Executive Summary:
- Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova recently threatened to add Georgia to Moscow’s list of “unfriendly countries” if it were to continue its pursuit of EU accession.
- Russia’s threatened measures include the potential suspension of air travel or the imposition of a stricter visa regime—both measures originally established by Moscow to provide potential leverage, and Moscow has previously weaponized economic ties against Georgia to similar ends.
- Moscow’s warnings align closely with Georgian Dream’s own EU-skeptic narrative, giving the ruling party additional cover to continue its campaign portraying EU accession as economically damaging to Georgia.
On April 16, Russian officials publicly stated that Georgia could face negative consequences if it continues on its path toward EU membership. Official Spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Zakharova said that Moscow may consider measures, including suspending air travel with Georgia and introducing a stricter visa regime (TASS, April 16). Such rhetoric directly concerns Georgia’s prospects of EU integration for the first time. Russia had previously reacted sharply to the possibility of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement (see EDM, November 3, 2009, July 5, 2022). Even after Georgia received EU candidate status, signals from Moscow remained relatively restrained, leading Tbilisi to believe the Kremlin was largely indifferent to the prospect of Georgia’s rapprochement with the European Union. These signals, however, were merely advisory. In April 2025, Zakharova described Georgia’s potential accession to the European Union as a “sovereign matter” for Georgia. She also remarked, ironically, “The crisis phenomena within the European Union are so evident, and their trajectory so predictable, that those who care about their national economies have no business being there” (TASS, April 24, 2025).
Moscow’s focus is shifting toward the European integration of post-Soviet countries. On April 13, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev stated, “It is time for Russia to abandon its tolerant attitude toward its neighboring countries joining the European Union” (Telegram/@medvedev_telegram, April 3). Zakharova’s statement came a few days after Georgian Foreign Minister Maka Botchorishvili emphasized in a parliamentary address that diplomatic relations with Russia are impossible as long as the occupation of Georgian territories continues. At the same time, she confirmed that Georgia does not intend to abandon its course toward European integration and will continue its rapprochement with the European Union (Facebook/parliamentgeo, April 15).
The tools Moscow is prepared to use against Georgia—including restricting air connectivity and cancellation of the simplified visa regime for Georgian citizens—were designed from the outset to serve as instruments of pressure. Russia has repeatedly acted in this way toward Georgia, first pursuing economic engagement and later using it as leverage.
Zakharova also issued a “threat,” stating that Russia might include Georgia on its list of unfriendly countries (TASS, April 16). Such a pressure tactic, however, appears naïve if the Kremlin believes it could affect Georgian society in any way. Russia officially introduced such a list only in 2022, but for many years prior, various surveys and rankings conducted in Russia consistently included Georgia among the countries considered hostile toward Russia. The situation gradually changed, especially after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In February, the Russian National Research Institute for Communications Development (NIIRK) published a 2025 ranking of the “friendliness of communication regimes in post-Soviet countries.” Georgia was included on Russia’s list of “friendly” countries as a “relatively friendly” state (NIIRK; Gruziya Online, February 17). This caused noticeable dissatisfaction in Georgian society, in which many continue to regard Russia as its main adversary.
Before Moscow suddenly began threatening Georgia over its rapprochement with the European Union, it issued similar warnings to Armenia (TASS, April 5). Russia has traditionally considered Armenia as a close partner. The threat of economic sanctions against Armenia can therefore be understood within the context of Moscow’s logic (see EDM, January 18, 2025). Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk stated that if Armenia joined the European Union, Russia would not have air connections with Armenia (TASS, April 5). At the same time, flights between Russia and Armenia have never been suspended. In Armenia, this threat may carry a certain degree of domestic political sensitivity, even if its practical impact remains limited.
In Georgia, there is extensive precedent for air travel restrictions (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 8, 2019). Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision in 2023 to resume air travel with Georgia and to lift visa requirements for Georgian citizens generated significant public outrage among a large portion of Georgia’s population (Eurasianet, May 10, 2023; see EDM, May 10, 25, 2023). Many Georgians remain skeptical of Russian influence and normalized relations given Russia’s continued occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (see EDM, August 25, 2008, June 18, 2014).
The same can be said about the possible introduction of a visa regime for Georgian citizens. Many Georgians have already faced visa restrictions (see EDM, March 30, 2001). The existing visa regime has, in any case, contributed to a clearer separation and to the perception of Russia and Georgia as two distinct states. To some extent, this has been beneficial for Georgia. Periodic economic embargoes imposed by Russia since 2006 encouraged the diversification of the Georgian economy, making it less dependent on Russia over time (see EDM, November 11, 2006, April 2, 2010, August 14, 2015). Georgian Dream has also largely sought to restore economic ties with Russia, which, according to critics, is increasingly leading to renewed dependence on the Russian economy (see EDM, September 11, 2025, January 12). At present, the Kremlin appears prepared to leverage this economic dependence.
The restoration of air connections with Georgia under conditions of international sanctions has more closely aligned with Moscow’s interests than with Tbilisi’s. For isolated Russia, Tbilisi has become, in a sense, one of its “windows to the world,” as well as a channel for expanding its soft power, including through the growing flow of Russian tourists to Georgia (see EDM, February 15, 2024). This has led to increased demand for the Russian language in Georgia. At the same time, however, the Georgian government does not welcome all Russian tourists. Near the end of December 2025, reports emerged of a growing number of Russian citizens being denied entry to Georgia based on the place of birth indicated in their passports, including individuals from occupied territories such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. The Russian Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy in Tbilisi urged its citizens to carefully assess “all circumstances and possible risks” before traveling to Georgia, noting that the actions of Georgian border authorities introduce an element of uncertainty into travel planning (Facebook/RuISEmbSwissGEO, December 30, 2025).
Moscow’s warnings could provide Georgian Dream with additional justification to strengthen its narrative about the possible negative economic consequences of EU accession. Zakharova, in particular, stated that such developments would “naturally affect Georgian producers of mineral water, fruit, wine, and other goods exported to Russia” (TASS, April 16). She also hinted at a possible decline in the flow of Russian tourists to Georgia, warning of potential damage to the country’s tourism industry. Georgian Dream has increasingly sought to convince the public that joining the European Union is no longer a pressing issue for Georgia’s economy, emphasizing that Georgia’s economic growth is already outpacing that of many EU member states (Formula, June 27, 2025).
The Georgian government’s rhetoric aligns with Russia’s, as they regularly accuse Brussels of supporting attempts at a coup d’état in Georgia, undermining sovereignty, imposing foreign values, and threatening the loss of national identity (see EDM, October 7, 2025). Zakharova has used similar formulations, stating that it is not entirely clear to the Russian side how Tbilisi can seek to join an organization whose members “support attempts to organize a coup d’état in Georgia” and impose “alien anti-values” on the Georgian people, thereby forcing them to abandon their culture, identity, and sovereignty (TASS, April 16).
Moscow’s new, more assertive position regarding the rapprochement of post-Soviet countries with the European Union is becoming increasingly evident, which may give Georgian Dream a pretext to intensify its campaign to convince its population about the risks of European integration. Georgian Dream could emphasize the possible economic consequences of strained relations with Russia, similar to the long-standing campaign warning the population about a potential war with Russia in the event of closer ties with NATO (see Perspectives, December 14, 2025).
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