Executive Summary:
- Chișinău’s imposition of new rules on elections, local government, and language in its Gagauz Autonomy is generating a political crisis that extends far beyond the borders of that 100,000-strong Christian Turkic republic along the Ukrainian border in Moldova.
- In addition to Gagauz opposition, including some threats of violent resistance, the breakaway Transnistria republic, fearful it will be next, is mulling a response, and Moscow is exploiting the situation to try to block Moldova’s efforts to join the West.
- Gagauzia is a particularly tempting target for Russian subversion given its location, its complicated history, and its division into four non-contiguous parts. Consequently, any assessment of Moscow’s plans in Eastern Europe needs to include Gagauzia.
Chișinău is imposing new rules on elections, local government, and language in its Gagauz Autonomy. These actions might appear to outsiders as little more than housekeeping moves, but they are creating a political crisis that extends far beyond the borders of that 100,000-strong Christian Turkic republic along the Ukrainian border in Moldova (RITM Eurasia, September 8). In addition to Gagauz opposition, including some threats of violent resistance by leaders there, these latest actions by Chișinău are prompting the better-known breakaway Transnistria republic in northern Moldova, fearful it could be the next target of such actions, to mull possible responses (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 7; RITM Eurasia, September 13). Moscow is both encouraging and exploiting this situation to try to keep Moldova within Russia’s orbit and block Chișinău’s efforts to join the European Union (Cotidianul.md, August 25). While not widely recognized as such, Gagauzia is a particularly tempting target for Russian subversion given its location along the Ukrainian border, its complicated history, and its division into four non-contiguous parts, any one of which could potentially be split off from the rest (see EDM, July 2; Cotidianul.md, August 25). Consequently, any assessment of Moscow’s plans for moves in Eastern Europe as a whole must include Gagauzia.
Gagauzia has been a problem for Chișinău since the end of Soviet times. This Christian Turkic people speak their own language and Russian rather than Moldovan and are mostly pro-Moscow. After first declaring its independence in 1990, Komrat, the Gagauz capital, agreed in 1994 to remain an autonomy within Moldova with a wide range of rights, including the right to go its own way if Chișinău ever joined Romania. Unlike most autonomies in the post-Soviet space, however, the Gagauz did not and do not exist in a single contiguous republic. Instead, four distinct regions are considered part of it based on votes by the population in the 1990s. Moldova is making moves to intensify its control of elections in Gagauz areas by demanding steps such as the adoption of party-list voting in place of single-member majority arrangements, downgrading more than half of the autonomy’s cities and thus limiting local representation, and insisting that any candidate for the head of the republic speak Moldovan and have lived in that region for at least ten years. This makes these moves especially disturbing for the Gagauz who see what is taking place not as some simple move but rather as another step by Chișinău to destroy their autonomy altogether (Cotidianul.md, August 25; RIA Novosti, August 25, 27, 28; Moldova 1, August 27; Radio Moldova, September 16).
Their fears have grown in recent months. The former head of the Gagauz Autonomy is in prison for channeling money from Russia to Gagauz candidates in the last election, leaving the region without its own governor. The autonomy’s parliament has been forced to continue operating even though its mandate ran out a year ago. Moscow propagandists are only too willing to fan both of these issues by drawing comparisons with other situations in the post-Soviet space and noting that some Gagauz now want to have their own national military force to resist what Chișinău is doing, actions they suggest only Russia can help them resist (see EDM, February 29, 2024; Cotidianul.md, August 25; RITM Eurasia, September 8).
Three issues make this development especially worrisome. First, Russia’s attention to Gagauzia is leading many in Chișinău to believe that Moscow is responsible for Gagauz resistance and thus recommit themselves to carrying out the latest reforms without change. This will only make the situation more fraught, given that many Gagauz reactions have local roots even if Moscow is encouraging and exacerbating them. (For background on that, see EDM, February 29, 2024; for a useful discussion of the situation now, see Cotidianul.md, August 25.)
Second, officials in Transnistria worry that what Chișinău is doing in Gagauzia is what the Moldovan authorities plan to do in their Slavic-majority, pro-Moscow breakaway republic. Such attitudes are also pushing them to become more hardline and to look to Moscow for assistance, reinforcing Moldovan views that these attitudes in Gagauzia are the product of Russian actions alone (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 7; RITM Eurasia, September 13).
Third and most worrisome is the possibility that Moscow, given its current course of testing the West’s commitment along its Western borders, might move beyond propaganda and use force covertly or otherwise in either or both of Moldova’s trouble spots, Transnistria and Gagauzia. Analysts in both Russia and Moldova have sketched out possible scenarios. Among the most likely triggers are a decision by Moldova to combine with Romania, something its leaders appear to welcome and that would give Moldova North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership by the backdoor, as it were, and inevitably spark a Gagauz declaration of independence, prompting Moscow to act before membership was formalized. (For background on that, see EDM, April 9, 2024; for recent discussions on these possibilities, see Cotidianul.md, August 25; RITM Eurasia, September 8.)
The possibility of a Russian move into Transnistria has long been discussed, occasionally fanned by sympathetic comments from Moscow officials. Gagauzia may be a more tempting target for compelling reasons. Not only could Russia attack it more easily because it could introduce weapons or forces without having to cross as much Ukrainian territory, but it might be more effective and far less costly in the short term because of Gagauzia’s division into four territorial units, the seizure of any one of which could be portrayed as a victory and would create political problems for Chișinău and the West by itself. The recent Moldovan moves to change election procedures are far more advanced and have sparked far more anger than the situation in Transnistria. Moreover, it would put Russian forces in Ukraine in a much better position to seize Odesa, something the Kremlin would like to do because, without other changes, it would leave Ukraine landlocked and with far less chance to develop independently in the future.
Moldovan officials say that Russia has already taken “hundreds” of Gagauz to Russia to train them for just such a Russian move. Moscow has denied this, but Chișinău has every reason to worry, and some in Gagauzia might welcome it, as Moldova’s pressure on what the Gagauz see as the last remaining elements of their autonomy is under attack (Cotidianul.md, August 25). In many ways, Gagauzia appears to be a far more tempting target for a Russian move than Transnistria or other places where development is more likely, either because of existing NATO membership or because geography would pose more problems for Moscow. At the very least, that autonomy and how both Chișinău and Moscow are acting deserve far closer attention now than what either of them has had lest a Russian move come where no one was looking.
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