [1]
There are reasons to be skeptical of these claims. The PRC’s white papers are principally exercises in persuasion. While they are intended to communicate the government’s official position to a domestic audience, their messaging function to the rest of the world is just as important—hence this white paper’s translation into seven additional languages (Xinhua, June 17). [2] Their contents should be treated with care. The most recent white paper, for instance, contains statements that are at best partial truths and at worst falsehoods. For instance, claims that Beijing safeguards the international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regimes are belied by its newfound acceptance of North Korean nuclearization, as well as its own nuclear program, according to the U.S. government (U.S. Mission to Geneva, February 6; China Brief, June 25). Its critique of U.S. violations of international law are equally applicable to the PRC itself. For instance, it is yet to respond to a letter from eight United Nations special rapporteurs that warns the country is likely violating at least 12 international human rights laws that it has ratified (UN OHCHR, April 16; China Brief, May 15).
Another reason for skepticism is that both the white paper and the surrounding commentary do appear to advocate for a new world order. The document’s preface states that the GGI is designed in part to answer the question of “what kind of global governance system to build” (构建什么样的全球治理体系), while further down it argues that the times are calling for a new “model of global governance” (全球治理模式) and repeats the PRC’s commitment to “establishing a new global political and economic order” (建立国际政治经济新秩序) first advocated for in the 1980s. The academic article by Fudan University scholars cited above also says that the GGI is intended to “transcend the Western-centric governance paradigm” (超越了西方中心主义的治理范式) and allow the PRC to “accelerate the construction of governance systems in emerging fields” (快新兴领域治理制度建设).
The notion that the PRC’s proposed system will transcend—that is, replace—the current one is echoed by Fu Xiaoqiang (傅小强), president of the Chinese Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a think tank that is part of the Ministry of State Security. Fu goes on to say that the shift to this system is “an historical inevitability” (历史必然) (CCTV, June 23). More bluntly, a recent op-ed in the South China Morning Post by Henry Huiyao Wang, the president of the Center for China and Globalization who has longstanding ties to the CCP’s united front system, ran with the headline “Trump has buried liberal world order but what comes next could be better” (SCMP, June 1).
Careful language about the government’s precise intentions is an important part of Beijing’s strategy. Building a completely new set of international governance institutions from scratch would be a formidable challenge with a low chance of success. Beijing will not pursue such a course of action: not only does it believe that dealing with current “severe and complex” (严峻复杂) global challenges is a “daunting and arduous task” (任重道远), attempting such a feat would likely alienate the majority of countries whose very support it needs (SCIO, June 6). [3] While it is happy to offer inducements for that support, it is also willing to wield its considerable leverage—as the white paper makes clear, “the world’s prosperity also needs China” (世界的繁荣也需要中国).
The white paper is keen to tout that Beijing is already a leader in many respects. Beyond claiming to “take the lead in practicing true multilateralism” (带头践行真正的多边主义) and arguing that its diplomatic record is a “source of strength for [its] … leadership of global governance in the new era” (为新时代中国 … 引领全球治理提供了力量源泉), it also styles itself as a leader in various other domains, including in scheduling fentanyl-related substances, in multilateral cooperation, in leading the Global South, and in global climate and biodiversity governance. It also claims it understands how to “guide the times” (引领时代) and “guide the direction of change”(引领变革方向). It still manages a level of hauteur, however, admonishing countries “not to be someone who hesitates or procrastinates by waiting and watching” (不做等待观望的犹豫者、懈怠者) and instead to be “someone who struggles and fights unremittingly” (要做自强不息的奋进者、搏击者). Global governance reform, clearly, is not a dinner party.
Conclusion
The latest white paper from the State Council signals that Beijing is making strides in pursuing an incremental approach to building a new world order, largely through the existing institutional framework. The kind of wholesale governance reform it puts forward will take time: it is, as the white paper points out, “an historical process” (一个历史过程) (or as the official English translation puts it more reassuringly, “a “gradual historical process”). Beijing’s dismissals of warnings that it seeks to build a new world order are a red herring. As the impressive tally the white paper’s third section lays out shows, it has already achieved many “remarkable results” (成效显著).
This year will be crucial for assessing Beijing’s continued progress of gaining international influence. A new UN Secretary-General is set to be elected, the G20 summit is coming up in Miami, and, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) laid out in the press conference held to launch the white paper, the PRC seeks to build its influence in a range of areas. These include its regional influence, as it hosts the APEC Leaders’ Informal Meeting later this year; its say over the governance of emerging fields, sustainable development, and industrial and supply chains; and its construction of governance platforms headquartered in the PRC, such as the International Organization of Mediation, the Secretariat of the Agreement on Marine Biodiversity Concerning the Ocean, and the World Data Organization (SCIO, June 17).
An indicator of how central Xi Jinping sees this initiative as a legacy issue for himself, the fall of 2026 will also see an inaugural “Xiong’an Global Governance Forum” held in Xi’s flagship urban construction project just outside Beijing (SCIO, June 17). This will provide a better sense of whether the GGI can match its billing to “provide a compass for the great ship of history to chart its course through turbulent waters” (为历史巨轮穿越风浪前行提供了罗盘), and whether Xi can be the helmsman that he clearly believes himself to be (SCIO, June 6).
Notes
[1] Zhang Ji [张骥] and Shi Xinyi [施欣怡], “The Institutional Logic of Global Governance” [全球治理倡议的制度逻辑] International Relations Studies [国际关系研究] (Shanghai), 2026(1): 35–57.
[2] The seven languages are English, French, Russian, German, Spanish, Arabic, and Japanese. (Given the extent to which the white paper emphasizes the importance of the global south, and Africa in particular, as well as the overrepresentation of the global north in global governance, one might have thought that Swahili, Portuguese, or Bahasa Indonesia translations would be more appropriate than, say, German or Japanese.)
[3] The particular new challenges the white paper highlights are the transition to a climate-resilient future, a deepening digital divide, the misuse of artificial intelligence, intensifying food and energy security risks, and non-traditional security threats.
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