Executive Summary:
- Satellite imagery in August showed the Russian military building pontoon crossings and roads around Henichesk and Chongar, two critical land-logistics sites connecting occupied southern Ukraine with Crimea.
- The Kremlin has incorporated industrial assets in occupied Ukraine into its military-industrial system, repurposing factories and other enterprises for military production and ammunition storage.
- Moscow has expanded military repair capacity in occupied Ukraine, mobilizing residents and facilities to restore equipment used by Russian forces in the war in Ukraine. Russia is building and modernizing railways, roads, and ports across occupied Ukraine to strengthen military logistics and connect occupied Ukraine with Russia.
In August, satellite imagery showed the Russian military building new pontoon crossings and access roads around Henichesk and Chongar, two critical land-logistics nodes connecting occupied southern Ukraine with Crimea. They are allegedly aiming to develop alternative routes that could keep military traffic moving if Ukrainian strikes continue to damage currently used bridges (Krym Realii, August 2).
Since 2022, Moscow has worked actively on taking over and reorienting enterprises in occupied territories of Ukraine to serve its military objectives. Russia has either closed or repurposed around 90 percent of industrial facilities in occupied Ukraine. Moscow has repurposed plants including the Stakhanov Railcar Plant, Luhansk Aviation Repair Plant, JSC Pervomaisky Mechanical Plant, and Snizhne Machine-Building Plant. These enterprises produce different types of equipment for railway, aviation, rocket, and space technology such as freight gondola cars, hydraulic motors, fuel control equipment, pumps, and turbine blades for helicopters and attack aircraft (TASS, October 16, 2024; Senat.inform, October 23, 2024; Rozsliduvach, December 26, 2025).
Since 2022, the Rostec state corporation has become a key mechanism through which Moscow incorporates occupied industrial assets into the Russian economy and defense sector (see EDM, November 12, 2025; Ukrinform, December 16, 2025). The Kremlin has also established repair bases for military equipment in the occupied territories and used residents to produce secondary and low-tech military components (Espresso, July 4, 2024).
Russia aims to repurpose industrial capacity to directly support its military. The Kremlin is prioritizing military production over the economic and social needs of the occupied territories. Since 2024, for instance, a reinforced-concrete plant in Berdyansk has produced anti-tank “dragon’s teeth” and other fortification structures. Occupation authorities also converted the former Dormash plant and agricultural-machinery enterprises in Berdyansk, Tokmak, and Melitopol into bases to repair Russian military equipment (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 26, 2024).
The Kremlin has also repurposed Ukrainian mines and underground facilities for ammunition storage and turned machine-building plants into military repair centers. Russian occupation authorities have also reoriented metallurgical factories to produce ammunition casings, and chemical plants to produce explosives (Ukrinform, December 16, 2025). For instance, Moscow now uses the Luhansk Machine-Building Plant and Luhansk Gunpowder Factory to repair armored vehicles, trucks, and artillery systems and store spare parts (Shid.media, July 4, 2025; Rozsliduvach, December 26, 2025). The Kremlin is also using some mines in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to store artillery shells, explosives, and other weapons at considerable depths (Ukrinform, November 27, 2024; Rozsliduvach, December 26, 2025).
Russia has expanded military repair capacity in occupied Crimea in the past year. At the end of 2025, the Russian authorities introduced double pay and extra compensation for Russian workers sent to Crimea under state defense orders to repair weapons and military equipment (Suspilne, November 2, 2025). In October 2025, Russian military personnel in Sevastopol, Crimea, transferred decommissioned trucks and dual-use vehicles to repair bases, where Russian specialists dismantled them for spare parts to restore military equipment deployed in southern Ukraine (Suspilne, October 31, 2025).
Moscow has invested heavily in road and railway infrastructure in the occupied territories of Ukraine to support its military logistics. Since 2023, Russia has spent around $425 million to build and maintain the railway network in occupied Ukraine. Russia aims to build new railway lines away from the front to safely deliver ammunition and military equipment to its troops (ZN,UA, March 27).
The Russian Unified Institute of Spatial Planning has proposed two new railway lines across the occupied territories of Ukraine (Berdyansk24, February 4; Pravda.ru, March 15). One such railway line would follow the existing land corridor to Crimea, running through occupied Mariupol, Berdyansk, and Melitopol, while a second line would connect occupied parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, linking Nova Kakhovka with Komysh-Zoria. Together, the proposed routes would deepen transport connectivity across the occupied territories and create additional links between the Azov coast, southern Ukraine, and Crimea.
Russia is also developing the “Novorossiya” highway network, combining new and modernized roads linking Rostov-on-Don with Mariupol, occupied parts of Zaporizhzhia oblast, and Crimea. Russian authorities plan to complete the highway by 2030 (ZN,UA, March 27). Ukrainian drone attacks have continuously disrupted traffic along the route in 2026, demonstrating its importance to Russian military logistics and its vulnerability to Ukrainian long-range strikes (24th Channel, August 10; TASS, August 16).
Over the past two years, Moscow has been building an additional road near the Henichesk crossing in the occupied part of Kherson oblast to occupied Crimea, developing a transport interchange that could facilitate military logistics (Radio Svoboda, August 1). In the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia oblast, Russian troops have also worked on reconstructing and building a highway on the Tokmak–Lahidne–Zarichne axis to connect the Melitopol and Berdyansk districts, improve military logistics, and ease the load on existing roads (Apostrophe, April 24). Russian occupation authorities also plan to connect Mariupol with Donetsk oblast to transfer military equipment and export grains and metals (Ukrinform, April 15).
Moscow is integrating the occupied ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk into its maritime transport network, deepening their approach channels to accommodate larger vessels (ZN,UA, March 27). Russian forces have used the port in Mariupol as a military logistics hub to transport fuel, military equipment, ammunition, and other supplies for Russian troops, while maintaining repair, fuel-storage, radar, and other support infrastructure there (Informator, June 10). These ports remain vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes, which have damaged infrastructure and constrained their operation as logistics hubs.
Moscow subordinates industrial and transport infrastructure in occupied Ukraine to Russian military needs. By incorporating enterprises into its military-industrial system, expanding repair capacity, and constructing new railway, road, and port links, the Kremlin is building a military rear designed to sustain Russia’s prolonged war and military presence in occupied Ukraine.
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