Executive Summary:
- Yerevan has been diversifying and developing a more balanced foreign policy I the past few years, in part through the signing of strategic cooperation agreements with multiple European and Asian countries.
- Armenia’s defeat in the Second Karabakh war in 2020 and the loss of the enclave in 2023, alongside Russia’s failure to live up to its security guarantees during these conflicts, have strained Yerevan and Moscow’s relationship.
- The goal of these new partnerships is not necessarily to end Armenia’s relationship with Russia, but is rather influenced by an evolving regional environment and Russia’s shifting role in the South Caucasus amid its war against Ukraine.
On April 1, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow (Prime Minister of Armenia, April 1). Putin effectively issued an ultimatum to Yerevan, demanding that it choose sides in Armenia’s foreign policy. The warning highlighted Armenia’s dilemma in practicing a balanced foreign policy. A cornerstone of Armenia’s foreign policy of the past few years has been the signing of strategic cooperation agreements with multiple European and Asian countries. The development has been notable given Yerevan’s more traditional reliance on Russia since the early 1990s. Despite efforts to diversify its partners, Yerevan faces limits to how far it can go in balancing its interests.
A key driver behind the shift in Yerevan’s balancing of foreign policy was Armenia’s defeat in the Second Karabakh War in 2020 and the subsequent loss of the enclave in 2023. In Yerevan’s view, Russia failed to provide sufficient security guarantees to Armenia, especially in 2021 and 2022, when its territory came under direct fire from Azerbaijan (Prime Minister of Armenia, September 24, 2023). This pushed Yerevan to reformat its ties with its longtime ally.
As a result, Armenia has increasingly turned toward the West and the East. One of the recent significant developments in Armenia’s partnerships is the strengthening relationship with the United States, including the Charter on Strategic Partnership Between the United States of America and the Republic of Armenia, signed in the final days of former U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration (U.S. Embassy in Armenia, January 15, 2025). Cooperation has continued under U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration and even expanded through the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and agreements signed during U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s visit to Armenia in February (see EDM, February 24, March 25). The most notable of these agreements includes cooperation in defense and security, such as surveillance drones, as well as in the construction of a nuclear power plant and the development of advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence (Prime Minister of Armenia, February 9).
Armenia has also been strengthening ties with the European Union. Initially based on the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, the partnership later included the deployment of the EU Mission to the Armenia–Azerbaijan border (see EDM, March 11, 2024). Relations between Brussels and Yerevan expanded into the EU–Armenia Strategic Agenda in December 2025, signaling deeper political dialogue and further cooperation on the visa liberalization process (European Commission, December 2, 2025). Yerevan will also host the eighth Summit of the European Political Community in May 2026 (Prime Minister of Armenia, April 6). The first EU–Armenia summit will be held alongside the meeting. This meeting will include a discussion on “strengthening bilateral relations in particular connectivity in energy, transport, and digital” alongside the developments in peace, security, and connectivity in the South Caucasus (European Council, March 26).
Cooperation with the European Union goes hand in hand with expanding ties with individual European countries. Among European countries, France is Armenia’s most active supporter. Armenia and France have strengthened their defense partnerships in recent years. For example, in October 2023, France announced its agreement to sign future contracts with Armenia for the delivery of military equipment, and in 2024, France signed a contract with Armenia to sell CAESAR self-propelled howitzers (see EDM, November 6, 2023; Azatutyun, June 18, 2024). Other European countries, such as the Netherlands, Poland, Germany, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom, have also expanded cooperation with Armenia in recent years (U.K. Government, August 28, 2025; Armenpress, February 26). The Greece–Cyprus–Armenia trilateral format, which includes cooperation on defense coordination, training, and consultation on regional security, meets to discuss the three countries’ defense cooperation regularly (Armenian Ministry of Defense, May 10, 2022; Armenpress, December 20, 2024; Armenian Embassy to Greece, April 22). The increasing range in Armenia’s partnerships with Europe indicates a notable shift in the country’s calculus toward the European Union and the West in general as its relations with Russia decline.
Beyond Europe, Armenia has seen expanded cooperation to the east. In August 2025, Armenia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) established a strategic partnership, including commitments to expand cooperation across the political, economic, cultural, and social fields (Prime Minister of Armenia, August 31, 2025). Armenia’s partnership with the PRC is not as close as those of the other two South Caucasus countries, but it serves as a tool for Armenia to tap into growing economic and investment opportunities arising from cooperation with the PRC. Armenia has also increased its ties with Kazakhstan. Kazakh Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev visited Yerevan on April 9. During the visit, he met with Pashinyan, where they discussed enhancing the two countries’ participation in the transport, transit, and trade sectors. During the meeting, they also discussed the implementation of the Roadmap for Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Governments of Kazakhstan and Armenia for 2026–2030 (Kazakhstan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 9).
The value of these various partnerships for Armenia ranges. This effort to diversify and balance Armenia’s foreign policy is one method to reduce reliance on Russia. On paper, Russia remains Armenia’s most potent strategic partner. The two became allies in the 1990s following the fall of the Soviet Union and have extensive bilateral relations in virtually all spheres, particularly in defense. Armenia has yet to make strategic agreements that sufficiently provide concrete security guarantees should a major conflict break out in the region, but Yerevan is taking steps to improve its own security capabilities and diversify its defense partnerships, most recently seen in the new arms deals with the United States.
Armenia’s strategic partnerships are not necessarily an effort to end its strategic partnership with Russia. Rather, they are dictated by a completely new geopolitical environment following its loss of control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the ongoing peace process with Azerbaijan, and Russia’s shifting calculus regarding its evolving alliances in the South Caucasus amid its war against Ukraine. Armenia is nevertheless likely to remain pragmatic and seek stable, mutually beneficial relations with Russia. This also means that the Russian military presence on Armenian soil is unlikely to go away any time soon, as it would undermine Armenia’s commitment to a balanced foreign policy.
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